Moldova’s President of Smoke and Mirrors

Presidents Igor Dodon of Moldova and Vladimir Putin of Russia deliver a joint news conference at the Kremlin in Moscow, January 17
Presidents Igor Dodon of Moldova and Vladimir Putin of Russia deliver a joint news conference at the Kremlin in Moscow, January 17 (Presidential Press and Information Office)

Moldova’s new president is no friend of liberal democracy. Igor Dodon, who came to power in December, enjoys basking in the glow of Vladimir Putin and his entourage. Read more

Baltic States Have Most to Fear from Trump Victory

Estonian prime minister Taavi Rõivas and NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen deliver a news conference in Brussels, April 3, 2014
Estonian prime minister Taavi Rõivas and NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen deliver a news conference in Brussels, April 3, 2014 (NATO)

For Eastern Europe and the Baltic states in particular, a Donald Trump presidency could be disastrous. The Republican has created doubt about whether or not the United States would honor NATO’s collective defense clause, Article 5, under his leadership.

Hillary Clinton, the likely winner on Tuesday, will have to ease Eastern European anxieties while at the same time supporting a genuine European defense policy that is based on a considerable hike in budgets. Read more

Putin Dismisses Confidant in Russian Elite Shakeup

Sergei Ivanov, then Russian president Vladimir Putin's chief of staff, attends a gala dinner in Moscow, May 9, 2015
Sergei Ivanov, then Russian president Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff, attends a gala dinner in Moscow, May 9, 2015 (Presidential Press and Information Office)

Sergei Ivanov’s dismissal as Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff this week is the most important change in the upper echelon of Russia’s political elite since Putin returned to the presidency four years ago. Ivanov was the longest-serving head of the Presidential Administration in post-Soviet Russia. He has now been appointed to the largely powerless position of presidential representative for ecology and transportation. This is certainly a demotion.

But that does not mean this was an abrupt change or a purge.

Two weeks ago, Putin’s replacement of four governors and several other high-ranking cadres was dubbed an empowerment of people with a background in the security services, the so-called siloviki.

Now Ivanov, the highest-ranking silovik, has been dismissed and replaced by a diplomat. Read more

British Vote to Leave: A Victory for Putinist Pseudo-Politics

Russian president Vladimir Putin looks out a window in Budapest, Hungary, February 17, 2015
Russian president Vladimir Putin looks out a window in Budapest, Hungary, February 17, 2015 (Facebook/Viktor Orbán)

As I see it, the Brexit vote signaled the worrying deterioration of political discourse in the West.

While it would obviously be a mistake to blame it on Vladimir Putin, I am pretty sure that the Russian president rejoices in the result, not in the least because it is the first triumph of the sort of postmodern pseudo-politics that is hallmarked by his name and that aims to create a world where facts are irrelevant, truth is non-existent and where semblance and suspicion define the acts of a political community. I’d call it Putinism but it has different faces, variants and names throughout the world — from Viktor Orbán to Nigel Farage to Donald Trump. Read more

Comrades in Arms

Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and Russian president Vladimir Putin answer questions from reporters in Moscow, February 17
Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and Russian president Vladimir Putin answer questions from reporters in Moscow, February 17 (Facebook/Viktor Orbán)

Sometimes in politics everything is exactly what it looks like.

This was the case when the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, visited Moscow last week, extended a gas contract with Russia and told the Russian president that the period when the EU automatically extended sanctions against Russia was “behind us.”

The moment of honesty came when Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán got to compliment each other on their Syria and refugee-related policies. “We value greatly the efforts made to resolve this problem [of Middle Eastern refugees],” said Orbán, adding, “We wish you great success in your international initiatives.” Putin then said, “Our people has sympathy for the position taken by the Hungarian government” on the refugee crisis.

