What was a Yemeni replica of the peaceful demonstrations that had been occurring throughout the Middle East this year turned into a deadly internal conflict last month that is edging closer to an all out civil war.

The crossover occurred two weeks ago when Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of Yemen, rejected for the third time a peace proposal mediated by the Gulf Cooperation Council that would have rewarded him with immunity for stepping down. The country’s most powerful tribal confederation, the Hashid (which Saleh’s own tribe is a part of) finally decided that enough is enough. With the blessing of the tribe’s leaders, also Yemen’s wealthiest businessmen, Hashid fighters have begun attacking Saleh’s government with live ammunition.

The battles between Saleh’s security forces and Hashid insurgents have plunged the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, into a state of desperation. Over two hundred people have been killed over the last week of fighting alone with both sides registering casualties. Hundreds of Yemeni families are gathering up their belongings and heading out of the capital city toward towns in the periphery which are experiencing problems of their own.

In a bid to consolidate his authority and eliminate his strongest political rivals, Saleh’s military rained mortars and rockets onto the Hashid leadership compound. None of them were killed though the attack highlighted the steps that Saleh was willing to take to kill his opponents and silence dissent.

The military operation only worsened the situation however. Rather than cow down, tribal fighters approved a retaliatory strike by shelling the president’s palace residence in the heart of the city. Saleh, his prime minister and the speaker of the Yemeni parliament were all injured in the attack. Seven guardsmen were killed and the violence got so out of hand that the White House and American State Department released a statement calling for all sides in the conflict to stand down and implement another ceasefire.

Luckily for the United States, Saleh was not killed in the shelling. For if he was, the administration would have been forced to recraft its Yemen policy virtually overnight.

Washington may be distancing itself from its onetime ally and asking the president to lead a peaceful transition but the death of Saleh would have been a catastrophic blow to the American position. Counterterrorism is America’s top priority in Yemen even if the safety, security and prosperity of the Yemeni people happen to concern the United States as well. Economic reconstruction and the development of strong and resilient governing institutions in Yemen is one way President Barack Obama has attempted to stem the pool of terrorist recruits in the bud. Unfortunately, that strategy has hinged on the hope that Saleh would act responsibly and use his power to bring about political reforms. In the record of the past four months, indeed of the past decade, it is evident that improving the lives of Yemeni citizens is not on Saleh’s “to do list.” Any foreign assistance that is diverted away from the military would strain the patronage network that Saleh has depended on for the past three decades.

The problem for American policy in Yemen is its lack of depth and clarity. Fighting terrorism and preventing extremism from proliferating in Yemen has been the central focus for the past ten years. Supporting Saleh to the hilt, even as the 65 year-old president detained human rights activists and terrorized religious minorities, was a far easier way for the United States to bring this about rather than addressing Yemen’s root insecurities. Building schools, fostering political participation, diversifying Yemen’s economy and redesigning its political structure would take years, if not decades, to achieve. Training Saleh’s army and hoping that they would take the fight to Al Qaeda, on the other hand, is a quicker way of frustrating the terrorists’ plans.

Yemen policy since 9/11 has been to promote a short-term fix to a terrorist threat that has longevity. Indeed in Yemen, extremism is generational, with former Arab resistance fighters telling their children stories about the 1980s Afghan jihad. Their lessons are passed on to grandchildren, creating another wave of recruits for the radical Islamist cause.

Saleh is, or was, an integral part of America’s fix against terrorism in Yemen. Yet his history of combating jihadists is spotty at best. During the 1994 Yemeni civil war, Saleh’s regime enlisted Salafi extremists to fight southern secessionists, to deadly effect. The Yemeni leader has also been known to hype the Al Qaeda threat in the hopes of extracting more money from the United States and the international community.

Saleh’s near-death experience should serve as a warning to American officials. It is time to look to the future. Sooner rather than later, Saleh will be gone and Yemen’s various power centers will begin competing among themselves for a spot in the new government. That new leadership may or may not have the gumption to thoroughly pluck away at Yemen’s multiple problems. Even if there is dedication, Yemen’s fumbling economy assures that these new leaders won’t have the resources to do the job effectively.

Washington has money but not the dedication. Dedication will only come if a new strategy for Yemen is devised, one that is geared toward helping the Yemeni people rather than aiding the Yemeni regime. A post-Saleh Yemen could be a fresh start for both.

