Despite the Arab League’s decision to extend, and then suspend, its monitoring mission in Syria in reaction to the uptick in violence, the conflict in this historically rich nation is becoming increasingly more violent. What was once a near resemblance of other “Arab Spring” protests, with hundreds of thousands marching for human rights and dignity, has churned into an armed confrontation between security forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and defectors from the Syrian army. It is now common to not only read about the crimes committed by the regime, which are horrific enough, but about retaliatory attacks from anti-Assad rebels as well.
The main armed opposition, the Free Syrian Army, is evolving into the only force capable of inflicting pain on Assad’s powerful security apparatus. And to the consternation of President Assad and his generals, the militia continues to grow in numbers, with dozens of soldiers at a time ditching their Syrian army uniforms to join the rebels’ ranks. (more…)
Last Monday, Syria witnessed the bloodiest day of the Syrian uprising with close to one hundred people killed across the country by Bashar al-Assad’s army and police forces.
The government-sponsored violence over the next two days either kept that pace or accelerated in some areas, particularly in northwest Syria, where activists and villagers have reported scenes of a “massacre” by tanks and machine gunners. During arguably the worst period of intimidation since the democratic protests began last March, the Syrian National Council, the most prominent anti-government political organization outside the country, has released figures suggesting that two hundred and fifty people were killed last week over a 48 hour span.
It is now undeniable that the Syrian regime is intent on stopping the protest wave any way it can, even if heavy weapons like anti-aircraft guns and tank warfare need to be used to get the job done.
The total death toll is now probably far higher than the 5,000 reported by the United Nation’s senior human rights official this month. It will continue to go up as more conscripts chuck their Syrian army uniforms and run into the arms of the opposition — a development that Assad’s Republican Guard forces have quickly responded to with summary executions, indiscriminate arrest operations and tank shelling.
With the cities of Syria literally running red with blood, it would be inappropriate, if not downright insulting, to suggest that Bashar al-Assad truly wants to usher in democratic reforms for his country. As long as Assad’s Ba’ath Party is considered to be the heart and soul of Syrian political life, the prospects of Syrians voting the way they would like to is just as delusional.
The crisis has caused even Syria’s allies to think twice before vouching Assad in public. Close to two months ago, China and China vetoed a Security Council resolution demanding that Syria halt violence against its citizens and pull its army from civilian areas. Now Moscow appears to be edging closer to the Western position, disregarding its previous stance of refusing to meddle in the affairs of a sovereign state.
In a draft resolution circulated to other Security Council members by the Russians, the Syrian government is urged to suspend its “suppression of those exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association.”
The Russians also call on the Syrian authorities to initiate a judicial investigation targeting those who have either ordered, were a part of or who were in any way implicated in abuses. The statement is an about-face from last October, when Moscow teamed up with Beijing to block a unified Council response to the violence.
In what may be another boost to the protesters, Arab League officials have reported that Syria’s foreign minister has accepted the Gulf Arab plan to send mediators into Syria to make sure that the government is actually doing what it says it is doing — pulling its forces back, releasing political prisoners swept up in the violence, reaching out to the Syrian opposition and generally ending the killing and arrests. On this front, Russia also appears to be at the forefront with the Foreign Ministry confirming that the government decided to allow monitors in after poking and prodding by Russian diplomats.
Moscow is still far away from where France, the United Kingdom and the United States would like it to be and with the Syrian regime having broken so many promises in the past, activists and Western powers are reluctant to celebrate the Arab League mission prematurely.
Although the Syrian government has promised unfettered access, there is a disbelief that the Arab monitors sent into the country will be allowed to travel to the worst effected areas freely. President Assad will be sure to make the lives of these monitors difficult, because he rightly understands that failing to obstruct the mission would confirm what nearly everyone has been saying about his regime since the unrest broke out — that it is brutal, inhumane and entirely at fault.
Similarly, withdrawing troops from centers of protest and releasing the tens of thousands of prisoners who have been thrown into jail cells would be an act of capitulation to the opposition.
Agreement aside, Assad has passed the point of no return. Minus resignation and a publicly humiliating trial, Syrians will not react to any of his reforms positively. The killings will continue with the Arab League now directly involved. Without stronger words and actions from China and Russia, a complete enforcement from Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan of the Arab League sanctions, and a Syrian president that inexplicably changes his stripes, a diplomatic solution to the crisis seems no longer a viable option.