And yes, in a perverse way, the two policies do indeed work very well together — that is, to suit the needs of the two leaders: Russia’s intervention in Syria aggravated the war and the refugee crisis. Which, in turn, strengthened Orbán’s position in Hungary and in Europe. Which, in turn, helped far-right parties and Putin allies and weakened the EU.

This unspoken but existing alliance, ultimately, against the EU and against the solution of a refugee crisis that benefits them both, was behind the chumminess that the Hungarian prime minister and the Russian president showed in Moscow.

The Russian pro-government press could hardly hide its joy over the visit. Izvestia wrote about a meeting of “not only partners, but friends on principles,” noting that Orbán was the first foreign leader whom Putin met in the new working building at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence. But calling Orbán and Putin friends is an exaggeration. Just as Orbán himself declared last year, Putin “is not a man who has a known personality,” which largely rules out making friends with fellow leaders. Even on principles. Read more

Battles and Breaks

Russian president Vladimir Putin gives a speech in Belgrade, Serbia marking the seventieth anniversary of the city's liberation in World War II, October 16, 2014
Russian president Vladimir Putin gives a speech in Belgrade, Serbia marking the seventieth anniversary of the city’s liberation in World War II, October 16, 2014 (Presidential Press and Information Office)

While the world was looking at the Russian military campaign in Syria, Russia may have scored a victory in Europe: the government of Valeriu Streleț in Moldova was toppled by a vote of no confidence initiated by pro-Russian parties in the Chișinău parliament. Meanwhile, opposition protesters clashed with police in Montenegro’s capital and the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, visited Moscow. It seemed as if Russia had been on a winning streak. But in reality, Vladimir Putin has too many battles to fight and his own strategy — if there is one — put him under pressure. In fact, Russia is winning only where it does not have to have a strategy. Read more

The Psychology of Loose Wheels

Russian president Vladimir Putin speaks with his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in Sochi, March 10, 2014
Russian president Vladimir Putin speaks with his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in Sochi, March 10, 2014 (Presidential Press and Information Office)

How annoyed would you feel if you had to make an utter fool of yourself, day after day, for benefits that are gradually decreasing? Probably about as annoyed as Sergei Lavrov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, did when he recently mumbled expletives into his microphone in the middle of a press conference. Little does it matter if the text that caused Lavrov’s outrage came from an assistant, a family member or Vladimir Putin himself. The head of a country’s diplomatic corps is not supposed to lose it like this.

Or take Vladimir Yakunin, a Putin confidant and former head of Russian Railways who unexpectedly resigned last week to become the representative of Kaliningrad in the Russian parliament’s upper house, the Federation Council, a position that comes with a lot less influence and money. Was he the victim of a struggle inside the elite? Was he replaced, as Leonid Bershidsky suggested, because desperate times call for efficient managers rather than kleptocrats? Has he taken a different career direction?

Again, this is not what really matters. What matters is that visibly, the power engine of the Putin era — material benefits in exchange for unwavering political loyalty — is failing. And not only inside Russia.

In the past week, Russian journalists, bloggers and Russia watchers have been trying to make sense of the abrupt resignation of Vladimir Yakunin. Some suggested that even with the enormous benefits and political clout that Yakunin enjoyed as the head of Russian Railways, it was simply too risky for him to stay in his position. His friend, Ugis Magonis, the head of Latvian Railways was recently arrested on corruption charges. But this is the kind of scandal that an official of Yakunin’s stature would certainly shrug off. It would be harder to do that with scandals such as the cancellation of suburban train services in Russian regions, which led to local protests at the beginning of this year and drew Vladimir Putin’s ire. Did it take Putin more than six months to finally approve the dismissal of one of his closest allies who shared a dacha collective with him?

Some said that the problem had become systemic and, as money is on low supply in Russia nowadays, we can expect more such dismissals: efficient managers replacing Putin’s cronies to fill the holes on state-owned firms. Some have to make money for others to spend or steal and the energy industry has been visibly struggling.

