Russia and the West have had a love-hate relationship for centuries. These are the stories of what some are already calling the Second Cold War.
A month after the Dutch political fringe claimed victory in a referendum that rejected the European Union’s association agreement with Ukraine, rumors of a “Russian hand” in the campaign that influenced voters to sabotage Ukraine’s European integration still swirl.
Can this referendum really be chalked up as a Russian triumph? Or is there an altogether more worrying lesson to be drawn? (more…)
During the past year, the primary focus of the American-Russian rivalry has centred around Iran. The United States put an end to Western sanctions against Iran and also chose to keep American troops in Afghanistan, who support, among others, many of the tens of millions of Afghans who are Shiite Muslims or who can speak Farsi (as opposed to the Taliban, who are Sunni and typically Pashto-speaking). Russia, meanwhile, intervened to aid Bashar al-Assad in Syria, whose survival diverts Sunni attention away from Iran’s Shiite allies in Iraq.
With Russia now withdrawing most of its forces from Syria and the United States hoping to do so from Afghanistan, the focus of the American-Russian rivalry could revert, perhaps, to Ukraine. By comparison to the Middle East, Ukraine has appeared to be quite quiet of late.
Russia may have dialed back the conflict there partly in order to shift the West’s focus to the Middle East. This of course has not been very difficult to accomplish, given Europe’s influx of Syrian migrants and America’s election-season rhetoric on issues like ISIS, the conflict in Libya and Donald Trump’s proposal to ban, for an unspecified amount of time, all Muslims from traveling to the United States.
If the American-Russian focus does move back toward Eastern Europe, one can perhaps guess the rough outlines of any geopolitical contest that may occur there. (more…)
Sometimes in politics everything is exactly what it looks like.
This was the case when the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, visited Moscow last week, extended a gas contract with Russia and told the Russian president that the period when the EU automatically extended sanctions against Russia was “behind us.”
The moment of honesty came when Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán got to compliment each other on their Syria and refugee-related policies. “We value greatly the efforts made to resolve this problem [of Middle Eastern refugees],” said Orbán, adding, “We wish you great success in your international initiatives.” Putin then said, “Our people has sympathy for the position taken by the Hungarian government” on the refugee crisis.
And yes, in a perverse way, the two policies do indeed work very well together — that is, to suit the needs of the two leaders: Russia’s intervention in Syria aggravated the war and the refugee crisis. Which, in turn, strengthened Orbán’s position in Hungary and in Europe. Which, in turn, helped far-right parties and Putin allies and weakened the EU.
This unspoken but existing alliance, ultimately, against the EU and against the solution of a refugee crisis that benefits them both, was behind the chumminess that the Hungarian prime minister and the Russian president showed in Moscow.
The Russian pro-government press could hardly hide its joy over the visit. Izvestia wrote about a meeting of “not only partners, but friends on principles,” noting that Orbán was the first foreign leader whom Putin met in the new working building at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence. But calling Orbán and Putin friends is an exaggeration. Just as Orbán himself declared last year, Putin “is not a man who has a known personality,” which largely rules out making friends with fellow leaders. Even on principles. (more…)
Here now is the predictability of geopolitics coming to the top of the news cycle: when you are top dog, you don’t take kindly to anyone trying to tear you down.
In the last week the United States, an empire in all but name, has struck back against its chief rivals. The first occurred in the disputed South China Sea where Beijing has constructed whole islands right in the middle of heavily-trafficked and potentially resource-rich waves. China’s plan was to extend its sea claim outwards from these islands, but the United States thwarted that scheme by sending a warship directly into China’s no-gone zone.
Meanwhile, in Syria’s murderous civil war, Russia’s deployment of bombers and tanks has now begun to be matched with the public announcement America is sending forces to fight in Iraq and to train allies in Syria.
In other words, the empire is striking back. But it’s playing by some well-defined rules as it does. (more…)
The news of a suspected foreign submarine in Swedish waters attracted massive media coverage last year. The Swedish Navy, a shadow of its former self after more than a decade of budget cuts, launched an intelligence-gathering operation to secure evidence of the intrusion. In November, the navy presented what it considered to be concrete proof of an intrusion by a foreign submarine. This included sonar tracks and a photograph, both of which had been subjected to detailed technical analysis and were made public.
Last week, the Swedish Navy said that another suspected submarine sighting, in late October, had been dismissed after extensive investigation which found that the suspected vessel was in fact a “workboat.” This second observation was made a full week after the original intelligence-gathering operation concluded and was treated by Swedish defense as a separate event. (more…)
Russia remembers that it lost the Cold War. The United States needs to be reminded that it won.
In the mid-1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall faded from immediate memory and talk of a “post-Cold War era” became prolific, the United States began to forget about Russia. Afghanistan and Iraq cemented our amnesia. A new generation of policymakers and thinkers became captivated with “emerging threats” and “global challenges” that required “international cooperation” and “collective solutions.”
