Atlantic Sentinel

Tag: Islam

  • Old Wounds in the Persian Gulf

    American, Arab and European armed forces may be intensively focused on operations over Libya but something just as dramatic is unfolding on the other side of the Middle East. Although this conflict may not be as violent as the one currently underway in Libya, it is nevertheless highly significant for every country that has even a remote interest in the region.

    The drama in question concerns the rebellion in the island kingdom of Bahrain, a small nation barely visible on a map but a geostrategic hub where the Arab world’s most fractious political and social fault lines converge: sectarianism, class, religion and age. (more…)

  • The Volcanic Island in the Persian Gulf

    Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are usually described in the press as the “big” American allies in the Middle East — the countries that hold the most geostrategic weight and the ones whose leaders are most willing and able to help the United States in the region when it cannot help itself. Before Hosni Mubarak was thrown out of his palace, all three states were also seen as the most politically stable, at least in the short term when compared to the tinderbox that is Lebanon and the young Iraqi democracy.

    This line of thinking has guided American foreign policy in the Middle East for the last three decades. Saudi Arabia is used by the United States to counter the influence of Iran in the Persian Gulf while Egypt in the Mubarak era was a key (if not the key) partner in counterterrorism missions. But with Arabs now waking up to anew reality — a reality that clearly exhibits the strong and windy force of “people power” — Barack Obama’s administration has rightly begun to rethink the myriad that is the American foreign policy status quo.

    Putting aside Egypt’s young transition to democracy for a moment, no other country today is more emblematic to America’s predicament in the region than the tiny kingdom of Bahrain; that little known island smack in the middle of Iran and the Sunni Arab world. (more…)

  • Hezbollah Withdraws from Lebanese Government

    There was once a time in Lebanon’s history when every major faction in its political system (the Hariri family, the Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and the Maronite Catholic community) decided to throw down their weapons in order to forge a national unity government. Hezbollah and the Sunni community led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri, bitter enemies in the past, were able to cast aside many of their differences in the pursuit of this goal. In fact, the national unity government that would result from this cooperation boded relatively well for Lebanon. Differences over ideology and policy were still prevalent, but those differences were being played out in the cabinet, not on the streets.

    Unfortunately, this era in Lebanon’s history has now eroded. On January 12, Hezbollah lawmakers and Hezbollah sympathizers in Saad Hariri’s administration decided to pull out of the government altogether, giving Lebanon watchers another bout of worry that the entire country may be quickly coming apart at the seams.

    The issue that prompted the pullout is one that has hovered over Lebanon like a dark cloud for the past five years: the International tribunal tasked with investigating the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

    While the work of the tribunal has proceeded at a slow pace, analysts monitoring Lebanon expect indictments to come out soon. Western and Arab officials are bracing for the ruling, which will probably charge members of Hezbollah with at least partial responsibility for Hariri’s death. Yet the cost of issuing the indictments may in fact come at the expense of Lebanon’s national security: something that ordinary Lebanese are all too accustomed with.

    It was quite clear at the beginning of the investigation that Hezbollah would not, under any circumstances, respect the international tribunal. Hezbollah has launched verbal attacks against the tribunal in the past, describing it as an Israeli plot to destroy its movement. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, has vowed to “cut off the hand” of anyone who attempts to arrest a member of Hezbollah for Hariri’s murder.

    The departure of Hezbollah from the Lebanese government is already being viewed by American officials as a provocation meant to plunge Lebanon into another round of sectarian violence.

    But in reality, this move may simply be Hezbollah’s way of demonstrating to the United States and its moderate Arab allies in the region that it has both the power and the influence to rewrite a chapter in Lebanon’s tense political history. Washington may not like what Hezbollah’s political wing is doing, but the fact remains that the White House doesn’t possess any leverage to stop Hezbollah from doing what it wants to do.

    How the prime minister and his political allies respond is now the next stage in the game.  Hariri has already been asked by the Lebanese president to remain in a caretaker role, at least keeping some semblance of governance in place — even if the Lebanese government is usually gridlocked on a good day.

    Qatar, a tiny Gulf Emirate that negotiated an agreement between rival Lebanese politicians only two years ago, may feel tempted to renew its role as a power broker. Demonstrations in support of Hezbollah and demonstrations in support of Hariri will ensue on the streets of Beirut, which could quickly turn sectarian if the situation is not kept under a modicum of control. (Hezbollah is the main representative of Lebanon’s Shia, while Hariri is often regarded as the de facto leader of Lebanon’s Sunni community.)

