Atlantic Sentinel

Tag: Vietnam

  • How Vietnam Went from American Foe to American Friend

    Nguyễn Phú Trọng Joe Biden
    American vice president Joe Biden listens to a speech by Nguyễn Phú Trọng, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, in Washington DC, July 7, 2015 (State Department)

    It’s easy to hold grudges; it envelopes one in a sense of superiority, a feeling of wronged righteousness, that allows irrational behavior to feel very, very good. When someone hurts you, it can be wonderful to lord that over them forever.

    Few wars in American history involve as many hurt feelings as the Vietnam War. Depending on when you chart it, the war lasted anywhere from the late 40s to 1975, when North Vietnam conquered the South. For the US, earnest combat began in 1965 and lasted until 1973, when the Nixon Administration washed its hands of Southeast Asia.

    The toll was hefty: 58,000 Americans and anywhere from 1.4 to 3.8 million Vietnamese died. On the American side of the Pacific, the war gave counterculturalism a salient boost in the body politic and for decades much of American foreign and domestic policy hung on the legacy of those years. In Vietnam, the regime used fear of another American invasion to build legitimacy — and support war in Cambodia — up until the 1990s.

    So it would be rather easy for both sides to neither forgive nor forget. Whole careers could be made off holding a grudge.

    And yet the Americans are about to start arming the Vietnamese.

    What the hell just happened here? (more…)

  • China, Vietnam Trade Blows Over South China Sea Oil

    China’s state media and Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry traded harsh words this week. The exchange came after the Vietnamese issued a strong protest over Chinese plans to search for oil in a disputed area of the South China Sea.

    It would be the first time that China has moved its massive and mobile deepwater drilling rig into the disputed area.

    Both nations have claims over the islands in questions, which Vietnam calls the Paracel and China the Xisha Islands. They waters around them are believed to contain vast quantities of oil and natural gas deposits. (more…)

  • Vietnam Expected to Loosen State Controls, If Carefully

    The international community is keeping a close watch on Vietnam’s National Assembly as it is convening a month-long session to decide the extent to which it will amend the Constitution. The session is expected to end next week with lawmakers believed ready to give the go ahead on loosening the communist country’s economy, finance and investment laws.

    The big question is: will the government take on its vested interests and reform the heavily indebted state-owned enterprises? (more…)

  • America, Vietnam Deepening Cooperation to Balance China

    In an historic meeting at the White House in Washington DC on Thursday, President Barak Obama announced with Vietnam’s president Trương Tấn Sang by his side that bilateral relations between the former rivals will be upgraded to a comprehensive partnership.

    In his remarks, President Obama called it “the steady progression in US-Vietnam relations.” Indeed, the progress since 2005, when a slew of business contracts was signed, has been profound with the United States now Vietnam’s largest export market. With unprecedented cooperation, in a wide array of sectors, it appears that a new era in American-Vietnamese relations has begun.

    The agreement stops short of a mutual defense treaty, similar to the one America has in place with Japan and the Philippines, but the breadth of sectors now open for cooperation will touch about every area of society. They include political and diplomatic relations, defense, trade, science and technology, education, the environment, health, tourism and war legacy issues. (more…)

  • Laos’ Hydropower Boom Attracts Regional Attention

    The recent decision by the government of Laos to green light the long delayed construction of the massive Xayaburi Dam made headlines across the world. Most analysts and commentators agree the move is controversial, as the dam will likely have significant negative environmental effects within Laos as well as in Cambodia and Vietnam, which lie further down the Mekong.

    It is believed that the small Southeast Asian country is planning to build up to seventy hydroelectric dams along the Mekong River and its tributaries, an increase from the previous but already significant estimate of 55. This construction boom will have wider repercussions than extensive environmental damage. It has the potential to alter the geopolitical balance in Southeast Asia.

    Even though the Laotian economy has been growing steadily over recent years, the country remains one of the most underdeveloped in Asia. Its gross domestic product per capita (at purchasing power parity) in 2011 was $2,700 and according to World Bank data only 71 percent of the country’s population had access to electricity in 2010. (more…)

  • Banking Scandal Exposes Split in Vietnam Leadership

    Vietnam has been rightly recognized as one of the hottest markets by global investors since its đổi mới policy of market reforms was instituted in the late 1980s. It has taken great strides in transforming itself from a wartorn country thirty years ago to one of the Asian Tigers. Lately however, Vietnam has hit a speed bump from bad economic policies seemingly resulting in a split within the Communist Party. These differences, culminated last week in the arrest of a prominent businessman, have sent shock waves through the country with rumors rife of additional arrests.

