Atlantic Sentinel

Author: James R. Pritchett

  • Conservatives Learned the Lesson of the 2017 Election

    Boris Johnson
    British foreign secretary Boris Johnson answers questions from reporters at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland, June 18, 2018 (UN/Jean-Marc Ferré)

    Britain’s Conservative Party learned the lesson of the 2017 election, when then-Prime Minister Theresa May lost her majority on the back of some rather limp campaigning.

    This year, under the more charismatic, if perhaps less reliable, Boris Johnson, the Conservatives have been in an optimistic mood, emphasizing hoped-for possibilities of economic, political and social renewal after Brexit.

    The mantra of their campaign was to “get Brexit done” after three years of back-and-forth negotiations with the EU. The calculation was that this would appeal to working-class Labour voters in constituences that want to leave the EU. The exit poll released by the three major broadcasters after polling places closed on Thursday night appears to bear this out. (more…)

  • Conservatives Need to Reevaluate Beliefs After Defeat

    Theresa May James Mattis
    British prime minister Theresa May speaks with American defense secretary James Mattis at Lancaster House in London, England, May 11 (DoD/Jette Carr)

    Given the vote share Labour has accrued in England under Jeremy Corbyn, ideas from Britain’s mid- to late-twentieth century are once again mainstream — and they pose an ideological challenge to the liberal consensus that is in many ways deeper than last year’s vote to leave the EU.

    Thursday’s election saw a one-nation-ish Conservative government face off against the most left-wing Labour Party in generations — both the left-wing elements of their parties, so to speak. The center ground thus shifted to the left, not just between cosmopolitanism and isolationism, but between different appraisals of the role of the state. (more…)

  • Scottish Referendum Raises Questions About Nationhood

    The polls are closed, but that doesn’t mean an end to the Scottish referendum in the news. Even by tomorrow night, there will be plenty more to say (and repeat) on the issue which, either way, will change the United Kingdom — either destroying it or keeping it together with new expectations of devolution among its constituent countries.

    All eyes, it seems, both north, south and abroad, are watching with some dog in the race, either culturally (in the case of the millions of Scots descendants who still claim to be Scottish) or politically. Politicians in Madrid, for example, are no doubt observing with particular interest and wondering how this will all knock on for Spain’s own issues with the Catalans and the Basques.

    Opinions on the matter are as divided in England as they are in Scotland, not just including the Scots living south of the border who have been unable to vote (like Andy Murray, who tweeted his support for independence) but also among the English. Some Conservatives see it as a wonderful opportunity to reduce the voters of the opposition; Scotland was for years a Labour bastion until many Scots felt underwhelmed and even outright betrayed by the policies of New Labour. With a reduced leftist population in a rump United Kingdom, the right-wing Conservatives and United Kingdom Independence Party would gain a larger relative portion of the vote. You’d think David Cameron would be pleased about that at least but credit where it is due — he does seem to genuinely want the union to continue despite the potential opportunities for his own party. (more…)

  • Inevitable Cuts Undermine American-British Partnership

    Robert Gates served both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama as America’s defense secretary. He is a man well versed in defense, considered perhaps even the best Pentagon chief since 1945. Clearly then, here is a man worth listening to when he says that defense spending cuts, taken by the British government, undermine the United Kingdom’s ability to be, in his words, a “full partner” of the United States’.

    He did not say, however, that the relationship between the two countries was at an end, nor that it had even been fundamentally altered, as the BBC’s Jonathan Beale claims. Britain’s prime minister, David Cameron, has pointed out while witnessing some locomotives, his country retains the fourth largest defense expenditure in the world. Nor does it have a constitutional limitation imposed on its use of armed force, such as Japan, or a history of shirking NATO commitments, like France — two other American allies. (more…)

  • Independent Scottish Defense Would Amount to Little

    Britain’s defense secretary, Philip Hammond, made light of Scottish plans for an independent defense on Thursday, arguing in an interview with The Daily Telegraph, “Taking random units and putting them together does not make an army. Half a destroyer would be no use to anyone, neither would be one frigate.” If crude, it is a fair assessment.

    The Scots will vote in a referendum next year about whether they wish to secede from Britain. Opinion polls show there isn’t majority support for independence although the separatist Scottish National Party is by far the dominant political force in the region. It promises to commit £2.5 billion per year to defense if Scottish voters decide to break away from the United Kingdom.