    Meanwhile, the most the United States can do is sit back, make some telephone calls and hope for the best.

  • When Religion Meets War

    What do you do when you know the exact location of a top level terrorist operative, but dropping a bomb on that location would cause a firestorm that could engulf an entire country into further chaos? Do you suck it up, assess the target and kill the people responsible for numerous attacks? Or do you take the high ground, consider the political context and wait to fight another day?

    These are the types of questions that American intelligence analysts are asking themselves in Pakistan today. The target in question is a recruitment and training center of the Haqqani network, an independent insurgent organization responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The American military believes that Haqqani leaders meet at this location on a near weekly basis, training new members and planning for the next operation.

    It sounds like a slam dunk case. The only problem is that this Haqqani compound is a mosque; the most potent and influential symbol in the Islamic world.

    Therein runs the conundrum which the United States face as its armed forces continue to take the fight to militants in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan. In fact, therein lies the microcosm of America’s battle against extremism of the past ten years; what is normally a “no brainer” in conventional military terms quickly turns into a tricky situation in a counterinsurgency environment.

    The United States have run into a similar predicament before, when US Marines were heavily engaged with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia in the southern Iraqi city of Najaf. The battle lasted for weeks, Americans were suffering heavy casualties and the Iraqi population of the city was often caught in the crosshairs. But as the Marines cleared the city block by block, they found themselves closing in on Sadr’s whereabouts. At one point, they circled Sadr’s exact location, inside one of Shia Islam’s holiest of mosques.

    The Americans, faced with a choice of bombing the shrine or leaving it alone, wisely decided that the latter was the more plausible strategy. Surrounded from all sides, Sadr negotiated a ceasefire with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) at the time, promising to halt attacks against Americans. The United States withdrew and many conservatives became highly critical of the decision. Yet the ceasefire agreement saved the Unites States a lot of aggravation with the Muslim world (to put it mildly) at a time when the military was still grappling with the prisoner abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib detention center.

    Six years later, the United States are in much the same situation, this time in a country that has a nuclear weapons stockpile and a heck of a lot more people (approximately 170 million). Thus far, the CIA has concluded that bombing the madrassa in Miranshah is not the best approach, fearing a violent backlash from ordinary Pakistanis. Instead drones have taken another approach to the problem, bombing the suspected militants coming too and from the site.

    Coalition commanders who are eager for success in Afghanistan may be itching to pull the trigger on the mosque. But showing restraint, as the CIA is currently doing, may in fact be more effective in the long term rather than killing a few Haqqani militants now. If counterinsurgency depends on the support of the local population, the last thing the American image needs is another wave of angry protesters in South Asia.

    Showing restraint, on the other hand, is the best essence of what General David Petraeus so often refers to as “strategic patience.”

  • Al Qaeda’s Civil War Strategy in Yemen

    Something disturbing is happening in Yemen. And unfortunately, it has nothing to do with the country’s declining oil reserves, dried up water resources, nor the Yemeni government’s problems with the Houthis to the north and the secessionists in the south.

    Rather a new internal conflict is arising in Yemen that could have devastating consequences, both for the country’s weak government and for American interests: a potential civil war between Yemeni Shiites and Yemeni Sunnis.

    At first glance, you may be wondering why this is news. Indeed, for those watching the small Gulf Arab state closely, it’s no surprise that Shiites and Sunnis have many disagreements. Yemen’s Zaidi Shia population, which comprises close to 45 percent of the people, is disenfranchised politically and is often subjected to harsh repression from the government’s security services, particularly in the northern province of Sa’da. (President Ali Abdullah Saleh is ironically a member of the same Zaidi sect.) It isn’t that big of a surprise to learn why Shiites in northern Yemen are staging an insurgency — the disconnect between those living in the capital and those living in the countryside is extraordinarily wide.

    Yet the conflict between Yemen’s Shiites and Sunnis may be taking a violent step into further escalation. Late last month, November 24, close to thirty people attending a Shia religious procession were reported killed in an Al Qaeda suicide attack. It was the first time in the history of the organization’s Yemeni branch that the group mounted an operation deep in the Shia heartland of the country. And while only a single attack by a single Al Qaeda franchise, it should serve as a warning to both the United States and its fledging Yemeni partner. In an attempt to further destabilize the country, Al Qaeda may be trying to foment the same sectarian violence that the group so effectively orchestrated in Iraq.