Just when you thought Syrian president Bashar al-Assad lost all of his allies nine months into his crackdown on protesters, another bombshell hits his desk. The situation inside Syria is deteriorating so rapidly that Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist organization that governs the Gaza Strip and heads the armed resistance platform against Israel, has found it in their interest to review its own ties with the Ba’athist regime.
If the reports are true, which suggest that some low to middle ranking Hamas political members have already streamed out of their Damascus headquarters, this could be an explosive setback for the Syrian leader, who has long relied upon relationships with armed groups to exert leverage in the region.
Compared to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and its ally Iran, Syria’s army hardly matches up. A large portion of its military technology is left over from the Soviet era and its generals have faced decades of economic sanctions related to military sales. The relationship with Hamas, in addition to Hezbollah in Lebanon, softened the blow to some extent.
The real interesting part of the story, however, is the motives behind Hamas’ decision. Its military wing, confined to the Gaza Strip, has used Syria as its main corridor for weapons supplies sent from the government in Iran. Syria’s support for Hamas ranges across the spectrum from mortars, machine guns and missile components to training in tactics and intelligence sharing.
The United States Department of State, long concerned about Palestinian terrorism in the region, boldly stated that Hamas fighters used Syrian soil for weapons training as recently as 2010.
The fact that Hamas officials are looking to relocate their central headquarters despite their decade-old partnership with the Syrians is a testament to how worried they are about the Syrian government crackdown — and how even the slightest association with that crackdown holds the potential of discrediting them as an Arab resistance movement.
These worries are not new. Last May, The New York Times ran a story suggesting that there was growing strain between Syria and Hamas over the former’s bloody operations against demonstrators. Rumors were that Syrian government officials even pressed Hamas to express its public support for Assad’s government. Hamas rebuffed those demands for an explicit statement of support for Assad would have severely hampered the movement’s image in the eyes of the average Syrian. Instead, the group vowed to follow a policy of neutrality.
Thousands of Syrian civilian deaths later, neutrality is evidently no longer an option for the movement.
Luckily for Hamas, there is no shortage of states willing to host the group. A post-Mubarak Egypt, with a resurgent Muslim Brotherhood picking up seats in the new Egyptian parliament, is a likely destination for Hamas leader Khaled Mashal and his colleagues to set up shop — close to the Gaza Strip and smack in the middle of the Arab world’s most populous country.
Mashal’s attempted reconciliation with the kingdom of Jordan, which kicked Hamas out of Amman over a decade ago, provides the organization with another possible venue (although the United States would surely use its influence with King Abdullah II to limit relocation to the bare minimum). Yemen could have been a possibility if the country was not going down the tubes, in a number of ways. Qatar, with its activist foreign policy throughout the Arab world and its long record of supporting Palestinian aspirations, could be a place holding a considerable economic upside.
Wherever the movement decides to go, Hamas has made a smart political calculation — not only for protecting the personal welfare of its members and their families but also because they the group recognizes that Syria’s Assad loses more control over the situation every time a bullet is fired at a protester. With Sunnis as a group getting killed at the fastest rate by an Alawite regime, it was increasingly becoming difficult for Hamas to brandish itself as a Sunni resistance group.
At the regional level, Syria has lost a valuable playing card in any future negotiations with the Israelis. But in the near term, Hamas’ potential departure will give Assad a reason to doubt his staying power. Now only Iran and Hezbollah are squarely behind him.
Just over a year ago, the Arab League was seen as a defunct regional institution with no political will to punish its members and no teeth to back up its resolutions.
With 22 member states, the forum was closer in structure to an exclusive club of autocrats than a effective pan-Arab body trying to improve the lives of its citizens. Statements of self-congratulation and expressions of Arab solidarity were shallow and routine attempts to solve disputes, while the underlying causes of the problems were left to fester. The league’s charter is as keen on preserving national sovereignty as it is on promoting pan-Arab solutions to regional issues.
Were a government to miraculously be condemned by the league, only the states who voted for the condemnation are required to implement the punishments — and even then, the body was unable to prevent states from looking the other way.
