Tag: Egypt

  • Hosni Mubarak’s Clever Ploy

    In a sign of the protesters’ collective strength in Cairo, a visibly tired and shaken Hosni Mubarak stepped in front of the cameras for the second time to announce that he will no longer be the president after his term expires in September. For the longtime Egyptian opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd Party, this announcement is the greatest gift they could have received after being subjected to the shadows for the last thirty years. But for the protesters who had risked their lives over the past week, shouting for Mubarak’s immediate ouster, this speech was much harder to take.

    Seven months may not be enough time, but it does give Mubarak and his National Democratic Party a slight chance to divide the current protests.

    As demonstrations continues in Egypt’s major cities, it may be easy to forget that Egyptians have only taken to the streets for slightly over a week. They have managed to succeed in the herculean task of forcing an entrenched autocrat to relinquish the throne — something that would have been impossible to imagine months ago. But seven days is not seven months. With the exception of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, rebellions rarely sustain their strength over an extended period of time. People have to be extremely dedicated to their cause to come out, in full force, every single day. Egyptians have passed this test so far, but you have to question whether the chants of “down with Mubarak” could remain as strong and potent for another 210 days.

    By announcing his departure in September, Mubarak may be hoping that the cohesiveness of the protest movement will gradually fade. Some advisors close to the Egyptian military were expecting him to relinquish control anyway. If this is indeed the case, then some demonstrators may be wondering what it was all for.

    While unsubstantiated, Mubarak may be trying to reclaim whatever legacy he has left by taking charge of the transition process, thereby ushering Egypt into a brand new era of pluralist politics. (Although it will probably take a little more time than seven months.) Few Egyptians would give him credit for such a transition, but the United States and other countries just may.

    What will happen in the next seven months is still unclear. One can draw up a number of scenarios that could occur as the year goes by. If Mubarak reneges on his promise, tens of thousands may simply take to the streets once again. If democratic elections are scheduled on time and Egyptians see them as legitimate, then all is well with the world. But if the Egyptian Armed Forces somehow tweak the electoral proceedings in the hopes of maintaining their hold on the regime (Omar Soleiman, the new vice president, will probably be the establishment’s man), the world and more importantly the Egyptian people will begin to question the very essence of their political system. Up to now, a stubborn and power hungry Mubarak is considered the problem. Absent credible elections after Mubarak is long gone, Egyptians just may turn against the backbone of society itself — the military.

    Hopefully it won’t come to that but it is a possibility. The armed forces have received an enormous amount of resources, wealth and prestige since the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Don’t expect them to give all of that away without pondering the implications.

  • Washington’s Next Move in Egypt

    Contemporary history of the past century has shown that popular revolutions, however exciting in the initial stages, can turn out to be very unpredictable in the end.

    The Iranian Revolution against the Shah of Iran was quite similar in composition to the protests that are engulfing Egypt today — broad swaths of the general population pouring onto the streets demanding the overthrow of an oppressive and dictatorial system. Yet when the shah left, a group of radical Islamists under the wing of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini managed to hijack the process, monopolize the opposition, and set up the regime that we now call the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    With this precedent in mind, can we actually predict what will happen when the unrest in Egypt is long over?

    The short answer is no. A rebellion is sporadic in nature and difficult to quantify with any accuracy or vigor, especially when the rebellion is still developing in front of our eyes. But we can nonetheless make some assumptions as to how Egypt’s political system will respond in the short term. A few general options come to mind.

    The most obvious, but least plausible, is that Hosni Mubarak will crush the protests, jail the most visible dissidents as an example to all demonstrators and retain his iron grip on Egyptian society.

    Although heartbreaking for the millions of Egyptians dreaming for reform, this is an option that would actually be well received by those crafting America’s geopolitical strategy. Mubarak has been immensely important to Washington’s Middle East policy for the past thirty years. In fact, the Mubarak regime has agreed on almost every major American initiative in the region (except for the war in Iraq), from Israeli-Palestinian peace talks to the containment of Iran; from the isolation of Hamas to pressure on Lebanon’s Hezbollah. With such a great track record, a surviving Mubarak could give Washington at least a temporary sigh of relief.