    The 2000s were heady times for Vietnam as its gross domestic product averaged 7 percent annual growth, foreign direct investment flowed into the country and it joined the World Trade Organization. The euphoria began to wilt after the government, in a bid to stimulate greater growth in the economy, clung to expansionary monetary policies too long which caused inflation to spiral out of control. Inflation peaked at 23 percent in August 2011 before falling to 8.3 percent in May of this year.

    Since then, GDP growth has slowed from 6.8 percent in 2010 to 5.9 percent in 2011 to 4 percent in the first quarter of 2012. The World Bank warned in June that “inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises, banks and public investments [will] be a drag on long-term growth.”

    The government’s economic policy, modeled on the growth of South Korea’s chaebol style conglomerates, called for assisting its domestic companies to expand in order to become more competitive globally.  But after years of cheap credit, state-owned companies have turned into inefficient behemoths saddled with ballooning debt levels.  They are so big that they currently produce 40 percent of Vietnam’s GDP.

    The collapse of the state shipping companies Vinashin and Vinalines could be indicative of the trouble many public enterprises are in. In fact, the ruling party was so concerned about the state-owned enterprises that it convened in early 2011 to review the country’s economic growth model and its failure in building chaebol style companies.

    Against the backdrop of a slowing economy and troubled state-owned enterprises, officials are increasingly concerned about the stability of the country. The arrest of business tycoon Nguyễn Đức Kiên two weeks ago, the cofounder of Asia Commercial Bank and owner of the Hanoi Football Club, for unspecified economic crimes is being interpreted as a way to deflect blame from the government.

    A few days later, Asia Commercial Bank’s chief executive officer Lý Xuân Hả was also picked up for “violating state regulations on economic management,” according to the state run Vietnam News Service.

    Since the arrests, the Ho Chi Minh Stock Index has sold off by 12 percent and ACB’s stock is down 22 percent. Moody’s Investors Service cut the bank’s credit rating with a warning that it was placing its credit on review for a possible future downgrade. Fitch Ratings wrote, the “arrest could trigger renewed investor concerns about corporate governance, transparency and liquidity issues in Vietnam’s banking sector.”

    According to some press reports, the arrests at ACB, one of Vietnam’s biggest priate banks, are the result of a power struggle within the Communist Party. Specifically, between Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng and President Trương Tấn Sang.

    Dũng, viewed by many as Vietnam’s most powerful prime minister after being reelected to a five year term in 2011, was the force behind Vietnam’s drive to develop dominant state-owned enterprises.

    Sang, on the other hand, is believed to be part of the old guard, worried about the increasing divide between rich and poor in the country. As such, cracking down on state-owned enterprises because of corruption is a way of discrediting the chaebol policy.

    In a pointed opinion article last week, President Sang said that “Vietnam was now under pressure from broken state-owned enterprises.” He lamented the “degradation of political ideology and the morals and lifestyle” of public officials. A not so subtle shot at Dũng.

    The prime minister, for his part, has come out supportive of the punishment of illegal activities in the banking sector “no matter who they are.”

    The crackdown by the government is sparking rumors of other arrests. Yesterday, Nguyễn Đăng Quang, the chairman of the food conglomerate Masan Group, came forward to dispel rumors that he had been detained.

    If the Communist Party seeks to insulate itself from the public’s ire over the struggling economy with a campaign targeting the wealthy, it risks starting another economic crisis by scaring away the foreign investment that drove much of the country’s growth in recent years. If that happens, its entire economic reform program could be threatened.

  • Careful Balancing Act for Southeast Asia

    On Monday, South Korean president Lee Myung-bak visited Burma and promised to extend loans and grants to the poverty stricken country.

    The surprise visit came as Japan and South Korea have stepped up their diplomatic engagement in Southeast Asia over the last month, which, in turn, comes on the heels of closer engagement by the United States since 2009.

    This stems not only from a desire to gain access to the region’s natural resources but more importantly, to bolster their soft power in the Mekong region, an area that is becoming increasingly important as concerns persist about Chinese foreign policy amid the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. However, while the Mekong countries are interested in the economic and political benefits from closer relations with the United States, they are mindful of the risk of antagonizing China. (more…)

  • Vietnam Key to Japan’s Southeast Asia Policy

    During the Mekong-Japan Summit held in Tokyo last month, Japan announced additional development aid for and investments in the countries that make up the Mekong Delta region.