    Paul Cornish, a professor in strategic studies at the University of Exeter, writes in The Daily Telegraph that that’s significantly less than the £3.3 billion that Scotland currently contributes to British defense spending, totaling some £35 billion — which is hardly enough to finance the country’s defense needs as is. (more…)

  • British-Spanish Relations Sour After Gibraltar Incursion

    In part of its ongoing dispute with the Spanish government over the sovereignty status of Gibraltar, Spain’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Federico Trillo-Figueroa, was summoned to the Foreign Office before the weekend for what was undoubtedly a heated exchange.

    The redress was in reaction to a recent naval incident wherein a civilian vessel from Gibraltar was almost seized by the Armada Española and Spanish customs officials, were it not for the intervention of the Royal Gibraltar Police.

    Europe Minister David Lidington explained on Thursday that Britain had “repeatedly made diplomatic protests to Spain over attempts by Spanish state authorities to exercise jurisdiction in British Gibraltar territorial waters.” He condemned Spain’s “provocative incursions” and urged its government “to ensure that they are not repeated.”

    The minister furnished other details of the latest incident, reporting that a Spanish “warship” took a tour of Gibraltar’s territorial waters for some time, followed by the arrival of Spanish customs vessels seeking to intercept the civilian boat. (more…)

  • Argentina’s Claim to Falklands a Travesty

    Of late, the Argentinian government has objected to continued Royal Naval deployments to the British overseas territory of the Falkland Islands which are situated some three hundred miles from Argentina’s coast in the South Atlantic.

    Buenos Aires under President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has since the end of last year made demands and claims over the islands, seeking to take Britain to international arbitration in hopes of gaining support for its case.

    It has, from celebrities including musician Morrissey and the American actor Sean Penn. They have made statements supporting Kirchner’s policy and damning Britain’s possession of the islands as an anachronism.

    Accusations have been made of Britain “militarizing” the issue via deploying “more” naval forces and prominent people, though how the dispatching of the Duke of Cambridge to the islands to learn air-sea rescue methods, or rotating a T-45 destroyer through the Falklands station simply because it was its turn, is “militarizing the issue” does not make sense to anyone aware of the concept of training deployments. (more…)

  • Fortress Under Siege? Gibraltan Sovereignty in Jeopardy

    In Foreign Policy this month, it was hinted that, along with the Falkland Islands, the tiny peninsular of Gibraltar, located on the southernmost tip of the Iberian Peninsula, may become a high-profile case for sovereignty discussion between Britain and a foreign power, in this case, Spain.

    This comes in tandem with a recent increase in tension concerning the aforementioned Falklands and the bid by the Argentine government to take the matter of their sovereignty to the United Nations.

    Gibraltar, nicknamed “The Rock” after the imposing mountain which overlooks its Mediterranean and Atlantic bays, was captured in the early eighteenth century by an Anglo-Dutch force and has been a British naval base ever since. Its position was further codified in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht which ended British involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession, along with formally declaring that a number of territories be ceded to Britain, including several French colonies in North America along with Gibraltar.

    The import of “Gib” in British strategic history was of high order, allowing a base from which to exercise command of the mid Atlantic, plague France and Spain and control the Western Mediterranean. It was a vital post during Britain’s expansion and later dominance of world affairs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

    The recently elected Spanish conservative government under Mariano Rajoy has made an official stance to the effect of a new vitality in the Spanish claim to Gibraltar, stating that it will abandon tripartite talks and ignore Gibraltan input on the issue. Instead, Madrid seeks only to deal with the British government directly, perhaps hoping for a more favorable course. (more…)

  • American, British Navies Explore Carrier Cooperation

    In the first week of January, defense secretaries Philip Hammond and Leon Panetta signed a statement of intent on aircraft carrier cooperation that, according to a Pentagon spokesman, will “provide the basis for the United States to assist the British Royal Navy in developing its next generation of aircraft carriers. This cooperation is a cutting edge example of close allies working together in a time of fiscal austerity to deliver a capability needed to maintain our global military edge.”

    Figuring out exactly what that means in real, physical results is not easy however because, like any NATO allies, and perhaps more than some, the American and British navies are often working together in a number of ways already, from deployments to individual secondments, to war games and other peacetime training exercises.