If you thought Ali Abdullah Saleh was on the ropes when he had just the Yemeni demonstrators to deal with, think again. The United States, Saleh’s most important financial and military donor outside of Saudi Arabia, are now edging ever closer to the opposition. And if rumors are correct, Obama Administration officials are in modest talks with the Yemeni government and the political opposition to ease Saleh out of power, for good.

Although Yemen is distinct from other Arab states (tribes are vastly more important than the central government and the state is riddled with weapons), one cannot help but compare this latest shift in American policy to the hasty response during the Egyptian protests two months ago. Read more “Yemen’s Saleh Following in Mubarak’s Footsteps”

With the world rightly focused on the international airstrikes over Libya (that campaign, at least tactically, is promising in the early stages), Yemen is inching ever closer to a full-blown civil war.

The civil war scenario sounds dramatic but in a country as poor, illiterate, and tribal as Yemen is — and with most Yemeni civilians carrying firearms themselves — the prospect of such a conflict is not altogether implausible.

Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, a staunch American ally against the Al Qaeda offshoot in his country, has been pressured on all fronts over the past month to relinquish power after 32 years. Up until this past Friday, the protests were more of a sideshow for Saleh than an actual threat — the president and his family, mastered in the tactics of consolidating authority, have dealt with demonstrations before, to no avail. But the show has now collapsed and quickly transformed into the very threat that Saleh hoped would never materialize. And the instigators of that transformation were none other than his own security forces and loyalists, who shot and killed 52 demonstrators in cold blood on a single day.

Since that incident, Saleh’s government has virtually collapsed amid a significant amount of defections and resignations.

On Sunday, Saleh fired his presidential cabinet in a bid to shake up the power structure and get new blood into his palace. The top general of Yemen’s armed forces, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, relinquished his post and threw his support behind the protest movement a day later. Over half of Yemen’s foreign diplomatic core, including the Yemeni ambassadors to the Arab League and the United Nations, have followed suit, demanding that Saleh step down before further blood is shed.

Perhaps the most significant, at least symbolically, of the resignations came when the leader of the Hashid tribe, Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar, decided to cast his lot with the opposition. Saleh is a member of the Hashid tribe, so losing support from within his traditional base is not necessarily positive for his future.

Where does this leave Yemen now? The easy answer is that it is too soon to tell. Saleh still retains the allegiance of his son Ahmed, who commands the most professional and capable of Yemen’s security forces, and all of his nephews, who hold positions of authority.

The Republican Guard, under the command of Ahmed Saleh, stands outside the presidential palace in a clear and overt exhibit of support for his father. On the other side of the street, General Ahmar and his battalions are standing with the opposition, ready to protect Yemeni civilians if necessary. Indeed, there have already been reports of violence between the two, with one dead and three more injured.

Once again, America finds itself enclosed in a tight box. Saleh, despite all of his excesses and abuses, has been Washington’s central ally against terrorism. Yemen is home to the most active Al Qaeda franchise in the world, with an English-speaking cleric named Anwar al-Awlaki taking over Osama bin Laden’s place as the organizations most public and charismatic figure. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been poured into Saleh’s security services in the hopes of taking the fight to the enemy. American drones have been partnering with the Yemeni government over the last year, flying reconnaissance missions and bombing terrorist hideouts when necessary.

In short, the United States are heavily invested in the continuation of Saleh’s rule. But with protests strengthening in the capital and across the country, that investment is now looking like an exceedingly poor one.

So while the United States should continue to stay on the sidelines as the Yemeni people demand their legitimate political rights, they should also make sure that the violence is kept to a minimum. Another fifty people killed by Yemen’s security forces or by the opposition is a sure receipt for long-term disaster — a disaster that the region certainly doesn’t need right now.

Luckily, Washington has contacts on both sides of the divide, with Saleh representing the government and General Ahmar representing the opposition. Both men have been heavily involved in Yemen’s counterterrorism effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and both have profited from America’s (and the international community’s) bank account.

Using these relationships, however difficult, could be a promising way to avoid the possibility of further conflict. Stalling a civil war must be the world’s primary objective in Yemen, above that of killing Awlaki and any other short-term objectives. A Yemen in chaos does nothing to help the fight against terrorism, nor does it create an environment conductive to the one thing that millions of Yemenis have been working toward — democracy.