Although Europe is a union now, from the American perspective, little has changed since the 1970s when, as President Richard Nixon’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger complained that he didn’t ever know whom to call when he needed to consult “Europe.” At times, it seems as though Washington would rather their allies across the Atlantic form a United States of Europe already and get it over with. But should it really want to?
Transatlantic relations have been a bit strained ever since President George W. Bush invaded Iraq without Europe and his defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, dismissed France’s and Germany’s posturing as the prattling of an “Old Europe,” out-of-touch with the contemporary balance of power.
Even as the continent cheered Barack Obama’s election victory in 2008, some worry about his apparent lack of commitment to the Atlantic alliance. The latest affront came in February of this year when the president skipped a EU-USA summit in Madrid, Spain, according to P.O. Neill, because of “plain old irritation with the ‘who’s in charge’ question.” Discord over economic policy at the G20 in Toronto, Canada last June only strengthened the perception that Europe and the United States are out of sync.
Would America really enjoy a Europe that maintains a single foreign and defense policy however? While some State Department officials may rejoice to find Europe finally speaking with one voice, America’s interests would hardly be served by it.
Whereas most government leaders appreciate the value of the Atlantic alliance, the EU’s mandarins and parliamentarians are rather more anti-American. They like to think of their project as one to counterbalance the Unites States’ position as sole remaining superpower. They dream of the day when the EU will finally translate its economic weight into political influence and once responsible for drafting foreign policy, would surely rather reach out to emerging economies as China and Brazil than the United States.
Egos, moreover, are a powerful force to be reckoned with, particularly when they hail from European states which formerly yielded significant international clout. Britain and France still like to think of themselves as great powers. France especially would likely seek to make a more unified Europe an instrument of its own ambitions. As long as it has to cope with two dozen or so different opinions, it may be more inclined to work with the United States directly than go through Europe.
Some Europeans are more committed to the Atlantic alliance than others. The Danish, the Dutch and the British for instance have more consistently followed America’s lead in foreign policy and are typically more willing to contribute to peacekeeping missions overseas. Their position may be overshadowed in a Europe that cares more for its own interests as a whole than the leverage of its individual member states. With the continent truly united, Washington would no longer be able to exploit differences for its own gain.
If there is to be a new Atlantic order which has Europe contributing more significantly to international security, and the United States be forced, as Robert Kaplan put it, “to yank Europe kicking and screaming into conflict zones,” it would have much greater difficulty doing so if Europe could indeed be reached with a single phone call. Better to have the continent divided and be able to scramble for support than find none at all.
It seems difficult to include talk of ‘Europe’ and then of Britain and France, which have differed greatly on foreign policy in the past number of decades especially in regards the US and its post-Cold-War foregin policy. In fact, considering things at the height of the Blair-Bush years, could Britain as an actor be considered ‘European’ at all when its neighbours (with some key ommitences) went the other way? I usually question Britain’s ‘Europeanness’ on all matters, but defence policy of late would seem to be back my arguments. This may well change with the way things are going and the breakdown of trans-atlantic relations between both Anglo-US AND US-EU.
I’m quite sceptical of this ‘dragging Europe kicking and screaming’ part also. If the EU develops into a stronger entity, then such dragging will be impossible, not that it was possible to do in the past either; regard France and Germany’s lack of presence in Iraq. United, a EU foreign policy would be independent of a US one, as you point out Nick, Divided it seems like that’s been the case anyway. Also one can ask what British, European or more integrated EU forces can/will be able to contribute in any future conflict zone. I think Kaplan wasn’t thinking with that remark, and I’ve yet to read a good explanation of it.
Aye, my point exactly.
True, but if I look at my own country, we’ve been persuaded time and again to go to war (or “peace keeping”), with the near sole purpose of keeping the Americans as our friends.
Is that the real reason or are the Dutch more predisposed to global action and UN tasks, does the foreign policy of the Netherlands, like that of Canada and Ireland hinge on international peace keeping missions such as in Bosnia etc, or is it to keep friendly terms with the US? Perhaps it’s a bit of both, I think. The Dutch are an international people and have been preasant in such peace keeping missions since 1990, but is it only to keep the americans on side?
Probably both, as you say. There’s a genuine interest in participating in peacekeeping, I’m sure, but also keep in mind that the Dutch military buys largely American stuff, and keep in mind the largely pro-American foreign policy of Dutch Governments, almost regardless of their political persuasions. It makes sense. The US are one of the country’s most important of trading partners (besides Germany) and the Netherlands always like to punch above their weight a bit internationally.