Atlantic Sentinel

Tag: Jordan

  • Jordan’s Quiet, Growing Role in Syria’s Uprising

    With the daily death toll in the Syria civil war reaching an average of nearly one hundred, a growing number of Syria’s neighbors are ramping up their support of those fighting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

    Most attention has been directed at Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, a group of Sunni dominated countries that have sent the largely Sunni opposition in Syria money and weapons and provides shelter and training.

    Turkey’s support has grown to such an extent that Bashar al-Assad himself has blamed Ankara for much of the violence.

    But neighboring Jordan has also begun to increase its commitment to the anti-Assad rebellion. (more…)

  • An Expanded Gulf Cooperation Council

    In a surprise announcement by Gulf Arab leaders last week, the Gulf Cooperation Council welcomed proposals by Jordan and Morocco to enter into the alliance. The GCC, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has been wracked by internal protest against monarchial rule since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia last January.

    The Al Khalifa Sunni ruling family of Bahrain is still experiencing its most extensive period of civil unrest since earlier in the decade when Shiites rose up against the monarchy for an extension of political rights.

    Saudi Arabia, the most powerful state in the GCC, continues to dispatch police to its restive Eastern Province where the bulk of its oil reserves are located, in order to crackdown on Shia protests there. UAE authorities have launched arrest raids against human rights defenders and civil society activists, most of whom come from the emirates’ wealthy clientele. Oman under Sultan Qaboos bin Said has been relatively peaceful  compared to demonstrations that have turned violent elsewhere yet residents in the quiet Gulf sultanate are taking to the streets. Oil rich Kuwait is dragging its feet on providing citizenship to thousands of people who, although not Kuwaiti in origin, have moved to the small Gulf state to improve their lives.

    The monarchies of the Persian Gulf are thus nervous about the type of political developments occurring around them, and in some cases, within their own borders. Saudis and emirates, who are preferably on the side of regional stability, have already acted in concert with the GCC to quell Bahrain’s protest movement. The offering of a GCC bid to Jordan and Morocco could be another tact to add new members and defend the alliance.

    Why Jordan and Morocco? Like the GCC overall, both are pro-Western regimes boasting strong intelligence and military relationships with the United States. Both are indeed monarchies, which would suit them well in a club that is composed exclusively of kings and sultans. Both also happen to be countries with large Sunni populations, which would undoubtedly help Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners unite the region’s Sunni community against encroaching Iranian influence.

    But if Jordan and Morocco are welcomed to join, why not Egypt, Iraq or Yemen? Geographically speaking, Iraq and Yemen would be far more preferable than Jordan, which is not even considered a Persian Gulf nation to begin with. Iraq also happens to sit atop the region’s second largest pool of oil, a product which would fill the pockets of the GCC with billions of dollars more in revenue.

    While Yemen’s oil production is scheduled to dry out completely in the next decade, Yemenis still possess more oil than the Jordanians, who rely almost completely on foreign aid to sustain their infrastructure and fund their government.

    Post-Mubarak Egypt, still in its infant stage of democracy and trying to reassert itself as an independent power, was notably absent as well, straining ties between Egypt and its traditional Gulf backers. Yemen, with all of its domestic problems and a nationwide protest movement of its own, remains the ugly sister on the outside looking in.

    The Jordanian and Moroccan bids should therefore be seen as a political strategy rather than an example of economic unification. Surrounded by an ascending Shia government in Iraq and the loss of a strategic ally in Hosni Mubarak, Gulf royals are nervous.

    How the United States and Europe fit into this equation is still to be determined. Indeed, it is important to remember that just because Jordan and Morocco are encouraged to apply doesn’t mean that both will find a new home in the GCC. Yet if their applications are accepted, the regional balance of power will be tilted more toward the Sunni states.

  • Don’t Forget About Jordan, Yemen

    With news focused on the exciting (yet increasingly deadly) political upheaval in the center of Cairo, it’s easy to forget that other states in the Arab world are experiencing protests of their own. The popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are certainly the most visible and ecstatic but dissent often takes a subtle form. In contrast to the clashes that have come to categorize the Egyptian demonstrations, other anti-government protests are starting to gain momentum, many of which have been peaceful and orderly.

    While Egypt is often referred to as the most strategically vital state for Washington’s interests in the Middle East, two other pro-American governments are starting to feel the heat from their own populations: Yemen and Jordan.

    Protests in the former should be assessed with a small dose of caution, not least because the Yemeni government is already dealing with internal conflicts, population growth and unemployment, along with water and oil shortages. Jordan, on the other hand, is strong, stable and wealthy enough to absorb demonstrations with a relative amount of success.

    The last thing that Yemen’s autocratic president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, needed was another thorn in the side of his regime. The country is faced with a multitude of problems — a Houthi rebellion near the Saudi border, a secessionist movement in its southern provinces, declining oil reserves and a steady stream of young people entering the poor jobs market. Indeed, this is why thousands of Yemenis in the capital are protesting to begin with. Tired of an unhopeful future and an economy running well behind its oil-rich Persian Gulf neighbors, the Yemeni poor (running in the millions) are demanding that their government get serious about reform.

    Yet when asked what reforms they would like to see, many in the demonstrations don’t exactly give reporters and journalists detailed answers. “We need freedom,” most say, but freedom encompasses a broad range of measures that a weak central government may not be able to take without jeopardizing its own position.