    Al Qaeda hasn’t been wasting time. A mere two days after the first operation, its operatives killed two more Shiites en route to a religious funeral. Two deliberate attacks in two days against Shiite targets is quite significant, even by Yemen’s standards.

    Thus far, there has not been much from the White House and the State Department in response to the attacks. In fairness, President Barack Obama has a lot on his docket right now, including a war in Afghanistan that he is attempting to salvage and nuclear talks with Iran that his administration is desperately trying to steer in a productive direction.

    But the White House, and the region in particular, should be wary of these two cases. Al Qaeda has indiscriminately targeted Shiites before. The result — a deep division between Shiites and Sunnis and a two year Iraqi civil war — was nothing short of horrific. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may be taking a page from the Iraqi experience, hoping to make the Yemeni government even weaker than it already is. The last thing Yemen needs is another conflict that could become unmanageable, if not chaotic.

  • Radical Islamism on the Rise in Tatarstan?

    Even if youngsters in Tatarstan are becoming islamic, the authorities in this Russian republic have little reason to fear a surge in religious extremism. Persecution of pious Muslims would in fact only spur violence, not prevent it.

    I recently came across an article that argues that Tatarstan is facing an Islamization scenario akin to what has already occurred in Ingushetia and Dagestan. It reports on a talk given at a conference on ethnic and religious tolerance recently held in Kazan. Rais Suleimanov, the deputy director of the Center for Eurasian and International Studies at the Kazan Financial University, points out that youth comprise 40 percent of people who regularly attend mosque in the region. Yana Amelina, the head of the Caucasus department at the center and another conference participant, notes that radical Islam has over the last few years replaced ethnic separatism as the dominant anti-state ideology in the Caucasus and is now spreading into the Volga region.

    When I was last in Kazan two years ago, I was struck by the sheer number of young women wearing “Islamic” clothing and young men with those beards that act as markers of Islamic identity in the former Soviet Union. This was in stark contrast to previous visits, when everyone (and especially young people) wore European style clothing and hair styles. The number of people with such Islamic markers was also much higher in Kazan two years ago than in my visit to Baku last week.

    Of course, wearing traditional clothing or a beard is not a sign that one is a Wahhabi extremist (though it might be interpreted as such a sign by the local authorities). But I think there is no doubt that young people are more religious now than they were five to ten years ago and that the religion they are following is not the “traditional (Hanafi) Islam” of the area but less moderate imports from the Middle East.

    But this does not mean that they are all ready to take up arms against the government or support some kind of Islamic Caliphate. The authorities would take that interpretation at their own peril — if they start repressing religious Tatars, they may end up promoting more violence than if the people were left alone to worship as they please.

    The proposal in the article that the government should reject any attempts at dialog with the “Wahhabi lobby” in Russia and instead ban all “Wahhabi activity” seems to be particularly counterproductive in this regard. This is the kind of thing that was tried in places like Kabardino-Balkaria five, six years ago and only led to more people taking up arms against the authorities, because of a desire for revenge against the very people who humiliated them or repressed their relatives. Those who follow this topic may well remember the story about Russian Interior Ministry operatives going into mosques and forcibly shaving people or carving crosses into their hair. The net result of these actions was a rapid increase in anti-government attitudes, followed by Islamic radicalism, then a spike in violence in the region.

    The regional authorities could shoot themselves in the foot by taking excessively harsh measures against nonviolent but pious Muslims who reject the traditional Islamic leadership in the region in favor of strands of Islam imported from the Middle East. In that case, one could see the formation of violent bands whose goal is revenge against those who humiliated or hurt them.

    If, on the other hand, followers of Salafi Islam in Tatarstan are monitored but not persecuted, the chances for a significant surge of religiously based violence in the region is pretty remote.

    Violence in the Caucasus is due to a combination of religious extremism, a hopeless economic situation, and a perception that the local authorities are all crooks. Tatarstan may have more religious extremists than it used to, but its economic situation is pretty good by Russian standards and its authorities are less blatantly corrupt than those in the North Caucasus. Unless we start seeing massive unemployment among young Muslim men in the Volga region, I don’t think we should worry about the kind of violence and instability that we see in Dagestan or Ingushetia spreading to Tatarstan.