But that was one year ago, when democratic governance and human rights in the Middle East were still simmering below the radar. Now, with the Arab Spring in full gear and tens of millions of Arabs standing up against their governments, the league has transformed itself from a ceremonial chamber into one of the busiest regional institutions in the region. The league still has a lot of work to do before it reaches the stature of the European Union or the Union of South American Nations, but its delegates are making a concerted attempt to sanction those who slaughter their own people and reward those who don’t. (more…)
Eid al-Adha, or “Festival of Sacrifice,” is one of the most joyous and religiously significant holidays for observing Muslims around the world. The start of the celebrations are typically marked by Muslims of all nationalities as a time to count their blessings, mingle with friends and spend quality time with family members.
The day commemorates Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son for God’s sake and comes after the annual pilgrimage to Islam’s two holiest sites in the Arabian Peninsula, the cities Mecca and Medina. It’ss such an important holiday to the Islamic faith that millions upon millions of people participate, some celebrating in groups as large as entire villages.
For Syrians, this year’s celebration was of particular significance. Only a few days before the events were to begin, President Bashar al-Assad had accepted an Arab League proposal from the prime minister of Qatar to stop the bloodshed against demonstrators in his country. (more…)
Last week, news of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s assistance to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad broke in The Washington Post. Two days later, the Khaleej Times, an English news outlet in Dubai, reported on a New York Times story that al-Maliki was instead urging Assad to end Syria’s one-party rule. The day prior, Al Arabiya, also from Dubai, ran an opinion piece saying that al-Maliki denied making statements urging Assad to step down.
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s foreign minister, answers questions from reporters at NATO headquarters in Brussels, January 18 (NATO)
When Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu issued Turkey’s final warning to Syria on August 15 it marked the end of an era in Turkish relations with the Middle East. Davutoğlu had visited the authoritarian Middle Eastern country sixty times in his post as chief Turkish diplomat and many of them were in crisis talks over the protests that had swept the country in the past six months.
Davutoğlu had expected his words to carry some weight and that Turkey, a regional superpower and a prospective candidate for European Union membership, could influence its neighbor to the south and encourage it to open up and halt the ongoing crackdown. When those words fell on deaf ears, it marked an end to an experiment known as the “zero problems” foreign policy.
Previous Turkish governments had taken a hard line toward the Middle East and a policy of cooperation with Israel. This changed from 2003 when Davutoğlu and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, representing the moderate Islamic AK Party, came to power and gradually started to assert civilian authority in the face of a suspicious secular military.
The idea was simple — engage with Turkey’s authoritarian neighbors such as Iran and Syria and, using a combination of trade and diplomacy ensure three goals: the securing of Turkey’s long border with the Middle East, a joint response to Kurdish extremism and (it hoped) the gradual cooling of a restive and volatile region prone to boiling over into conflict which would threaten Turkish stability.
In recent years and after elections in 2007 secured an even bigger AK Party majority in Turkey’s parliament, the zero problems policy was rolled out into other areas outside of Turkey’s usual sphere of influence. More authoritarian countries in North Africa such as Algeria, Libya and Tunisia all benefited from a gentler diplomatic approach and greater trade with Turkey.
The biggest event came when Turkey started to foster greater diplomatic and economic ties with its traditional enemy Greece. In 2010, at a time of great economic and political crisis in Greece, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu visited with an army of Turkish ministers and businessmen. Joint cabinet meetings were held and contracts signed and while key issues of borders and a final solution to the Cyprus question were not settled, they were never meant to be. The aim of Turkey’s visit was one of solidarity with its stricken neighbor and to foster an atmosphere where the two countries could set aside their differences and focus on areas of mutual benefit.
The American government and some European nations such as Britain have called for Turkey’s entry into the EU to be accelerated. Turkey’s zero problems policy has also been praised in parts of the world as promoting a more stable and prosperous Middle East.
But zero problems in fact created problems — and awkward ones at that. Some politicians in America and the EU have wondered aloud that if Turkey is actively engaging with regimes such as Iran and Syria, whose side exactly is it on? France and Germany grumble loudly that Turkey turning a blind eye to blatant human rights abuses in Iran and Syria harms its prospects of EU membership.
Worse still, Israeli-Turkish relations have collapsed after several diplomatic incidents, including one case bordering on the bizarre when Israel’s deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon summoned Turkey’s ambassador and dressed him down on national television.
