Atlantic Sentinel

Tag: Africa

  • Libya Consulate Attack Could Force Deeper US Engagement

    On Wednesday morning, the Reuters news agency reported that four Americans, including the country’s ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, had been killed in an attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, the cradle of last year’s revolt against the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi.

    The ambassador and members of his staff were killed when unidentified men stormed the grounds of the diplomatic site, armed with small weapons and homemade explosives. Though no official details have emerged on how Stevens and the three members of his staff died, Libyan sources have indicated that a volley of rocket fire may have been responsible. It is thought by most commentators that protests against an American film said to insult the Prophet Muhammad served as the primary motivator for the assailants.

    The tragic development is the latest in a series of attacks against international and government personnel across the Middle East and North Africa. From an assault on a Red Cross convoy carrying British diplomats across Libya to recent violent protests at American and other embassies in Cairo, Egypt, disturbances clearly indicate that the political and social fallout of last year’s upheaval in the region has yet to dissipate.

    Indeed, given the severity of today’s criminal act and the grave impact that diplomatic deaths can have on a country’s policy actions, it is likely that the near term future may see an American refocusing of efforts on dealing with unrest and other ongoing issues in the new and established countries of the Middle East.

    More violent than the protest movements in Tunisia and even Egypt, the 2011 international campaign in the skies above Libya was seen by many as having been relatively successful for the United States and its coalition partners in terms of remaining relatively withdrawn from invasive operations in support of democratic regime change.

    Unlike the campaign on the ground for rebel forces, the conclusion of Libya’s “Arab Spring” movement turned out to be a discreet coup for the Obama Administration’s foreign policy. Although expensive, both the support of various Arab League and NATO partners and the clear mandate to avoid ground missions allowed the United States to act in a limited fashion, intervening without the need to stall ongoing operational rebalancing to priorities in Asia and the Pacific.

    This kind of intervention capacity, one that includes a level of reliance on the support of responsible international partners, may be increasingly valuable as America restructures its commitments in the wake of a political decision to focus on East Asia and the ongoing focus on budgetary austerity across the Western world.

    However, in the context of the embassy attack, it seems likely that the challenge for American administrations will lie not only in deploying such intervention capacity but also having to affect involvement in a region whose priority status was envisioned to be diminishing. After all, with unrest and uncertainty presently peaking in events like those that killed Ambassador Stevens, it is undoubtedly the case that the United States will need to devote significant and visible efforts to encouraging and supporting the construction of institutional stability in countries in both Africa and the Middle East.

    One point to consider is that, given that most recent dissident acts of violence have come from the general citizenry, as opposed to official government or third party groups, the United States will be incentivized to lend significant support to local governments in the form of security advising and engaging with stakeholders to crack down on factions that are contributing to instability across the region. Those factors include and are exacerbated by the fact that large segments of Arab population remain in possession of arms that were used during protests and rebel actions last year.

    The basic fact is that the attacks on American diplomatic sites in Egypt and Libya communicate a continued need for American engagement in the Middle East. It seems likely that policymakers, particularly given upcoming elections in the United States and obvious corollaries to the situation in Syria, will quickly address the previously waning topic of how security aid can be directly rendered to those states that emerged from the Arab Spring.

    Indeed, popular dissension and dangerous circumstances for international actors imply that the United States might even have to throw stabilizing efforts into high gear in the short term to assure both regional partners and new acquaintances alike.

    The question will inevitably be whether or not America can adapt to such a diffusion of national security priorities. Can Washington act to adopt appropriate granular approaches to affecting policies in the Middle East that can, at the same time, both guide broad confidence building initiatives and keep resource commitments, and thus the viability of achieving other global goals, in check?

    Given the escalation of localized unrest these past few days and the sudden impact it has had on international diplomacy, we will surely find out in the weeks and months to come.