    There will be occasional disenchanted Tatar extremists who want to fight, but they will continue to do what they have been doing for the last decade — they’ll go off to the Caucasus, or to Afghanistan, and fight there. Tatarstan itself, as well as the entire Volga region, will become more religious, to be sure, but will nonetheless remain fairly stable and non-violent for the foreseeable future.

  • Who’s to Blame for the Arabs’ Troubles?

    Those interested in the politics and culture of the Arab world may want to check out this short blog post from Tom Ricks over at Foreign Policy. Granted, Ricks doesn’t exactly contribute anything himself in terms of substance; his post merely highlights a debate between two scholars about the state of the Middle East today. But this is precisely why Ricks is one of the most knowledgeable journalists in international relations today. He knows when to step back and share the spotlight with other perspectives. (more…)

  • Building a Mosque in Election Time

    The newest political hot spot in America is the mosque slated to be built near Ground Zero, the site of the Trade Towers bombing of 2001, in New York City. Politicians are lining up and taking sides in the countdown to elections this fall. Even President Barack Obama voiced his ambivalent and unclear opinion, noting that America’s commitment to religious freedom must be “unshakable.” That includes, according to the president, “the right to build a place of worship and a community center on private property in Lower Manhattan.” The next day though, he backpedaled and declared that while people have a right to build mosques in America if they want to, he isn’t quite sure about the wisdom of this particular location.

    As always politicians are using the controversy first stirred up by conservative talk radio hosts to make election bids. Some are saying that they believe in freedom of religion; others that they believe in zoning laws and the sacredness of this particular site. And surprisingly, unlike most issues, this one is not split down party lines.

    For one thing, mere months from November’s midterm elections for Congress, no one can afford to disenfranchise his or her electorate. According to a recent CNN poll 68 percent of Americans are opposed to the mosque being built at Ground Zero. Even politicians not up for election this cycle have to watch their step or risk losing votes for their party. Many lawmakers have decided that silence, at least on this issue, is golden. Whatever they say, they’re bound to insult either their political base or their political party. We are way past the days of actual integrity and principle, if ever those days have existed in Washington.

    What are the principles behind the issue? America certainly is a place of freedom, including religious freedom. Yet there are lines. Your freedom to do what you like cannot infringe on another’s for example. And no matter your religious preferences they cannot suspend the laws of the land, thus polygamy, human and animal sacrifices and honor killings are all illegal notwithstanding your religion.

    To say the mosque should be built because of religious freedom is an emotional response and not an analytical one. There are already many mosques in America and none have ever been controversial as this one is. It’s not the mosque; it’s the location. The truth is that the building of this mosque in this neighborhood in New York is a local issue and has nothing to do with the federal government or the nation as a whole at all, at least under normal circumstances. With this in mind President Obama’s initial refusal to comment was the appropriate one since this has nothing to with him nor his branch of government. But these are not normal circumstances.

    In this particular case even though the planes blew up and destroyed buildings in New York the attack was made on the whole of the United States and its people. Muslims made the attack. Perhaps not these Muslims, but the mosque’s intended location is certainly politically provocative and intended to be so. So the people of the United States and at length their president, after due consideration, do have every right to weigh in on this debate. Whatever the outcome, the mosque controversy will certainly affect the November elections and perhaps even those of 2012.

  • Obama’s Numbers in the Arab World

    I’m a big fan of Dr Marc Lynch’s work. In addition to being considered a respected professor in a top-tier American university (George Washington University), he is also one of the best versed in Middle Eastern culture and knowledgeable about virtually every issue in the Arab world. So whenever Dr Lynch writes a post about Arab public opinion or has something to say about American-Islamic relations, I tend to read it very quickly.

    Such was the case last Thursday, when Lynch devoted a post to the dwindling appeal of President Barack Obama in the eyes of ordinary Muslims. Technically, the Brookings Institution sponsored the poll and conducted the project, but it’s people like Lynch (not to mention Steve Walt and Tom Ricks) that make sense of the data and try to put it into some perspective.

    For a full look at Brookings’ results, click here (PDF). I highly recommend that you take a look at the raw figures, because it gives us a sense of what issues still ring true in the hearts of Arabs. But if you just want to get to the nuts-and-bolts, the results can be best described as quantification of America’s declining appeal, even in countries that are considered to be American allies. The poll not only reveals an unfortunate American decline in popularity, but also the deep frustrations that many Arabs hold over America’s inability to meet its promises and commitments. (more…)