    Interoperability, then, seems covered by existing practices and furthering of it would seem to suggest more of the same. But the statement really comes into its own when one regards the recent policies of the British Defense Ministry in procurement issues and in retiring systems.

    The October 2010, after the latest Strategic Defense and Security Review had been released, I noted the loss of the Harrier GR9 from the Royal Air Force inventory here at the Atlantic Sentinel which ended over thirty years of British use of the vertical takeoff jet, the first in service being the Royal Navy Sea Harriers in 1978 which saw action in the Falklands War. The construction of the two Queen Elizabeth class carriers remained on the board despite fears that one could be scrapped. It may still be sold.

    With the retirement of the Harrier, the Royal Navy was left with two light aircraft carriers of the Invincible class: Illustrious and Ark Royal — Invincible herself being decommission in 2005 — with nothing to throw off them, but in the SDSR, Ark Royal too was to be immediately retired and currently only Illustrious remains in the role of a helicopter carrier. It is believed she will remain in service until 2014 from which point there will not be a vessel in service with the Royal Navy capable of operating such fixed-wing craft, regardless of the fact that there aren’t any anyway. Considering the Royal Navy was the first to operate aircraft carriers in the First World War, it must certainly be a source of shame and embarrassment for that institution.

    This, however, is not surprising. The loss of the last real aircraft carrier fielded by the Royal Navy, HMS Ark Royal in 1978, was a sign of the future as much as the past. The Royal Navy had been reduced in capabilities (but not commitments) since the mid 1950s. The winds of change at that time clearly blew forth the final touches to the fact that the Royal Navy had been relinquishing its two hundred year position of mastery of the seas, and the responsibility of maintaining their peace, since the Second World War.

    It really hit home in the Suez crisis when the US Navy demonstrated clearly the new formula of the international system, one in which Britain, and subsequently the Royal Navy, was no longer the arbiter of good conduct on the great common of the seas. The US Navy took that role, that capability and that responsibility.

    With the passing of Poseidon’s trident from Britannia to Columbia, the funding also changed hands. It was now the duty of the American taxpayer to finance the world’s largest navy with as many as eight carrier fleets today. Britons could at least sigh in relief that this burden was no longer theirs.

    Yet until the 2010 SDSR, British defense reviews maintained the need for global role aims, despite constant reduction in suitable capabilities. The Falklands war of 1982 is an example of this.

    The 2010 SDSR said it would reduce commitment yet maintained the decision to continue construction of two new carriers, made by the previous administration, which shows a bolstering of capabilities to support commitments necessitating force projection, an about-face compared to previous reviews.

    The point of such aircraft is geared toward projecting power from beyond established force conveying infrastructures such as those found in or close by states willing to provide airstrips and other facilities. This is therefore not something vital to the security of Britain as a state but in protecting established and emerging interests beyond the immediate area, to maintain good conduct at sea and in the littoral — a job, we have already established, that is undertaken by the much larger, much more capable United States Navy. Could this then be a minor reversal of the last sixty years of British decline at sea in favor of the United States Navy’s growing presence?

    In austere economic times as these, even the Department of Defense has considered force reduction, to the happiness of some pundits and observers who too often fail to realize the importance of the United States Navy to maintaining the current international system and the responsibilities of the United States to that system.

    Should the United Kingdom come to assist this task of Atlas, the US Navy would find itself more free to cut down its own forces and perhaps, depending on the burden being taken on by allied forces, reduce the number of its carrier fleets.

    This is not to say that is how things will pan out but the American encouragement of British plans to expand capabilities like force projection and sea basing are surely not done out of the goodness of Secretary Panetta’s heart. The United States will surely benefit from a friendly carrier out doing the same job as the US Navy, especially one operating the same aircraft, speaking the same language, with officers and men who have worked with the United States Navy and with equipment using similar supply chains to the United States Navy and allowing American aircraft to land on a conventional carrier deck.

    Furthermore, it may be wondered if this will involve industry assistance of some kind in the development of the carrier itself, which would seem to be mentioned in the statement, but of what kind is not made clear. Both the new Royal Navy carriers and the next generation of American ones are said to feature electromagnetic catapults. No doubt the sharing of other technologies could be agreed upon to increase interoperability.