  • Why There Won’t Be an African Spring

    While the attention of Arab and Western media was largely focused on the historic victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate in Egypt, street protests of a scale not witnessed for two decades continued into their second week in Khartoum and other major Sudanese cities. There are also protests in Gabon and Togo while the upcoming elections in Kenya are anticipated with anxiety.

    Africa tends to be viewed through a prism of disease, starvation, violence and, most of all, corruption. When the “Arab Spring” erupted in late 2010, it was generally seen as a Middle Eastern phenomenon rather than an African one, even if its main protagonists were all located on African soil. However, while events to the northeast of Tunisia have dominated the news coverage, events to the south have been no less tumultuous.

    At the same time, a perceived “African spring” is probably more a Western anticipation and less an African reality. This is what the cases of Kenya and Sudan show to us. (more…)

  • Libya: French Soft Power in Retrospect

    If a state possesses sufficient “soft power,” it has acquired the ability to frame and shame events and actors in international relations. The ability to frame enables the protagonist to package a debate in terms that are conducive to its own interests. The power to shame refers to the possibility of trapping other countries rhetorically and changing their behaviour.

    The French role in last year’s intervention in Libya was a perfect example. (more…)

  • Western Nations Silent as Libya Tumbles

    Dozens of angry protesters surrounded the building of Libya’s National Transitional Council in Benghazi during the last week of January, the first to willingly come under the control of the post-Gaddafi interim authority. The members of the NTC, who have stepped into the governing vacuum left by the dismantling of the colonel’s regime, are increasingly under hot water with a growing segment of Libya’s population.

    Some of the very rebels who volunteered to fight under the NTC’s banner during the country’s eight month civil war are now turning against the body’s leadership which is often described as inept, corrupt and at times incompetent. The days when Mustafa Abdel Jalil and his colleagues on the council were hailed as revolutionary heroes and the guardians of Libya have gone. Or, as The Washington Post rightly put it, the “honeymoon is over.”

    The restoration of public security has been a significant concern for Libyans of all backgrounds and tribal affiliations since Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was officially declared dead last August. Five months later, most of the country’s security work is left to the armed brigades that swept up loyalists and drove them out of the capital of Tripoli. (more…)

  • Libyan Interim Government Urges Militias to Disband

    Libya is facing a lot of problems, even after the successful defeat of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s loyalist forces and the murder of the once dictator himself. But officials in Libya’s National Transitional Council, the interim body that has been criticized over the past few months for its lack of transparency, are gearing up all of their resources to ensure that Libya’s future is a little bit easier going into the New Year.

    Improving Libya’s economic and political future cannot be achieved until the council is serious about mending fences with former Gaddafi fighter and bringing the nation’s dozens of independent militias firmly under the central government’s authority.

    Like any postwar transition process, reconciliation across the board is key — an effort that not only demonstrates the government’s goodwill to those who fought on the wrong side but a move that helps ensure that everyone is given a say in the new governing arrangement. With eight months of conflict pitting Libyan against Libyan, reconciliation and reintegration, as well as rebel disarmament and the establishment of and strong transparent national institutions, is an urgent priority for the NTC.

    Accomplishing this objective has been a difficult and painfully slow endeavor since the civil war was officially termed over after Gaddafi’s capture and death last October. At least two hundred civilians turned fighters continue to patrol Libya’s two largest cities, Tripoli and Benghazi, with the most powerful militia in the capital resisting the city council’s disarmament efforts until the transitional government proves that it can take over the security function.

    Residents in Tripoli have been complaining about the presence of militias from out of town, with fighters from Misrata and Zintan, both cities in the west, acting as if the capital were their personal fiefdom. The same rebels who were cheered on by Libyans from both the east and the west are increasingly resembling bands of renegades who are menacingly patrolling neighborhoods with their machine guns and anti-aircraft weaponry.

    For their part, Libya’s roving militias continue to view themselves as their nation’s guardians — the only people capable of providing the type of stability that is needed to defend against a Gaddafi loyalist comeback.