When the United States did pay attention to Europe or Eurasia, it sought to expand NATO, bolster the European Union and extend democratic norms often against Russia’s wishes. When our strategic adversary was weak, we exploited the power vacuums that emerged and made sure that Russia became, in fact, a “regional power.” Most of this action was done without a nuanced understanding of Moscow’s goals or ambitions. Putin remembers all of this – along with most of the twentieth century – as follies that must be corrected.
So here we are, surprised by Russian actions in Ukraine. But we shouldn’t be. The Kremlin takes no notice of our “new eras.” Putin’s Crimea snatch reminds us that territory, power and influence still matter. Hence the Washington DC circuit has been reinvigorated in recent weeks by old men waving their long-ago written “I told you so” policy tracts. Listening to them is unbearable but serves us right. (more…)
While it calls for limitations on NATO’s missile defense shield in Europe and raises questions about the justification of such a system now that a nuclear deal with Iran seems within reach, Russia’s own missile defense systems capabilities have been strengthening.
The combination of the United States building missile defenses in Europe and Russia enhancing its defensive capabilities could, as Bill Gertz argued in The Washington Free Beacon last year, “upset strategic stability and complicate efforts to reduce strategic offensive arms.” Not only is the development of such systems a concern; some of the systems are for export purposes too. Hence, it would accelerate the missile defense arms race on a larger scale.
America’s refusal to provide information to Russia regarding the locations of its missile defense interceptors in Europe, the number of interceptors and their reaction speeds has prompted Russia to undertake a comprehensive missile defense program of its own. (more…)
Late June, the Shah Deniz consortium chose the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project as its partner of choice for exporting Caspian Sea gas from Azerbaijan to Europe, excluding competing Nabucco West.
The European Union and the United States welcomed the decision as another concrete step toward decreasing the former’s dependence on energy exports from Russia. They would probably would have reacted likewise if Nabucco had won instead.
The news was received even more positively by Italy. Premier Enrico Letta declared it “a great victory.” The reason for this enthusiasm can be easily understood by looking at any map depicting the routes of all the competing projects. They were all designed to link with Turkey’s Trans Anatolian Pipeline, but then each would have taken a different path.
Nabucco would have headed northwest through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to connect with existing pipeline infrastructure in Austria and is aimed at servicing mainly Central European countries.
TAP instead heads west through Greece and Albania, crossing the Adriatic Sea to end up in southern Italy. It will mainly serve Southern European countries. (more…)
After the European Union agreed to a financial rescue of Cyprus on Monday, the Netherlands’ Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who chairs the group of eurozone finance ministers, announced, “We put an end to the uncertainty for Cyprus and the eurozone.”
Yet much of the uncertainty was created by the bloc’s unwillingness to bail out Cyprus altogether and the possibility of Russian involvement in its rescue. (more…)
In the latest issue of Proceedings magazine, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Mowchan of the US Army articulates a vision of Russia that is in many ways at odds with reality. For this reason, it deserves a commentary that will also act as a rebuttal.
Early on, the author refers to the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as Russia’s Sword of Damocles hanging over Southeast Europe and the Caucasus. If so, it’s a rusty sword indeed. Mowchan himself notes in the conclusion of that section of the article that,
Currently, the BSF’s only viable warship is the Slava class guided-missile cruiser Moskva. […] If current modernization and manning trends persist, the BSF will be unable to effectively accomplish any of its assigned missions in the next five years.
So how can a fleet comprised of ancient, barely seaworthy ships serve as an existential threat to the entire region?
According to Mowchan, the threat lies in the fleet’s coming resurrection. The Russian government has announced grand plans to modernize the fleet by sending up to fifteen new combatants to the fleet by 2020. Yet in the current Russian military, such plans are rarely accomplished.
Nevertheless, I am sure that the fleet will be substantially more capable in 2020 than it is now. It will at a minimum have the two Neustrashimy class frigates (transfered from the Baltic Fleet), three new updated Krivak class frigates, and perhaps one or two new Admiral Gorshkov class frigates. A Mistral and one or two new Ivan Gren amphibious landing ships are also likely. Add in a couple of new diesel submarines and a minimum of ten new combatants seems highly likely. So in 2020 the BSF will undoubtedly be much more powerful than it is now, though it will probably still be outclassed by the Turkish Navy.
But what will Russia do with these forces? Lieutenant Colonel Mowchan believes that the fleet “will become a tool by which Moscow exerts greater influence over other Black Sea nations.” Well, of course, one of the main reasons countries build military forces is to increase their political power, so that statement seems fine on its face. The problem comes with the author’s assumption that security in the region (and perhaps in the world as a whole) is a zero-sum game where any gain for Russia is automatically a loss for the United States. He sees the BSF’s modernization as leading to “an increase in the possibility of conflict between Russia and those Black Sea states seeking greater integration with the West” and positioning Russia “to threaten American vital interests in the region.”