    The Royal Navy faces severe challenges in achieving any kind of position from which to lend credible assistance however. In the summer of 2010 it was thought Britain and France could closely integrate aspects of their defense capabilities, including the use of the French carrier Charles De Gaul, an idea that was later rubbished by Liam Fox, then defense secretary, for good reason, Charles De Gaul being a nuclear powered, conventional CATOBAR carrier. The new British carriers will also facilitate catapult assisted takeoff as opposed to the “ski jump” type used on the Invincible class and optimized for aircraft like Harrier.

    For the same reason this could not work, the Royal Navy will struggle to adjust to the new vessels, and hence commitment of the assistance of the United States Navy.

    The Royal Navy has no operational memory of such a large vessel, of orchestrating such large air flight groups, or of operating decks or aircraft compatible with catapult assisted takeoff. The US Navy has, and Royal Air Force pilots will no doubt have to learn from American counterparts in the technical difficulties of landing and taking off from aircraft carriers, as much as Royal Navy servicemen will have to learn from their opposite numbers in American service in handling all aspects of carrier operation.

    This is quite good news as it will be easier to learn from the Americans than any other power with an aircraft carrier, simply by closeness of relationship and by common language. One also suspects the souring of cordiality between Britain and France surrounding eurozone fiscal policies may have played a part in turning to the United States when just last year the French were heralded as the new partner for interoperability and joint training. Defense diplomacy is alive and well.

    Furthermore the Ministry of Defense plans the Royal Air Force to use the F-35C on board the new carriers. Britain is the only Level One designated state involved in the unfortunately slightly troubled Joint Strike Fighter project and, should all creases be ironed out, will benefit greatly from experience of working with the United States, specifically the US Navy which is set to use the same variant.

    The scheduling of aircraft production however may seem slow with the F-35 perhaps entering service in 2020. The Queen Elizabeth is due to enter service at some point around 2016. That leaves her without aircraft for four years which by the standards of things at the moment is perfectly fine and sensible. Eight years then until RAF pilots (and one hopes, one day again, Royal Navy ones) as well as Royal Navy sailors will learn everything they can on American ships about carrier operations and duties. Ample time, considering it only took the Royal Navy two years to develop the first true aircraft carrier (HMS Argus, launched in 1918) from scratch and write at least the first few chapters in the book on modern naval aviation.

    The only problem which remains then, in theory, is the rest of the Royal Navy fleet which has had its other types cut, a number of destroyers and frigates lost along with the amphibious dock landing ship Largs Bay, now HMAS Choules.

    With a smaller fleet the Royal Navy will have a weaker stable with which to create and augment a flotilla based around one of the new carrier. Forming two such flotillas around both of the new British carriers is out of the question so perhaps there again interoperability with the United States Navy, and possibly even the French, will be the expected outcome, should the scenario come about where Britain has to deploy two aircraft carriers at the same time. Should it have to go it alone, the Royal Navy force sent may be at increased risk due to lack of support vessels and have limited capability if specialist vessels like the Bay class are unavailable or too far away for whatever reason.

  • Americans Gives Russia British Trident Numbers

    Recent newspaper reports bring to our attention an intriguing WikiLeaks revelation of American-Russian agreements as part of the New START treaty. The agreement, according to diplomatic cables released by the whistleblowers’ website, detailed plans for the Obama Administration to reveal to the Russians the serial numbers of all Trident D5 missiles which the United States provide to Britain.

    The issue here lays in the policy which Britain pursues with regard to its nuclear forces. The policy relies on ambiguity: officials never disclose the exact numbers of the nuclear arsenal that is held by Britain. One can well imagine why this was part of the New START process as part of its raison d’être is the reduction of delivery vehicles used by both Russia and the United States. By also disclosing the number of American supplied British delivery vehicles, the Obama Administration is making sure to gain Russia’s trust. It would make little sense for the Kremlin to accept American vehicle and warhead reductions, attempt to match them as part of the reduction treaty and yet have to completely ignore those it provides to allies and uses by proxy. (more…)

  • The Future of British Armed Forces

    This is the second part in a series of reports on the effects of Britain’s latest Strategic Defense and Security Review. The first entry focused on the announced changes in strategy. This article discusses the consequences for procurement.

    The cuts on equipment and manpower outlined in the Strategic Defense and Security Review are now clear and months of speculation and worry have been replaced by mixed emotions amongst senior servicemen and their juniors. Depending on one’s position and service, or what one might think of as the key elements of British defense, the news is relieving, bad or terrible.