    The summit was further evidence of Japan’s goal of developing stronger relations with Southeast Asian states as the Japanese economy is beset with tepid growth and due to the uncertainty and mistrust with the region’s biggest and fastest growing power, China.

    However, the headlines last month overlooked one of the most important outcomes of these meetings thus far, the steady improvement of Japan-Vietnam relations to the level of strategic partnership. (more…)

  • Vietnam, United States Announce Military Drills

    Vietnam and the United States have announced that they will hold five days of “noncombatant” military exercises in the central part of the country near the city of Da Nang at the end of April 2012.

    Press reports indicate that the drills will be focused on skills like navigation and maintenance.

    The cooperation between the former enemies points to the new dynamic at play in the region with the smaller nations fronting the South China Sea increasingly falling into the arms of the United States due to their fear of a rising China.

    The American-Vietnamese plans to conduct drills comes against the backdrop of a fresh dispute between China and the Philippines. The latest confrontation between the two nations was triggered when Chinese fishermen were discovered in waters claimed by both China and the Philippines. The Chinese deployed navy ships and planes to the area in support of what it said were its sovereign rights, forcing the present Philippine warship to vacate.

    Relations between Vietnam and the United States have steadily improved over the last ten years as they share mutual concern over China’s rise and future plans in the region. Vietnam, like the other littoral states, has claims to portions of the South China Sea which is believed to hold vast reserves of oil and gas deposits.

    As the Chinese navy vastly increased its capabilities in recent years, Vietnam has also embarked on expanding its naval posture. In 2009, it bought six Russian diesel submarines worth $2 billion, in addition to eight Sukhoi fighter jets, with plans to buy more in the future.

    Although they share a communist ideology, bilateral relations between China and Vietnam have been historically difficult. The two fought a war in 1979 after China became concerned that Vietnam was developing closer relations with the Soviet Union. This was a time when Sino-Soviet ties were strained and there was a fear that Chinese interests in Indochina would be affected.

    The war was inconclusive militarily but sent the message that China would not tolerate with outside meddling in its backyard.

    Beijing has tended to bully its neighbors when it is powerful. In 2011, it warned Vietnam that it would not hesitate to use military force to enforce its claims in the South China Sea region.

    Despite China’s threats, in April 2012, Vietnam partnered with Russia’s Gazprom company to develop two offshore gasfields in the ocean.

    Vietnam faces a quandary of seeking help from the United States against China without allowing the country to open up to political reform. The government has succeeded, however, in keeping tight control over power even as it reformed the economy, much like China has done. Following its economic reforms, foreign direct investment flowed into the country lifting average annual growth to 8 percent from 2003 to 2007. However, the World Bank predicts that Vietnam’s economy faces tough prospects going forward from rising inflation and increasing unemployment.

    As such, the old axiom holds true in Southeast Asia as elsewhere. The enemy of one’s enemy is one’s friend. China and the United States aren’t quite enemies but the region’s smaller countries share concerns about its military expansion and what it means for their interests going forward. For this reason, China is pushing countries like Vietnam to seek out support from the Americans in order to balance China’s power.

    For its part, America is eager to reestablish its position in Asia as it has announced that its economic and political interests lie here in the twenty-first century, hence President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia. Therefore, we can expect to see additional plans for drills between militaries as the specter of a rising China hangs over the region and the world.

  • Chinese Dam Building Tests Southeast Asian Resilience

    China’s hydropower development activities on the Mekong and Salween Rivers are a clear illustration of the country’s potentially destabilizing strategy, with both diplomatic and environmental impacts, in Southeast Asia.

    These waterways, along with the Yangtze River (one of China’s domestic targets for intensive development), constitute the Three Parallel Rivers UNESCO World Heritage Site in southern China’s Yunnan Province. China has thirteen projects planned on the Salween (known in China as “Nu”) River above its entry into Burma, including several adjacent to or within the ecologically sensitive heritage site.

    The environment is clearly not a priority in the Chinese decisionmaking process on the topic of energy development. But what about the priorities of China’s neighbors?

    Beijing is, in fact, planning and building dams on several rivers that originate in southern China and flow into other South and Southeast Asian nations, including the Mekong, the Salween and Yarlung-Tsangpo or Brahmaputra River.