Or maybe Putin does not have to do anything with Yakunin’s exit at all. Perhaps Yakunin was tired after ten years at the helm of Russian Railways and left the company to enjoy his fortune. After all, as the governor of Kaliningrad pointed out, he had gotten his status as an envoy, necessary to be a representative of Kaliningrad of the Federation Council, already in 2014.

Certainly, this does not sound very plausible. Neither do theories that claim Yakunin was aiming at a political career by taking up a seat in the Federation Council. Yakunin had a political career already, as the head of the Russian Railways. His seeking parliamentary immunity sounds only slightly more of a realistic explanation.

Still, despite the implausibility, talk about Yakunin’s impending political career are so persistent that there may be something behind it. It seems unlikely that Yakunin would be groomed as a successor to Putin but it comes up frequently in the Russian press. What if Yakunin has to appear as Putin’s “likely” successor because power groups in the Russian elite have already someone else in mind?

All of these explanations are plausible, some more so than the rest. We cannot know for sure, until the head of another state-owned giant is dismissed, whether Putin needs efficient managers. We cannot know whether Yakunin is a stand-in for a presidential candidate until pro-Kremlin media starts to portray him as such. We cannot know if he is a victim of a power fight within the elite that Putin could not control.

However, neither explanation bodes well for Putin. They all show weakness, in different forms. People getting frustrated on different levels of the power vertical. Uneasy decisions on scarce money costing key people their jobs. Corruption scandals getting to the higher echelons of the Russian elite. Power struggles slipping out of control. Vladimir Putin may, as Ivan Krastev suggested, not participate in day-to-day decision-making any more, but — check the polls if you don’t believe me — he is the only politician in the country. He is there alone to reap the benefits or to suffer the blows.

Near abroad getting further

And now these blows come from the outside too. The president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko freed political prisoners last week. Barring the possibility that Europe’s last dictator really means to turn into a democrat this time, Lukashenko is soliciting more money. Not from the IMF or the European Union but from the only place that he could possibly get it before elections in October: Russia. Russia has already given $760 million to Belarus but Lukashenko is unimpressed: he wants as much as $3 billion. The Belarusian president knows that an increasingly paranoid Russia can be blackmailed with Belarus’ mending fences with the European Union.

And it is not only Lukashenko: When in June, protesters took to the streets in Yerevan over a hike in the price of electricity prompted by endemic corruption in the Russian-owned power company, the Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, decided to demand economic and political concessions from Russia before breaking up the protests.

Presently, Russia is able to placate loyal elites in its neighborhood but this is visibly becoming harder. Soon it will find its two other aces in the game of integrations — jobs for guest workers and markets for substandard exports — similarly difficult to use in the face of rapidly growing nationalism and poverty. There will be more blackmails and more side glances to China or the European Union. In short: more signs of the weakness of Russia and the only politician in it, Vladimir Putin.

Bad decisions and indecision

Sanctions accelerated Russia’s crisis. But they were the best thing that could have happened to Putin. The Russian president has been wallowing in the sanctions because they gave him an excuse. They gave him a Potemkin wall to pretend that without the sanctions Russia would flourish. That it is not losing in the global energy game. That it would have a functioning economy had it not been for the West. They gave Putin an opportunity for an experiment to transform Russia into a besieged fortress.

But the experiment is failing.

Even in a besieged fortress, politics has to prioritize. And when money is on short supply, priorities matter more. Putin may have succeeded in changing the narrative but he has not changed the system. A flawed polity will produce bad decisions. It will produce, as Valery Solovei pointed out, unnecessary, lavish pavement works in Moscow while people get laid off. And it will produce more of such and on a larger scale. No cadre replacements can stop this inertia.

The little pieces coming off the machine reflect a growing frustration with the state of affairs in Russia. And while there is a growing fear of the unknown in the West, this fear is gradually receding in the post-Soviet elite. The West needs a better strategy.

This article originally appeared at No Yardstick, August 29, 2015.