    Libya’s rebels are also getting impatient, demanding that the NTC expand its membership so more revolutionaries can join.

    The interim body’s chairman, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, is making an effort to do just that. The defense and interior ministries, both critical to defending and operating Libya’s borders, oilfields and ports, are sending out applications to former rebels through municipal councils, encouraging them to lay aside their weapons in return for full employment. Security jobs are just the kind of work that the thousands of militiamen have been asking for. Soldiers and policemen require many of the same skills that Libya’s diverse militias have been honing since the revolution began last February, including arms training, basic command and control, issuing orders, taking them, building camaraderie and taking care of wounded.

    Yet upon entry in the security forces, militiamen will also be forced to learn skills that they have not performed previously, like abandoning their freelancing ways and pledging allegiance to a state that is only in its infant stages. Rounding up people on mere suspicion will have to be replaced with issuing arrest warrants upon probable cause. Prisoners will need access to an attorney instead of rotting in a jail cell, indefinitely. Those who are found not guilty of their crimes or those who cannot be linked to a violation through credible evidence are to be released back into the population. A system of laws then must be drilled into the heads of Libya’s politicians, generals, police officers, bureaucrats and armed citizens.

    No one said rebuilding Libya will be an easy task. Thanks to Gaddafi’s obsession with himself and his ideology, any of the national institutions that were functioning have been worn down or like the Libyan army, purposely destroyed for fear of a faction emerging powerful enough to rival his own.

    The NTC’s job opening is a big step forward but one that cannot be sustained without good natured international assistance, from military liaison teams and military education, to election observers and creation of employment in Libya’s petroleum industry and outside of it.

    The present situation in Libya, where militias clash among each other over prisoners and territory, cannot be sustained. Converting the militias into a national army and police force will not end all of the country’s problems but could set a good precedent.

  • India Able to Offset Chinese Influence in Africa

    The current geopolitical landscape in Africa represents an unique opportunity for occupying the power vacuum that will be created as Western nations reduce their footprint abroad. China will be best placed to seize this opportunity and has already been aggressively stepping up its involvement in Africa.

    Domestically, there is a sentiment in India that it is not doing enough to compete with China in Africa because the Indian economy is sensitive to oil prices, which notably affect the prices of food. India will have to do more if it wants to pole vault to superpower status by riding on the African wave.

    Forming an alliance with other nations would enable India to compete seriously with China’s spending power, value neutral approach and lack of domestic opposition. India could team up with Brazil and South Africa by expanding the ambit of the India Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum or with the United States in recognition of India’s democratic credentials. (more…)

  • Egypt’s Generals Shun Democracy Again

    It was only one week ago that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, suppressed for decades, was celebrating a glorious victory. Millions of Egyptians lined up to participate in the first of three rounds of voting for a new Egyptian parliament. Three days and millions of ballots later, Egypt’s election authorities declared the Islamist movement the ultimate victor with a vote share of around 40 percent. The al-Nour coalition, representing a fundamentalist Salafist strain of Islam, won nearly a quarter of the vote. Egypt’s liberal parties, in the meantime, came in a close third place. But regardless of whose party ended up with the most votes, it was clear from the onset that all Egyptians won. The election was the fairest and cleanest experienced in modern Egyptian history.

    All of these feelings are spoiled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the group of military men that have effectively been running the country since they pushed their former boss out of Cairo last February.

    Egypt’s top generals have long been the elite class of society, using their positions behind the scenes to formulate Egypt’s foreign policy while grabbing a big slice of the nation’s industrial output. The resignation of Hosni Mubarak, who was an Air Force pilot himself, threatened to jeopardize many of those perks — even if popular approval of the army soared as a result of their siding with the protesters. And while the common Egyptian is still sympathetic to the army command, often considering them the only public institution that they can trust, Egypt’s military council had made things very difficult throughout the period of transition.