    Downstream riparian nations include Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. All of these countries will be affected by China’s dam building and hydropower operations in upstream reaches of the aforementioned rivers.

    We may also consider nearby projects on the few Southeast Asian rivers that do not necessarily originate in China but in which Chinese investment and interests are focused.

    As one example, in 2011 the president of Burma suspended construction of the Chinese funded $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project on the upper Irrawaddy River over safety issues, resident relocation programs and environmental concerns. Nevertheless, China is pressing for resumed construction on the site from which it expects to reap the majority of generated power for Yunnan growth once the 6,000megawatt project is completed. Myitsone is just one component of a six dam Chinese project on the upper Irrawaddy River intended for energy export to Yunnan.

    Despite the suspension, however, a recent report from an nongovernmental organization operating in northern Burma indicates that work surrounding the project continues, with Chinese workers continuing preparation on the Myitsone site and accelerated mineral extraction in the intended reservoir area.

    Chinese impacts on the Mekong River community are not yet so overt or contested. Where the Lancang River exits China and becomes the Mekong, it contributes about 18 percent of the total mean annual flow of the entire Mekong River basin. The other 82 percent of Mekong River flow originates in the lower basin from its numerous tributaries there.

    During the dry season (northern winter), as much as 30 percent of the total flow in the Mekong River comes from the Chinese portion of the basin. Compared with a population of roughly ten million in the upper basin, concentrated primarily in Yunnan Province, there are more than sixty million residents of five countries in the lower basin area.

    With an overall basin size of 800,000 square kilometers, there seems more than enough water to sustain the people of the Mekong River basin, if water was all they needed. Of historically greatest importance to downstream nations is the productivity of the inland freshwater fishery along the Mekong River, which is estimated at more than two million tonnes annually.

    Unless the river flow regimes and their influence on this fishery are better understood before further disruption, dam building activities and the ensuing strict flow regulation for hydropower production could decimate a principal food resource in downstream areas.

    Working ahead of its downstream neighbors, China has five operational hydropower dams on the Lancang River in and above Yunnan, with three more projects currently under construction and as many as 23 more in planning stages.

    All of these projects in China are on main reaches of the Lancang, as few workable tributaries exist in that narrow portion of the basin.

    Downstream countries along the Mekong have been working consistently together on the Mekong River Commission and, until recently, have refrained from reservoir and hydropower construction on main river reaches.

    Laos has proposed for MRC approval the controversial Xayaburi Dam, a $3.5 billion project that is expected to generate 1,260 megawatts of electricity for the country and could earn back its cost in a single year for the Thai developer.

    A single dam along the lower Mekong River would certainly alter flow regimes in the region but will only marginally exacerbate the changes that are seen with China’s dam building activity upstream. However, spurred on by China’s concentration of projects, another ten dams on main river reaches are currently in the proposal and planning stages for MRC countries. That rush of project development is in addition to 41 hydropower dams on tributaries to the Mekong River that are expected to be complete by the end of 2015 and as many as 37 more lower basin tributary dams that could be developed in the 2016-2030 period.

    Unlike dams on the main reaches of the Mekong River, which are subject to MRC approval, these tributary dam projects can proceed under the development practices of the individual lower basin countries.

    China’s influence on the lower basin has, in effect, spurred the potential fragmentation of an historically strong MRC and its cooperative process. Instead of attempting to deal with the lower basin as a bloc, China could more easily overcome opposition to its own plans for the Mekong River on an bilateral basis, at which China excels when seemingly limitless investment packages are employed as leverage. For the MRC states, however, it’s not all about the money.

    Lower basin riparians have, until most recently, recognized the delicate balance between hydropower projects to provide energy for economic development in individual nation and the need to maintain the ecologically vulnerable shared freshwater fishery that provides food security to millions of Southeast Asian residents.

    China seems to see no such necessity for balance and is interested in the Lancang primarily as a resource for producing energy.

    Widening the regional gap in priorities, China has refused to participate with fellow riparians in the MRC to date. Eventually, as China proceeds with its own dam building efforts, the lower basin countries will reach a point at which effects on river flow regimes become obvious and the sustainability of the vital Mekong basin freshwater fishery wanes.

    With full dam building efforts applied in both upper and lower basin regions, complete collapse of the subsistence fishery ecosystem is well within the realm of likelihood, destroying 81 percent of the protein source for the lower basin peoples. A recent study has found that the tributary dams are actually more at fault for such a potential collapse, although flow regulating dams on the main Mekong River reaches will only hasten the demise of the Southeast Asian fisheries ecology.