    Cynics like myself didn’t foresee the RAF losing out so badly, and the Royal Navy still afloat. As mentioned, the Royal Navy will lose 5,000 personnel, according to the SDSR. Each service has taken a serious cut, with an overall defense budget reduction of 8 percent. The aims of the review seem to be at least somewhat in line with the last SDR, as far reshaping of services is concerned. Further steps have been taken to shed the Cold War role, although this is undoubtedly a Treasury, not strategy led review. The future, according to the document, will be a mixed bag of threats from cyber attack, terrorists and failed states.

    The language of the review lacks the optimism of its predecessor, the 1997/1998 SDR. It is also more defensive and yet it maintains some of the ambitions of a global role and the desire to maintain applicable forces capable of international action. The cuts in capability, i.e., materiel of specific kinds for specific duties, may suggest otherwise however. There’s also a designed ruthlessness and relationship to efficiency in the words of the review which, although appealing to the pragmatist, may remain unfulfilled. Promises are made of rigorous tests within procurement and prioritization of what is needed and what is not and value for money in line with high standards and “best equipment for our troops.”

    Much was made in the run-up to the review of a streamlining and modernization process, much in keeping with the kind of ideas expressed by General Sir David Richards. A move away from the “Cold War role” was desired and to some extent, one supposes, achieved. Armored vehicles and self propelled guns — the weapons of a conventional military — have been cut by 40 percent in the new review. This will see a reduction in the number of new, highly effective Challenger II Main Battle Tanks. A lighter role for the Army is predicted and prescribed, with a loss of 7-8,000 personnel. New Chinook helicopters (or perhaps the ones which are on the ground doing nothing) will be brought to play.

    In keeping with the shift from a “Cold War” conventional role and the personnel reductions, the British Army will be withdrawn from Germany in entirety. The SDSR maintains that, in the future Britain will be able to perform one stabilizing mission of brigade level (up to 6,500 men) with maritime and air support as required. This is much smaller than the current commitment to Afghanistan (by approximately 3,000), a commitment which is comparatively minute compared to the American and even former British deployments. General Richards will certainly be pleased with the emphasis on rapidly reacting, lighter forces geared toward interventionist, dare one say, and counterinsurgency roles. Though, too, understandably bitter about the reduction in personnel his service has endured. Longer terms of service in operations, maybe even on the American style one year deployment, are a possibility.

    Better protected land vehicles will replace the present soft skin fleet, presumably due to lessons learned in Afghanistan concerning IEDs. The Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) fleet of armored vehicles will, it seems, come online in the form of the “Scout” ASCOD AFV, Terrier engineer vehicle, and a utility vehicle.

    Unmanned munitions delivery vehicles have been mentioned, along with precision missiles, as alternatives to the destructive capability of heavy armor. Within the Army, it is organization and doctrine which looks to get the best facelift. A restructuring into multirole brigades should increase the ability to act with the right forces, but, with the loss of a whole brigade, will reduce the manpower brought to bear. The likelihood is a slimmer force divided into more capable blocks instead of different brigades being better at different operations. It may not change Army organization as seen in the public eye; regiments and corps being split up or amalgamated is not the necessary repercussion, although never off the cards.

    The review also mentions the repeated mantra of better C3 (command, communication, control ) and ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) but this has been an Army focus for years now.

    The Royal Air Force is to lose the Harrier jump jet, a reliable if old airframe famed for its vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capabilities. It is this which allowed the design of the small “scoop deck” carriers which formed the backbone of the fleet dispatched to the Falklands in the 1982 war. This is a loss of highly versatile air-to-ground capability in favor of keeping the ageing but not-so-versatile Tornado ground attack aircraft and the expansive fleet (300) of Eurofighter Typhoons. The latter aircraft, serving no other use than as an air-to-air interceptor fighter to protect the United Kingdom mainland, has been one of the great tragedies of British defense procurement.

    It is worth noting that the RAF has not shot down an enemy aircraft in combat since the Second World War and, with the situation as it is, is perhaps unlikely to do so again. The “logic” of the review, although renewing emphasis on interventionist low intensity operations does make strides to keep an all round defense; perhaps why these late, overpriced, single role pariahs are to be kept. The RAF stands to lose 5,000 personnel and the costly, outmoded Nimrod reconnaissance craft are to be scrapped. Their maritime role seemingly to be transferred to a derivative of the Lynx helicopter known as Wildcat.