    Saleh and his band of military loyalists have been in power longer than Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak — a success that most autocrats around the world can only dream of accomplishing. Without a strong push from the protesters, it’s hard to fathom that Saleh would respond in a way that the protesters could find suitable.

    The good news is that President Saleh understands he needs to take action. Addressing the nation, he announced that he will not run as a candidate during the 2013 presidential election; a concession that is eerily reminiscent of Mubarak’s pledge not to run this September. Saleh has also decided to increase the salaries of the military in an attempt to maintain their loyalty. Will the promise not to stand for election be good enough?

    Jordan is another matter. While Jordanians are gathering in the cities to complain against high prices and poor education, few that live in or know Jordan believe that this will amount to anything resembling the Tunisian or Egyptian uprisings.

    Contrary to other governments that hold a minimal amount of credibility or respect with their people, the Hashemite kingdom led by King Abdullah II is widely accepted by a large sector of Jordanian society. The monarchy rarely gets criticized harshly; the appointed government and parliament take on that role. This is visibly evident throughout the current discord inside the kingdom, with Jordanians directing their anger at the prime minister even though it is the King who dictates what goes on.

    King Abdullah has already responded by dismissing Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai and replacing him with Marouf al-Bakhit, a former prime minister and monarchy loyalist. Similar to Saleh’s preemptive actions in Yemen, Abdullah has increased subsidies and lowered the price of fuel, hoping that these measures will help quell the protests before they manage to attain a mass following. The Islamic Action Front, the political wing of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, refused to endorse Bakhit’s appointment though, arguing that the entire system of royal appointments needs to be revised.

    That demand, however revolutionary, will most likely be cast aside by the monarchy as too radical a proposal. The king has the authority to appoint the prime minister, a tradition that will be difficult to change after sixty years of entrenched Hashemite rule  But it is yet another indication of opposition forces and ordinary citizens in the Middle East starting to challenge the way things are run.

    Washington need not worry about Jordan — the country is the most secure in the region and the political order is largely ingrained within Jordanian society. Yemen too, despite its instability, is not a major concern at this time. The protests have been peaceful and violence is confined to hotbeds of the anti-Saleh south.

    Much depends on how Egypt evolves. If the demands of the protesters are marginalized by the regime, those participating in the Jordanian and Yemeni demonstrations may pack up their things and go home. But if Mubarak leaves or gives up authority, then both of these countries could be forced to grant more concessions in the face of an emboldened protest movement.

  • Peace Talks Collapsed Because of Jordan

    Remember the direct talks that occurred in September between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? The question seems silly, but given the short duration (a total of sixteen hours), it wouldn’t be much of a surprise if people have forgotten that both sides actually spoke face to face. After just three meetings, the discussions broke off amid Israel’s refusal to extend the settlement moratorium. Abbas has stayed on the sidelines ever since, a position that he will continue to use as long as the Israeli government refuses to cease settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

    The reason I bring this up is twofold. First, we haven’t had direct talks since that early September date and the United States has been desperately trying coax both sides into talking one on one for the past few months. (Is President Obama getting discouraged?) But more importantly, people in the media (and bloggers like myself) have been citing the wrong reasons as to why the talks collapsed.

    Before this short Newsweek brief came out over the weekend, people similar to myself assumed that the September discussions were terminated because Netanyahu and Abbas were stubborn and unwavering in their demands. In other words, that Israelis wanted one thing, the Palestinians another, and a moderate compromise remained elusive.

    This, apparently, was the wrong assumption to hold. According to Newsweek‘s Dan Ephron, the talks were doomed from the start, due to Netanyahu’s unwillingness to discuss anything before Israel’s “security concept” was accepted by Abbas’ negotiators. This may be a reasonable demand, given Israel’s contentious past with its Arab neighbors and Palestinian militants. But when one gets to the heart of what Israel’s “security concept” means, Netanyahu’s stubbornness simply becomes unjustifiable.

    In details provided by Newsweek, Netanyahu wanted Israeli troops on Palestine’s side of the West Bank barrier, in addition to a large contingent of Israeli soldiers in the Jordan Valley.

    This last demand is particularly difficult to understand. The state of Jordan is, based on Middle Eastern standards, one of the most moderate regimes in the region. Jordanian and Israeli intelligence have worked together repeatedly over the past decade on everything from immigration control to the tracking of militants. Jordan even holds a formal peace treaty with Israel, one of only two Arab states that do so (Egypt being the other). So why, despite all of these positives, was Netanyahu so insistent on retaining Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley?

    Negotiators who were involved in the September talks confirm that the demand was due to Israel’s concern about Jordan turning more radical in the future. Last time I checked, Jordan was relatively stable, and the one political party that Israel has always been leery of, the Muslim Brotherhood, is largely a pragmatic political actor in Jordanian politics.

    Netanyahu is either using Jordan as an excuse to surround a potential state of Palestine with Israeli troops, or King Abdullah’s Hashemite Kingdom is a lot more fragile than we all have been led to believe. Taking Netanyahu’s politics into account — and his desire to keep his right-wing coalition afloat — I’m guessing that the first statement weights more heavily in his mind than the second.