Then came the ill-fated Mavi Marmara fiasco in 2010. A botched raid by Israeli special forces on a ship heading for the Gaza strip ended in nine activists killed and several injured Israeli commandos briefly taken captive, and effectively froze relations between the two nations for a period. Currently, Israel and Turkey are at loggerheads over who is to blame and if an apology by Israel is required. A thaw in relations may only happen if there is a change in government in one or both countries.
Also, these issues were manageable so long as there was no major geopolitical event that could disrupt the delicate balance between East and West that Turkey had so carefully set over the previous decade. Turkey felt that it could continue to develop links to nations once considered beyond the pale and gradually reform itself to become more attractive to the West.
Which is why it could be argued that no country in the region was caught more unawares by the Arab Spring than Turkey. When it broke out in Tunisia, Turkey like France found itself wrongfooted by mass popular protests that started to either remove existing regimes friendly to Ankara or force them into making extensive concessions.
Most damaging were the fall of Tunisian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Libya’s descent into chaos. Turkish business had invested heavily in both countries and now face serious losses as uncertainty looms as to the post-Arab Spring political landscape.
Most worryingly of all, as the protests inch closer and closer to home, Turkey faces an unprecedented foreign policy challenge as a tense Lebanon combines with a mass protest movement in Israel, a surge in violence in Iraq and a Syria in meltdown.
This has seen Turkey in some ways revert to type as its unilateral tendencies start to reappear. Already Turkey has darkly hinted that what is happening in Syria is an “internal Turkish matter” as it frets about the possibility of a long porous border becoming a backdoor for Kurdish terrorism. Nobody is predicting a Turkish intervention in Syria but then again few had predicted the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
The options for Turkey now are limited. It can either wait and see or follow its zero problems strategy and simply shift its stance to accommodate the new order falling across the Middle East. The approach in recent months has been markedly different to how Turkey dealt with Libya and Tunisia initially, as Ankara tries to stay one step ahead in the diplomatic game. Turkish ferries have helped injured civilians out of rebel held Libya for treatment in Turkey or elsewhere, while aid has been promised to Egypt and Tunisia in an effort to woo the new governments. A new Kadima led government in Israel may lead to a thaw in relations between the two countries.
Where this will end nobody quite knows but it will be dictated by the ebb and flow of the Arab Spring.
This story first appeared on War is Boring, August 18, 2011.
The noose around Bashar al-Assad’s neck is tightening. Five months into a nationwide anti-government protest movement that shows no signs of abating, the Syrian president and his inner circle of advisors and security officials have decided to step up the aggression against cities and towns that were overtaken by pro-democracy sentiment. The suburbs of Damascus, quiet and largely insulated from the unrest until last month, have adapted into an extension of the marches further south and west — a dangerous escalation for the regime that has tried to retain its base of support in Syria’s two largest cities, Aleppo and Damascus.
Further southeast, the central Syrian city of Hama is in ruins from the aftermath of the most horrendous military assault since demonstrations stared in March — perpetuated by Assad’s most loyal units of the security services. The streets of Hama are deserted, filled with compacted garbage, destroyed homes, collapsed buildings and the decaying corpses of the “martyrs” who put their lives on the line to defend their rights. Entire neighborhoods have been reduced to ruble from the tank shelling and machine gun fire sporadically aimed by Syria’s most elite troops. And while the casualty count is nowhere near the 20,000 that were ordered by Bashar’s father in 1982, the military incursion had a devastating psychological impact nonetheless. Yet just as Syrian protesters have refused to cower from government intimidation, the residents of Hama are ready to rebuild their city and pick up where they left off. (more…)
As the pro-democracy protests inside Syria reach its fifth month — and as the international community continues to figure out what to do next — President Bashar al-Assad’s security services have still not found any remorse for their fellow citizens.
While the number varies according to the source, an estimated sixteen hundred Syrian protesters have been mowed down by the regime — with 28 people killed on Friday, July 17, alone. Hundreds of Syrian families have been torn apart and ruined, often with a son missing or a father killed in the line of fire. Villages that were once havens for tourism and farming are now deserted, scores of residents chased away to Turkey in a bid to escape the escalating brutality. Meanwhile, Bashar Assad has shown no signs of wavering in his stern desire to hold on to power. Common sense would suggest that the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who hit the streets every day are tired of risking their lives in the face of a well armed and equipped army. Yet the passion that the demonstrators have grown to rely upon is only growing stronger with each killing and each rumored detention.