    The polar opposite of another Mubarak term would be the complete overthrow of the Egyptian president and the total dismemberment of his ruling National Democratic Party. Most Egyptians would love to see this happen and for very good reason. Egypt under the NDP has struggled mightily in terms of economic development. The state itself has sustained an impressive growth rate of 5 percent, but the money has not made its way down to the families that need it most. Indeed, some researchers estimate that forty of Egypt’s eighty million people live at or below the United Nations poverty line.

    There is also a very real possibility that the abrupt departure of Mubarak and his party would usher in a degree of chaos and confusion. This is precisely what is happening in Tunisia today, where different factions of the political opposition (the secularists, nationalists, communists and Islamists) are struggling to caste aside their ideological differences. If this same confusion were to occur in a post-Mubarak Egypt, Washington and Europe could find this scenario especially alarming. If people are unwilling to compromise on the most basic principles for the way forward, democracy will be seen more as a disorderly nuisance than a legitimate form of government.

    These two scenarios are scary, both for Egyptians and for the Obama Administration. Luckily, both represent extremes that are unlikely to materialize. Mubarak has lost so much credibility with the Egyptian people that his days in office are numbered, even if his regime is able to quell the protests for a few more months. If Mubarak’s regime were to collapse soon however, it is also unlikely that anarchy would envelope the entire country. The military is too well embedded within Egyptian society for the institution to take a passive role should violence hit the streets.

    Therefore, what the United States should plan for is a hybrid of these two extremes, something between Mubarak crushing all opposition and the Egyptian state collapsing after his defeat or departure. What American officials may be privately hoping for is an internal coup d’état where the generals squeeze Mubarak out of power for the sake of state stability. What could result is a government dominated by the military for a few months until presidential elections are held in the next six months.

    In other words, a peaceful transition orchestrated by the military would be the best policy for the United States to endorse and actively encourage — if the military lets go of the reigns and plays a constructive role when elections are scheduled.

    There already are some negative sentiments toward Mubarak in parts of the armed forces. If the protests grow in the next day or two, or if Mubarak makes another embarrassing television display, the Free Officers Corps just may give its aging leader the boot.

  • United States Hedging Rhetoric on Egypt Protests

    My television has been tuned to CNN for the past 24 hours, and the footage that the network has been broadcasting (thanks to Al Jazeera and those brave Egyptians with cell phones) is nothing short of extraordinary. Young and middle aged Egyptian citizens from all walks of life are holding hands and shouting in unison, “down down with Mubarak.” The Egyptian government has issued a citywide curfew for Cairo, Alexandria and Suez in an attempt to regain some hold over the situation. Yet the protesters have thus far been undeterred.

    As is expected, the situation inside Egypt is very fluid, a term that was used by the American State Department two nights ago during a press conference. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, through the Sunday talk show circuit, has urged the Egyptian government and the protesters to refrain from further violence, a standard neutral response from an administration that isn’t exactly sure how to proceed. (more…)

  • A Week of Turmoil in the Middle East

    There is so much happening in the Middle East right now that it’s difficult to know where to start. The entire Arab world seems to be on the verge of a calamitous path toward confrontation, evident in Tunisia’s struggle to form an interim government. Protests continue in Algeria over economic conditions and the rise of food prices, while Jordan — one of the most stable countries in the region — is experiencing its own demonstrations.

    But these are all marginal events compared to what is happening right now elsewhere in the region. Here is a brief summary what has happened over the past week in the Middle East and which of these events are likely to continue in full force in the month ahead.

    Hezbollah takes over Lebanon

    To the dismay of Europe and the United States, Hezbollah has been able to muster enough support in the Lebanese parliament to appoint the next prime minister, effectively kicking the American backed Saad Hariri out of power.

    The new prime minister is a man named Najib Miqati, a billionaire businessman and former prime minister who served immediately after Rafiq Hariri was killed by a massive car bomb in 2005. This whole story began when Hezbollah pulled out of the government over Saad Hariri’s refusal to stop cooperating with a United Nations tribunal investigating his father’s death.

    In addition to ending the reign of a coalition that was supported in the West, Hezbollah’s takeover signals what analysts in the region have long suspected: that the Shia militant group is Lebanon’s most powerful military and political force.

    Washington hasn’t responded significantly yet other than expressing concern with Hezbollah’s rise. But there really isn’t anything the United States can do about it. As Hezbollah gains in strength, American-Lebanese ties are likely to be weakened.