This is perhaps the core of my disagreement with this article, as I see the potential for regional security to be a positive-sum game (or, if things go badly, a negative-sum game) where improvements in regional security can help secure the interests of both sides. In my view, improvements in Russian naval capabilities will lead, inter alia, to greater and more effective cooperation with NATO and other states’ warships in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Mowchan explicitly rejects this view and that’s fine.
But I wonder, does he really think that Russia might go to war with NATO in the foreseeable future? He argues that France’s decision to sell the Mistral to Russia “sets a dangerous precedent that could result in such capabilities being used against NATO or other American allies.” He believes that Russia bought the Mistral ships in order to “create inter-alliance frictions that could undermine NATO’s cohesion and decisionmaking in a crisis — especially if Russia is an active participant in such a conflict.”
Actually, I think Russia bought the ships because its leaders realized that a joint construction program was the best possible way for them to modernize their shipbuilding capacity. And besides, quoting one French source, “the Mistral is just a ferry painted grey.” It is not some dreadnought.
Again, I question the possibility of Russia and any NATO state going to war any time in the foreseeable future. But perhaps I am naive in this. If so, I would welcome those who disagree to comment with plausible scenarios that lead to military conflict between Russia and NATO — especially given the deplorable weakness of Russia’s conventional forces and the sad state of their conscripts.
Finally, there is the question of whether Russian activity in the Black Sea can “threaten American vital interests in the region.” According to the author, these include democratization, regional stability, and access to energy supplies. I would argue that the Black Sea is a fairly marginal territory for the United States. Europe may care about access to energy supplies (i.e., natural gas) from this region, but America does not get any of its natural gas and very little of its oil supplies from this area. (In fact, America gets twice as much oil from Russia as it does from all the other post-Soviet states combined.) So energy is an American interest only indirectly, via its effect on Europe. And Europe has recently focused on developing alternatives such as LNG and shale gas to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies.
Most new Caspian and Central Asian energy resources developed in the coming decade will be going to China, not Europe. Turkey gets gas from Russia through the Blue Stream pipeline that traverses the Black Sea, and may participate in the coming South Stream project across the Black Sea, neither of which the Russians are likely to cut off — they need the money.
Regional stability is important, but as I already argued, this is something that can best be achieved by working with Russia, not against it. Because of simple geographic proximity, the Black Sea will always be more important for Russia than it is for the United States, much as the Caribbean is more important for the United States than it is for Russia.
Russia will have more interest in regional politics and greater staying power in the event of political conflicts, so the only way to truly achieve regional stability is to engage in a partnership with Russia that integrates it into regional political institutions, including those in Europe, for which the Black Sea is quite peripheral.
Finally, there is democratization. As recent events in the Middle East have shown only too clearly, this is an interest for the United States primarily when nothing else gets in the way. Stability, alliances, access to resources all trump democratization. Furthermore, the governments brought in by “color revolutions” in the former Soviet states (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan) have all (in different ways) failed at building democracies in their countries. Ukraine’s leaders failed by engaging in internecine squabbling that prevented them from institutionalizing their gains and led to the return of Viktor Yanukovich as president. Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia made some early moves against corruption but has since been gradually building a populist demagogic regime that has shut down opposition media outlets and used violence against protesters. Both states are more democratic than they were prior to their revolutions, but they have certainly failed to meet the expectations with which the new regimes came to power.
This is not to say that the United States do not have one vital interest in the Black Sea. It plays an important role in transporting goods and people to Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network and overflights of former Soviet states. This is a network in which Russia plays a critical role and has proven quite helpful in reducing American dependence on supplying its troops through Pakistan. In other words, the most important reason for maintaining American access to the Black Sea is an area in which Russia and the United States act as partners.
Given this reality, I would recommend that the United States work to improve relations with Russia in the region by engaging it in bilateral and multilateral cooperative activities, including greater military to military contacts. Military cooperation can, over time, build trust (consider the role of military contacts with the United States in the Egyptian army’s response to the recent protests in that country). Working with the Russian navy will gradually reduce suspicions of the other’s intent on both sides. And (again gradually) this will in turn lead to greater security in the Black Sea region.
Recent newspaper reports bring to our attention an intriguing WikiLeaks revelation of American-Russian agreements as part of the New START treaty. The agreement, according to diplomatic cables released by the whistleblowers’ website, detailed plans for the Obama Administration to reveal to the Russians the serial numbers of all Trident D5 missiles which the United States provide to Britain.
The issue here lays in the policy which Britain pursues with regard to its nuclear forces. The policy relies on ambiguity: officials never disclose the exact numbers of the nuclear arsenal that is held by Britain. One can well imagine why this was part of the New START process as part of its raison d’être is the reduction of delivery vehicles used by both Russia and the United States. By also disclosing the number of American supplied British delivery vehicles, the Obama Administration is making sure to gain Russia’s trust. It would make little sense for the Kremlin to accept American vehicle and warhead reductions, attempt to match them as part of the reduction treaty and yet have to completely ignore those it provides to allies and uses by proxy. (more…)