For months, the cycle of violence in Syria has followed a predictable pattern — Syrians chant for freedom, some are killed, funerals are held and more are killed during the funeral procession. It is a bloody, seemingly never ending cycle of anger, yet one that has given Syrians longing for freedom more fire to continue their struggle.
Nevertheless, if there has been anything positive that can be gleaned from the months long anti-regime campaign, it is the peaceful behavior that the protesters have exhibited to their fellow citizens, some of whom are not always as stringently against Assad and they would hope. This fact should not be overstated, for it contradicts an integral component of the Assad regime’s survival strategy — propagate a disastrous, if not limited, period of sectarian fear that will scare Syria’s minority communities back into Assad’s arms.
Violence and intimidation have been Damascus’ high cards, but provoking the Sunni Islamist boogeyman has long been the option of last resort for Bashar, an Alawi president who gains most of his support from Syrian Christians, Druze and Alawis who fear a Sunni takeover of the country. The men and women who pour into the streets know this full well and have been well disciplined not to retaliate against the Alawi community, even as armed Alawi militias have entered a number of cities to shoot up the demonstrators.
Yet as reports indicate that a minor sectarian clash occurred in the central Syrian city of Homs — a mixed neighborhood with Sunni and Alawi residents — one must wonder if this patience is starting to wear thin. Upon the discovery of three Alawis whose bodies were executed and mutilated (presumably by anti-regime figures), Alawi gunmen opened fire in a predominately Sunni neighborhood of the city in retaliation. Shops and small businesses owned by Sunnis were also burned and destroyed, sending a shiver down the spines of the vast majority of protesters who had hoped to sidestep the sectarian issue.
It is tempting to describe the incident as an isolated case, or as an act created by the regime to punish Homs for is spirited resistance. But those conclusions, however tempting, would also be premature, particularly in a country with a Sunni population jumping at the chance of kicking Assad’s Alawi dominated government out. While Syrians of all denominations have been victimized by the Assad dynasty over the past four decades, Sunnis have the most to complain about. A group that composes 75 percent of Syria’s population often finds itself on the outskirts of Syria’s power structure (with the exception of some Sunni generals and wealthy Sunni businessmen). Therefore, the sectarian incident in Homs could be just as much a start of things to come as a bad day better left forgotten.
If, however, sectarian infighting is increasingly on the agenda, Bashar al-Assad will have succeeded in his first step at dividing the Syrian opposition and pitting neighbors against each other. In the mind of Assad, the more violence leveled upon Alawis — regardless of who is doing the killing — the more likely Syria’s minorities will drop their opposition and gravitate toward the ruling elite.
Washington, the United Nations and Syrians should expect the sectarian line to get to thicker in the next few weeks. Failing to prepare accordingly would not only be a dangerous mistake but represent a severe case of amnesia.
Syria is not the safest place to travel for anyone interested in taking a relaxing vacation this summer. Despite a dedicated stampede against anti-regime demonstrations across the country, the Syrian government is still not having much success in containing the protest fever. Syrians long accustomed to looking over their shoulders have now broken through the blanket of fear that the government has relied upon to survive over the past forty years. The situation is getting quite testy in Syria’s periphery, particularly near the Turkish and Iraqi borders, which were quiet until a few weeks ago. Over 10,000 Syrian refugees have fled across the border to makeshift camps in Turkey, dragging the Turkish government into Syria’s internal conflict.
Recognizing that time may not be on his side, President Bashar al-Assad addressed the Syrian people at Damascus University in an attempt to mollify the anger and concerns of millions of his fellow citizens. Before the speech, Assad was hiding from view by remaining silent, even as his military and intelligence agents were killing innocents and razing entire villages. Assad, normally in Syria’s newspapers every single day, was nowhere to be seen in the press. Rumors even surfaced that the Syrian leader was refusing to answer telephone calls from the United Nations Secretary General, which would help explain why the international community is having such a tough time trying to convince him to stop the bloodshed.
But on Monday, June 20, Assad broke his silence, stepped in front of the television cameras and spoke to the Syrian public for close to an hour. (more…)
The revolt in Syria is growing out of control and last weekend was the turning point. The total death tally during those two days was unprecedented for the uprising with some one hundred Syrian protesters killed by Bashar al-Assad’s security forces on Friday alone.