    As the first and most ambitious single actor, the overall upstream riparian and the basin country with the least apparent consideration for a cooperative and balanced approach to the river, China will take much of the blame for this decline.

    As with the MRC, while the lower basin countries are all members of ASEAN, China is not. Without a common local or regional authority, MRC countries have little alternative but to appeal to the United Nations for intervention in their emerging dispute with China over the uses and hydrologic alteration of the Mekong River basin.

    One potential outcome is a procedural stalemate, by which the long cycle of international mediation allows China to complete its dam building efforts on the Lancang River. At that point, the damage to the lower basin is done and MRC nations must simply deal with the consequences of a diminished resource.

    Working sooner and more quickly, however, the lower basin countries could propose a river treaty with an independent overseer. A valuable precedent for this action can be found in the Indus River basin, where India and Pakistan have maintained the Indus Waters Treaty for more than fifty years with oversight by the World Bank. There are still disputes between the countries over (accused) abuses and violations of treaty provisions and allowances but at the very least there is an established mechanism for dispute resolution through independent evaluation and arbitration by a third party.

    As a second potential outcome of the MRC complaint, and following on historical precedent, China may attempt to employ capital investment in infrastructure development as a way to get what it wants from the downstream nations.

    China could make such a preemptive move in order to mitigate, by diplomatic and economic means, the physical impacts of its new dams on the lower riparians. Specifically, China may offer to help the MRC countries build their own dams, on tributaries and/or main Mekong River reaches, in exchange for freedom of construction and regulation on the Lancang River in the upper basin.

    China has precious few opportunities to do that before any further alteration of the river flow regime occurs and downstream impacts become too difficult on the shared resources of the MRC nations.

    Lower basin states must hold firm to an understanding of the impacts that their own dam building activities will have on shared resources and reject China’s “help” that is actually aimed at fragmentation of the lower basin system.

    With such a realization of Chinese plans, the MRC states will finally recognize the potential impacts of Chinese involvement and push back at China in a concerted effort to bring the upstream nation’s own dam building activities under control and environmentally responsible oversight, though by then the fishery could be lost entirely.

    Demands will be made for China to pay for lost resources in the lower basin and any dispute could lead to negotiation, conflict or both.

    In any case, China stands to lose a valuable cache of trust and goodwill with its neighbors, if not also valuable investment and trade markets, not just in Southeast Asia. Other resource and trade partners watching all of this unfold will think twice about their relations with China after such alienating behavior in its own neighborhood. No country has it in their national strategy to be taken advantage of by a neighbor or trade partner.

    Without preemptive engagement and China’s cooperation and a willingness to consider alternatives alongside fellow riparians in the lower basin, MRC nations will lose control of the Mekong River and the abundance of its valuable ecosystem. MRC nations can bring China to the negotiating table through diplomatic and economic sanctions, an action to which China must acquiesce for fear of losing one of its nearest and fastest growing markets.

    Once China is forced to negotiate for its use of the upper basin in the Lancang and Mekong River system, the evaluation and arbitration process will slow China’s progress considerably by subjecting its dam building projects to international standards of environmental assessment on an individual and collective basis, which China has largely avoided to date. Its ambitions for a cascade of strictly regulated hydropower dams on the Lancang River, which are considered vital to economic and industrial development in its southern provinces, will be slowed or lost entirely.

    This article was adapted from a strategic simulation run by Wikistrat, the world’s first massively multiplayer online consultancy.

  • The Distorted Legacy of Vietnam

    As far as the Vietnam War is concerned, conventional wisdom is dominated more by ideological perception than historical fact.

    The proponents of the “soft power” doctrine might call it “soft victory.” A victory practically in name only was what the socialist bloc could claim in Southeast Asia. For the nineteen years of its duration, the conflict in Vietnam took countless lives and left the country’s economy in shambles. This was a conflict desired only by the socialist countries which therefore owe some explaining in regards to their “victory.”

    However brutal the South Vietnamese regime may have been, it did not interfere with communist operations north of the 17th parallel. It also abstained from engaging in the same Maoist inspired grand projects that Hanoi invested in, much to its later disillusionment.

    In short, the onus of belligerence falls entirely upon the North Vietnamese and their Chinese and Soviet patrons. (more…)

  • Obama Nuking His Own Nuke Policy

    For all of the foreign policy challenges that the Obama Administration is attempting to manage and resolve, none seems as important to the president personally than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear nonproliferation continues to be the backbone of Barack Obama’s security policy, and an issue that the president himself has worked extensively hard on over his first eighteen months in office.