    Some endurances put upon the Royal Navy seem the most unusual. The nuclear deterrent, based on the Trident system, launched from Vanguard class submarines was included in the defense review, although only in by saying that real decisions about it will be delayed for six years. The class, however, will be reduced from four to three boats, with economies of service to be imposed. Deployed missiles and warheads are also to decrease.

    Maritime reconnaissance, as mentioned, will move from fixed-wing to small rotor-wing, carrier-based aircraft and not the American Hawkeye like some of us dared to dream. Also in this department we come across some of the more unusual decisions within the SDSR.

    The Royal Navy fleet is to be reduced by four frigates. Nineteen destroyers and frigates will remain consisting of the Type 45 Anti-Air Destroyer and the Type 23 Frigate, the latter to be replaced eventually by the Type 26, the design of which is still a mystery, although increasingly a smaller, T-45 looking modular vessel is likely. This all leaves a relatively small fleet for global operations which should still provide enough to support a small, relatively weak carrier battle group based on the new CVF Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier.

    For many months, nay, years, the carrier project seemed to be under the sword of Damocles, and yet the SDSR has confirmed it will progress and that both vessels will launch. This fits the kind of strategy the SDSR paints as the future, and follows the facts that modern conflicts have relied on carriers (including Sierra Leone, the Falklands War, and Afghanistan, where over 90 percent of all airstrikes have been carrier-based). It is, however, still likely that the second carrier will be sold.

    One carrier shall be kept in “extended readiness” however which means in store for emergency and not otherwise deployed. The issue of the carriers’ aircraft complement has been solved with robust efficiency. The F-35C, the STOVL version, has been dropped as the frame of choice in favor of the F-35B; the same model to be used by the US Navy. Given the advantages the F-35B has over the other craft, and the problems which have dogged the progress of the STOVL version, this can only be a sensible option. This had meant, however, a reconfiguration of the carrier’s deck to allow catapults and arrestor wires. Again, not a bad thing.

    The only issue here lies in timing. With Harrier, the current at-sea aircraft of the British forces, to be immediately scrapped, there will be no British fast jets at sea until the F-35B enters service as the Joint Strike Fighter at some vague point in the near future. The carriers themselves will enter service in 2020 instead of 2016. The loss of Harrier is coupled with the loss of HMS Ark Royal, to be retired immediately, and the potential loss of HMS Illustrious to leave no power projection capability till 2020 at the earliest. The reconfiguration of the deck will also, it is specifically mentioned, allow interoperability with American and French navies, who will be the only allied people with fast jets anyway. Unmanned vehicles and helicopters are also mentioned as viable alternatives, to be based on Illustrious or Ocean and Invincible.

    Amphibiosity is to be maintained minus one Bay class landing dock. Pending a review of efficiency, HMS Ocean might also be axed. She competes with HMS Illustrious for the role of helicopter carrier, which presumably will also be the fate of HMS Invincible due to the retirement of Harrier.

    The upshot of all this is a general reduction in numbers while attempting to maintain capability (which will perhaps be the epitaph of the British armed forces), particularly the Army and Air Force. On the other hand the Navy has lost most of its capability almost overnight and this is an unusual thing for British defense reviews, which have followed the do the same with less policy since the withdrawal from east of Suez. For many years the Royal Navy, and thus Britain will lack any real ability to project power, even on the feeble basis they had in the post-Falklands navy. This has dire implications for British interests abroad which are usually protected by the Navy’s strike ability. The downscaling of the Army in favor of C3 ISTAR and a greater reliance on technology suggests an acceptance of fourth-generation warfare while still forgetting the necessity of troop numbers in counterinsurgency campaigns. That could be part of the plan though, with politicos and public alike unwilling to venture on such conflicts again.

  • Britain Unveils New Defense Strategy

    This is the first part in a series of reports on the effects of Britain’s latest Strategic Defense and Security Review. This part focuses on the announced changes in strategy. The second entry discusses the consequences for procurement.

    Britain’s Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) has now been published and, depending on whom you are, it’s either as bad or not quite so bad as you had feared. In fact the only people who may see benefit in changes planned in the SDSR are the Treasury, having managed to cut 8 percent of the budget for defense.