Assad’s regime has clearly shown its hand. For one, the killings last weekend illustrated how serious the Syrian government is taking the protests, which can easily be considered the largest rebellion since the Muslim Brotherhood rose up against the Assad dynasty in the early 1980s. That revolt was crushed by Syrian authorities in the city of Hama.
Concessions, such as the introduction of a political parties bill, the dissolution of the Emergency Laws, the formation of a new cabinet and the release of hundreds of prisoners, have failed to meet the intended effect of dividing the opposition. Instead, since those concessions were handed out, the protesters have become bolder in their demands. What once was a plea for general political and economic reform from President Assad has snowballed into a revolutionary movement against his very rule. (more…)
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in Paris, France, December 9, 2010
Now that the “Arab Spring” has reached the villages and cities of Syria, Bashar al-Assad has, within a few short weeks, met his most challenging obstacle since inheriting the presidency from his father eleven years ago.
Close to one hundred Syrian demonstrators have been killed by regime loyalists and security services over the past week and the reformist wave that originated in the small southern town of Daraa is now escalating into the suburbs of the country’s largest city. Assad has clearly learned from his fellow autocrats by hinting at concessions in the hopes of fracturing the protest movement. Hundreds of demonstrators who were detained since the unrest began were released and Assad’s spokeswoman promised reporters that the Syrian government would consider abolishing the hated 1963 emergency law.
For the United States, putting pressure on the Assad regime is a double edged sword. On the one hand, a downfall or substantial weakening of Assad would give Washington and its Arab allies a significant victory in the Middle East. Syria has long been Iran’s principle ally in the region (since 1979) and the Syrian government has made Israel’s life difficult by pouring money and logistical support into armed Islamist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
At the same time, a post-Assad Syria could very well lead to a number of negative contingencies, all of which could jeopardize the Arab democracy movement.
For starters, Assad and most of his advisors in the military and security forces are Alawites, a small sect of Shia Islam that is a minority in the broader Syrian population. Sunnis, who make up more than 70 percent of the population, have been browbeaten and sidelined by the Assad family for over forty years. A sudden removal of Assad and his Alawite dominated regime could ignite a sectarian conflict between Sunnis tired of sitting on the sidelines and Syria’s minorities who have gotten used to governing the state and enjoying the privileges of power.
Therefore, while the United States would surely like to see one another Middle East troublemaker in the dustbin of history, the Obama Administration should think twice about taking steps to further Assad’s demise. A no-fly zone over Syria in order to protect civilians is out of the question, for the measure would include the bombing runs and cruise missile attacks that continue in Libya today. These actions may have been tolerated on the periphery of the Arab world but it will not be supported by any Arab state in the very heart of the region.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has already ruled out a Libya style intervention in Syria. Surprisingly, Clinton commented that a number of American officials in Congress regarded Assad as a reformer — a sign to opposition Republicans that the administration will not pressure Assad in the same forceful way as it did Muammar Gaddafi. Despite Clinton’s assertion, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman are not backing down from their earlier statements in support of an American response.
There is a divide in the American government as to what the official policy toward Syria’s brutality should be. As the violence ramps up, that divide will only widen and calls for a humanitarian intervention (from both Democrats and Republicans) will likely increase.
However difficult from a political standpoint, the White House has to refrain from using the Libya scenario as a precedent. Assad and his fellow Alawites will not willingly seize power without a fight. And that fight will be just a bloody as the battle in Libya, but far more troubling strategically.
With Arab demonstrations even popping up in the sleepy sultanate of Oman, it seems safe to conclude that the entire region is experiencing a mass revolt.
What started as a dissident gathering in the peripheral state of Tunisia has spread to the heart of the Muslim world, taking out an Egyptian strongman and threatening to unseat a Libyan tyrant. Protests continue to build up in Yemen where a series of ethnic and tribal groups that have longed felt disenfranchised by the government are demanding greater opposition involvement in the country’s political institutions. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are also preparing for action, attempting to use the “Arab Spring” as an opportunity for forging a single government from two separate factions.
However exciting this narrative may be, it is not necessarily an accurate portrayal of what is happening. Yes, the Arab world is dealing with popular sentiment and most of the region’s leaders have not dealt with this type of dissent before. It would not even be a far stretch to brand this wave of protests a new era in Arab history, distinct from the autocratic abyss that its people have been living under for decades.