    Two months ago, the United States hosted the very first “Nuclear Security Summit” which was designed to find and lock up loose nuclear material around the world before international terrorists could get a hold of these dangerous components. The summit was a great illustration of the president’s appeal across the world at that point in time. Forty-seven national leaders chose to make the journey to Washington DC to participate in the discussions. And when all was said and done, all 47 produced a collective communiqué outlining the urgent need to find and secure nuclear material for the sake of global security. Nuclear nonproliferation was once again an issue on the world stage.

    But the summit was only the start of the administration’s campaign. Around the same time, the White House shocked the Washington establishment by diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in American foreign policy. The United States would no longer point its nuclear arsenal toward the direction of nonnuclear weapons states, even if American interests were directly threatened (although the actual wording of the National Security Strategy excluded Iran and North Korea from this promise). In an extreme transformation from the Cold War era, the National Security Strategy (NSS) prohibited the offensive use of nuclear weapons in an armed confrontation. Last but not least, the NSS stressed that America’s large and powerful nuclear stockpile was to be used only for defensive purposes. Or as Washingtonians like to say, for deterrence purposes.

    But perhaps more important than the actual directives of the NSS was the way the strategy itself portrayed nuclear weapons: outdated, expensive, dangerous, and useless for the twenty-first century.

    The central aim of both events was to demonstrate to the world the extent of Washington’s sincerity. The NSS and the summit were also political moves which administration officials hoped would convince other states to back America’s stance on the Iranian nuclear program.

    That was then. The world has changed markedly over the past few months, and as a consequence, the United States has changed its stance on the nuclear issue.

    In the latest case of American knee buckling, Washington recently signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Vietnam that would in effect spread nuclear technology to East Asia. To be fair, the deal is not entirely unprecedented. Under President George W. Bush’s administration, the United States enacted a similar agreement with India. President Obama largely followed the Bush blueprint by approving a nuclear sharing pact with the United Arab Emirates in 2009 (which Congress later signed into law). Like previous agreements, the American-Vietnamese deal focuses solely on the peaceful development of nuclear energy, which officials hope will show other states that nuclear transparency is the better option.

    However, there is one vital difference that could damage President Obama’s entire nuclear nonproliferation policy. As the American-Vietnamese nuclear agreement currently stands, the Vietnamese government would still be allowed to enrich its own uranium, rather than importing it from the world market.

    To some in the administration, the clause may not seem to be such a big deal, particularly given Vietnam’s quick transformation as a responsible actor in the international system. But the omission of a “gold standard” in the Vietnam deal is in fact significant in a number of respects.

    First off, the gold standard omission portrays to the world an America that is both unsure of its own nuclear policy and a nation that is all too willing to make exceptions to those labeled pragmatic or strategic. In essence, Washington is saying one thing and doing another. “If your country is in an unstable environment or is a reluctant partner, then don’t expect the United States to support your right to domestic enrichment.” Iran clearly fits in this camp, as do Jordan and Saudi Arabia, albeit at a much smaller scale. “If, however, your leaders comply with American demands, then Washington will drop its objections.”

    Is this the type of message that the United States want to send to the developing world? If the Obama Administration truly wants to improve American credibility in areas that are traditionally hostile to American objectives, then the answer would appear to be no. A “my way or the highway” mentality can hardly be labeled constructive within the broader campaign of international outreach.

    Why the Obama Administration decided against following the India-UAE example with Vietnam is anyone’s guess. Perhaps this was the only way the United States could finalize a very profitable business contract. Perhaps the Vietnamese were unrelenting during negotiations. Or perhaps Washington is not concerned about the Vietnamese getting the Bomb.

    Whatever the reason, the American-Vietnamese agreement is not going to sit well with the Iranians. Tehran has been trying to exert the very same nuclear enrichment rights that the Vietnamese were privileged enough to squeeze out of Washington.

    What is more, the United States may have also established a dangerous precedent in future nuclear negotiations. Countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt may now insist that they be granted the same nuclear enrichment rights. This not only puts the United States in a tough position with members of the developing world, but also ruins Obama’s strategy of an eventual “world without nuclear weapons.”

    No one said the foreign policy business was going to be easy. But it may be a lot easier if the United States exerted some consistency on a major security issue.