    Protests in Egypt

    Egyptians who are tired with the iron fisted rule of Hosni Mubarak have taken the time to mimic their Tunisian counterparts by demonstrating against their government. Blake Hounshell of Foreign Policy puts the number of protesters at 100,000, a small number compared to Egypt’s total population of eighty million. And evidently, Al Jazeera television is not concentrating as much on the Egyptian protests as those in Tunisia. But they are protests nonetheless and how the Egyptian security forces decide to fend them off will determine whether the ranks of the opposition grow or fade.

    Iran talks collapse

    The P5+1 decided to give talks with Iran another chance last weekend. Unfortunately, the discussions didn’t even start. Iranian nuclear negotiators demanded that the UN stop all economic sanctions against their country before the nuclear program could be addressed. Of course, the permanent members of the Security Council refused (as they should have), and the meetings collapsed after two days. An enrichment-for-inspection deal may be the only diplomatic option left to the United States to solve the problem short of war.

  • The Middle East’s Sham Democracy

    Egypt is one of Americas closest and most dependable allies in the Middle East. Yet its openness to political reform and dedication to democracy are anything but genuine.

    Ever since Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981, the country has been ruled by a single strongman, buffeted by an expansive, brutal and loyal security service. Human rights violations, particularly against political opponents, are commonplace with thousands of protesters thrown into prison on the most frivolous of charges. 

    Egypt’s army and police force is given an enormous amount of leeway and jurisdiction when it comes to arresting and detaining “criminals”. After Sadat’s killing, an “Emergency Law” was put into effect that provided the armed forces with unlimited power. Most public officials in the Egyptian government are cronies that depend on handouts and other “goodies” from the regime itself. And as might be expected in any autocracy, civil society groups and political parties must first receive the state’s permission before competing in the electoral process.

    Taking all of this into consideration, perhaps it isn’t surprising that Egyptian citizens have not at all been excited about their parliamentary elections Sunday. Many of the poor and most in the middle class brush the elections away as if they are a facade, or a tool used to boost the legitimacy of a unpopular regime.

    In many ways, they are right. Human rights organizations and the small political parties that compete with the regime are under the heavy hand of the state during the entire process. The United States are even getting around to the same conclusion. The Obama Administration has expressed its frustrations and reservations to Hosni Mubarak on his lack of political reform, unfortunately to no avail. President George W. Bush was perhaps the most vocal in his criticism, which eventually paved the way for a semi-accountable parliamentary contest in 2005.

    Yet whatever accomplishments were made back then, today’s Egypt is returning to its old ways. In fact, Mubarak’s security forces have been much more assertive this year in preempting challengers. Free media, ranging from text messaging, satellite television, independent newspapers and radio broadcasts, has been curtailed to such a degree that it’s difficult to believe Egypt was once considered the center of gravity in the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition bloc to Mubarak’s party, has witnessed over 1,000 of its members rounded up in the streets and thrown into jail. In addition to the arrests, the weeks long crackdown has had a tremendous psychological impact on the entire Brotherhood organization. A group that is usually strong and unified is now coming apart at the seams, with some members questioning why the Brotherhood decided to take part in the elections at all.

    Egypt has always been seen as an autocratic state. But this year’s repression is quite remarkable when compared to other cases. Speculation thus far has rested on the idea that the regime is simply trying to create a supportive environment for the next presidential election. Rumors are that the ailing Mubarak will soon give the reigns over to his son Gamal, a young and inexperienced politician who needs all the help he can get in solidifying control.

    But the motive may be more black and white than that. In the last parliamentary election, the Muslim Brotherhood shocked the world by capturing 20 percent of the parliament. The Mubarak regime never experienced that type of defeat before. While the ruling party still won the election, the gains that were made by the Brotherhood were quite embarrassing for the regime. The poor showing by the dominant party was both a direct referendum on its ability to govern and a punch to the ego of the Egyptian government. Mubarak doesn’t want this to happen again, and he will use all the power at his disposal to make sure this goal is met.

    In the end, Mubarak’s supporters will win Sunday’s elections, but the results will do nothing to improve the regime’s credibility with the Egyptian people. If the United States speak up and denounce the results, Cairo will look exceedingly bad. But if Washington stays silent, as they are projected to do, the average Egyptians will once again be the real losers.