But it would be misplaced to say that the entire region has changed or has been affected by the “people power” movement. One state in particular continues to do business as usual without any dramatic repercussions from its people — Syria.
Like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, Syria is a heavily autocratic society with an established ruling elite. Bashar al-Assad inherited the presidency from his father Hafez in 2000 at a young age of 34 — this despite the fact that Syria has technically a republican form of government.
Assad and his top advisors and generals are all Alawites, a sect that holds most of Syria’s power but comprises at the most 10 percent of its population. Multiple political parties have been banned in the past and, like Egypt, the ruling party (in this case the Socialist Ba’ath Party) is the dominant force in the decisionmaking process.
Syria has also been ruled by emergency law since 1963 which allows the security services to arrest people on mere suspicion and detain them for indefinite periods without a judicial hearing.
Despite these characteristics, Syrians have yet to stand up to Assad in full capacity. The question is why? It’s not like Syrian society is so closed off from the world that outside information doesn’t creep into the country. Syrians, especially in Damascus, know full well that their Arab brothers are taking it upon themselves to enact political reform.
One plausible factor could be Bashar al-Assad’s talents as a skillful political manipulator. As he has demonstrated throughout ten years in power, the Syrian president knows how to shut people up without compromising himself or his credibility. But another large part of the equation could be the pervasive sense of fear that many Syrians have about speaking out freely.
The government monitors email and other Internet activity on a daily basis. The recent opening of social networking sites could be seen in a similar light, making it easier for the Syrian government to spy on what its citizens are saying and doing over multiple web forums. There should be no surprise that people feel uncomfortable about expressing their views.
Yet as protests escalated in Bahrain, linger in Egypt, pressure the regime in Yemen and began in Oman, Syrians may gradually second guess whether the status quo serves their interests for a more hopeful future. Right now, all we can do is be passive spectators on the outside, looking in.
Five years ago, a former Prime Minister of Lebanon and longtime American ally, named Rafiq Hariri, was assassinated by a car bomb in the heart of Beirut. The incident fueled a popular uprising of Lebanese civilians commonly referred to as the “Cedar Revolution,” which would quickly pressure Syrian forces out of Lebanon after decades of occupation.
Yet the removal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory was not the only aftershock of the Hariri killing. The United States government under President George W. Bush would later blame Syrian authorities for orchestrating the attack on a moderate and Western Arab politician. Washington would sever all diplomatic ties with the Syrians until five years later, when President Barack Obama entered the Oval Office. The Shiite militant movement Hezbollah, which was already on the American security radar for past terrorist attacks, would bear the brunt of America’s attention.
Now in August 2010, after that intense and tumultuous time in Lebanese politics, a UN investigation will release its final judgment on the Hariri murder. Syria has been exonerated from any wrongdoing. That leaves Hezbollah operatives as the main instigators of the attack.
On the eve of the judgment, with everyone preparing to finger Hezbollah for the crime, Lebanon is once again bracing for a political firestorm that could quickly turn violent. The irony is that Rafiq Hariri’s son, Saad Hariri, is now the man who has to keep the lid on the simmering pot.
Unfortunately, this is going to be exceedingly difficult for the younger Hariri to accomplish. He is in a tough position regardless of who is blamed for his father’s murder.
Prime Minister Hariri can either put his firm weight and political support behind the commission’s ruling, making his position known to the world but hurt his appeal with the majority of the Lebanese population (who happen to be Shia and highly supportive of Hezbollah as a social organization). Or he could endorse Hezbollah’s position and denounce the results. He may also choose to order the creation of a new independent commission aiming to uncovering evidence that may have been previously overlooked by the original investigation. This move, however, would hurt him with the United States and Israel at a time when Lebanon is already experiencing a harsh rebuke over the Israeli border incident.
So what can Hariri do?
So far, he’s been trying to straddle both sides by largely keeping his mouth shut and letting the tribunal do its job. This is what Hariri is probably going to do until a verdict is reached.
If Hezbollah isn’t fingered, Hariri has dodged a bullet. But if Hezbollah is in fact implicated, then Hariri may choose to call another investigation in order to keep a potentially violent situation from getting out of control. The Lebanese government’s main concern is to limit a potential civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. The best way to do that is to divert pressure to an outside actor.
This is all speculation of course. In either event, Hariri Junior is going to strain some relationships.