    The headline grabbing details include a loss of 5,000 personnel for both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The Army will lose even more, 7,000 to bring the numbers of soldiers from all arms and services to 95,000. Defense projects will be scrapped, along with a number of fleets of vehicles, including the iconic Harrier jump jet of Falklands War fame. Against much expectation, the two CVF aircraft carriers will be built but one may be sold.

    Each of the services is expected to suffer in terms of materiel and manpower, as is the Ministry of Defense, the political body which, in part, directs British strategy and security policy. However, procurement issues aren’t strategy; they are the visible results of changes within the system which mean either a reorganization based on strategic nuances or, in this case, economic weakness. In this article we hope to take a look at what the cuts are, what they mean for each service, and how they effect or are informed by strategic issues.

    Firstly we must examine the parts of the SDSR which aren’t attracting headlines. The strategy parts. The SDSR is informed by the National Security Risk Assessment, among other documents. The former points to the following as the major concerns for the British state: terrorism; instability and conflict overseas; cyber security; givil emergencies; energy security; organized crime; border security; counterproliferation and arms control.

    Energy security was hinted at during the SDR of 1997/1998, although cyber security is a new addition and has produced some alarmism in the media concerning “cyber terrorism” and also attacks of such a nature by other states. Cyber warfare, or rather, cyber methods within defense, have been used recently by both Russia and China and have caused some understandable concern within the administrations of the West. Operation Titan Rain, the Ukranian server crash, and some others have pointed out the vulnerability of states to these tools. The intention from this is to establish a counter cyberterrorism group.

    The rest of the SDSR seems to be more of the same as last time, but with rather less emphasis on an ethical foreign policy lead strategy. The harsh economic times seemed to have instilled a pragmatism which was not evident last time in the SDR. Because of this, campaigns outside that of a purely British interest flourished in places like Sierra Leone, Kosovo and more.

    The residual terrorist threat in Northern Ireland gets a mention, as do intelligence matters surrounding Islamic terrorism from both domestic and foreign sources. As expected.

    Of particular interest are the chapters concerning alliances and partnerships. There has been much speculation on this matter. Some hypothesized that Britain and France would enter into a surprisingly close defense partnership, perhaps including the sharing of an aircraft carrier. In the SDSR we see the results of these, and other, concepts concerning Britain’s alliances of the day.

    As has been the same since the 1950s, NATO forms a large part of British defense policy, as outlined in the SDSR, and is described as the bedrock, in fact. A continued close alliance with the United States is another continuing and unsurprising theme, though the reductions in spending and capability suggest an even greater asymmetry between the world’s preeminent military power and the United Kingdom. Interestingly there is a greater emphasis on European power features. An outward facing EU, willing to get to grips with global issues seems to be a desired element of British defense policy, much in keeping with the concept of working closely with the United States with the hope of directing American power in support of British aims, which has often worked in the past due to such close similarities in views. In the EU, where Britain has a greater say, the prospects of utilizing European power are even greater.

    Working closer with France and the Americans seems the order of the day. In the hard world of practice, a greater need for multilateral action and alliance may develop and this is well catered for in the review, with emphasis on allied operations.

    There are details concerning interoperability with the French, also, which include the development of Franco-British military doctrine and training programs. Greater logistical support based on the A400M airlift project is mentioned, suggesting the possibility of an amalgamated though not shared airlift fleet. The development of an integrated military industrial complex is also worth much attention. It certainly means a continuation in European based defense projects, with more jobs based in the United Kingdom and France for manufacture, and more homegrown capability. This is in keeping with much of the SDSR and the headlines which follow it.

    The knock on effect of the cuts and cancelations on British jobs, especially those in BAE, have been noted in the media — although this particular reference to developing a shared industrial and technological base with France will mean at least a continued position for British war related industries. What the results will be may include more shared systems development, such as how Eurofighter was built in league with an alliance of EU member states. It will not be surprising, therefore, to see more systems developed in league with the French to replace existing independent ones. Vehicles of all variety, small arms and so on may be developed from this to be used by both French and British armed forces for both ease in cost and interoperability. However, the history of shared defense projects is one which does not inspire confidence.

    This brings us neatly on to materiel. The impact on British jobs could be seen as a sign of progress. Traditionally British defense capability has been marred by the intense and unpragmatic desire to develop equipment within the British Isles, much of it of a questionable quality, invariably late and almost certainly costing considerably more than previously expected. Even equipment bought in from the United States is often modified to comply with MOD specifications, at great cost, or to fit EU regulations, again at cost — a prime example being the Boeing Chinook debacle. This mindset has led to such unfortunate incidents as the 1990s example of amphibious vessels wherein the construction of such assault ships was seen as an opportunity for social regeneration and an attempt was made to build vessels on the river Tyne, where ships have not been built in decades. This effort failed miserably due to the lack of skilled workforce. The idea of putting the construction of important weapons in the hands of provincial politicians so that they may garner favor through the provision of jobs only works when the people have the skills to do so and is one of the sad tales of British procurement.

    Working closer with allies will also mean a smaller burden (depending on how you look at it, perhaps) on the British armed forces, though there are certainly issues around operational sovereignty. At current it seems unlikely that Britain could individually mount an operation similar to that in the 1982 Falklands War or even Sierra Leone. After the cuts this will certainly be the case for a few years and even then, with greater reliance on the French and/or Americans, such an operation may be even less likely as political and military action would be dependent on their support.

  • The Strainful Relationship: Where’s the Beginning and the End?

    David Cameron, in The Wall Street Journal recently observed that the constant quibbling and worrying over the “special relationship” is a curious pastime among British observers, journalists and the man in the street. Cameron divides these worry merchants up into three camps which seem quite accurate and I admit to being, on occasion, guilty of all of them. However, as Sir Christopher Meyer, former ambassador to the United States, recently reminded viewers at the Royal United Services Insitute, the relationship with the United States is the biggest challenge that the British diplomatic service, and indeed, British policy faces.

    Cameron, like his predecessors, has failed to say what this special relationship consists of apart from vague reference to a list of happy coincidences and events which seem to be now of questionable importance. Numbering among them are: a shared doctrine on trade (some of the time); somewhat frequent cooperation in international institutions and also outside of them. Apart from that it’s hard to think of anything meaningful or worth entertaining as anything other than a cultural token viz “standing shoulder to shoulder against fascism” and other well known extracts from your school history lessons. Common language and culture to a good degree also go a long way to make many see the United States as the natural closest friend that Britain’s got, and even vice versa. (more…)

  • A400M and the Politics of Aircraft Design

    The International Air Tattoo at Farnborough in Gloucestershire is one of the largest and prestigious events in the aerospace world. It gives pilots a chance to show their abilities in the skies to an appreciative audience, but its major purpose is as a show for various companies to drum up support and interest for their latest projects.

    At the Waddington Airshow a few months ago I myself got to wander around the hangers in which the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) companies had set up and were giving away litriature and answering questions to journalists, members of the public and passing foreign dignitaries. GlobalHawk were even there who provide their GlobalHawk surveillance UAV to the Americans and the Germans. In the hanger, companies like BAE and Northrop Grumman present alongside smaller ones and even university departments whose young engineers were there showing their achievements in the field and no doubt looking for jobs.

    These events are thus an important if not major process in securing contracts with the forces to which these companies provide. At Farnborough it is no different, but on a larger scale, with some of the most awaited projects making their debuts. This year it was the A400M which had the crowds craning their necks in anticipation. They’ve all seen F-16s and Super Hornets before, even the Harrier’s begining to lose its relative splendor. (more…)

  • The Current Problem in the Falklands

    In 1982 the Buenos Aires government under General Galtieri invaded the Falkland Islands off the south coast of Argentina with a force of several thousand soldiers, overwhelming the garrison of Royal Marines stationed on the island. On the same day the Royal Navy was ordered to assemble a task force to reclaim the Falklands by force. The history of the conflict can be found in many books but despite a British victory exacting over six hundred Argentine lives the causes of the war persist to this day, at least in Argentina.

    The claim to the Falkland Islands (or Malvinas as they are known to Argentinians) is one of proximity and historical claim; i.e., that they are much nearer to the Argentina than they are to Britain. Secondly Argentina, after gaining independence from Spain, sent a ship to use the islands as a penal colony. This was never accomplished due to a mutiny aboard the vessel. In 1833 a British force arrived and claimed the desolate islands. They have since seen the establishment of settlements, from which grew the current population of Falkland islanders. In the minds of Argentinians however, the islands are “rightfully” theirs. (more…)