    Trying to hang on to executive power for an extended period of time was the latest argument used by Egyptian protesters to retake the streets of Tahir. The objective of the strike was clear: pressure the military council to hand over its authority immediately to a civilian government.

    Like the previous mass protests in Tahir, violence between demonstrators and security forces occurred, killing forty people in the process. The generals backed down after these clashes, perhaps alarmed that ordinary Egyptians were beginning to equate the military with the old Mubarak machine. Presidential elections, which were delayed by a year, were moved back to its original date of April 2012.

    The generals are at it again though, this time appointing a civilian council made up of technocrats, former politicians, union leaders, artists and intellectuals that will be responsible for vetting candidates for the Constitution writing committee.

    For some reformers and secularists who lost big time in the elections, the army’s decision to steal back some of the thunder away from the Islamists in the future parliament could not be a better gift. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s record of caring for the poor and establishing a system of social services for Egyptian citizens, many (most evidently women, civil rights activists and nationalist candidates) are concerned that the Brotherhood will reinvent itself once it takes power. Add the Salafists to the mix and liberals around Egypt are questioning whether the progression of their country will be stalled or turned back.

    Diluting the parliament’s power to appoint who serves on the Constitutional Assembly, as was originally promised by Egypt’s generals, kills that sentiment for the time being. Unfortunately, the generals are breaking their promises to the majority of Egyptians who actually voted for an Islamist politician.

    Egypt’s people must be asking themselves a number of questions. Is the military intent on staying forever? Why is it interfering in the democratic process? And what is the purpose of voting if the representatives that are put in office are powerless to do the people’s work or forced to defer their role to an unaccountable body of military men?

    These are all fair questions. Without answers, each question makes the journey toward a new and democratic Egypt the slightest bit longer and rockier.

  • Egyptians Take to Streets, Demand End to Military Rule

    “Down with the field marshal!” yell the protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Thousands have been there since Friday, with many more spread out along the side streets. Most protesters are peacefully gathered, sometimes marching in groups of one or two hundred, but some are tackling the security forces head on.

    Down the side streets, protesters are throwing rocks and petrol bombs and security forces respond with tear gas and rubber bullets. When one person is hit, others haul him back to the square where ambulances are running back and forth. There are a few makeshift hospitals in the square where people are getting treated for injuries. Many have been shot in the eyes. One of the lions adorning Qasr al-Nil Bridge, which leads to Tahrir, spots a bandage over one of its eyes as well. (more…)

  • Libya’s New Leaders See Violence Continue

    For the NATO coalition that had been bombing Libyan targets nonstop since March, the war to bring down Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime could not have ended soon enough.

    Executing tens of thousands of strike sortie missions on a multitude of Libyan government targets across a country three times the size of Texas would have taken a toll on any military force. Even NATO, the most equipped and technologically superior military alliance the world has ever known, had trouble successfully hitting the right targets during the opening stages of the war. So when Gaddafi was found by Libyan revolutionary fighters and dragged out of a sewage drain, dirty, bloody and humiliated, only to be killed minutes later, in the city of Sirte, NATO commanders responsible for the Libya operation were all too happy to officially declare their work complete a week later.

    The only problem with declaring “mission accomplished,” of course, is that Libya is still stuck in the mid of a security vacuum, albeit with a dictator now dead and buried.

    The National Transitional Council is making the best of a bad situation, urging their fighters to turn in their weapons, announcing the start of elections in June to select a constitution committee and electing a new interim prime minister. Libyan oil production, a mainstay of the economy, is also expected to return to prewar levels as the months proceed while international oil companies are attempting to court the new power brokers for a share in the action.

    However, security across the Libyan heartland — from Tripoli down to the southern desert — is far from conducive to rebuilding a society from the ground up. Despite NTC plans to reintegrate rebel militias into a unified Libyan army and police force, hundreds of fringe groups loaded to the teeth with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades continue to patrol city blocks as if they are defending their own personal fiefdoms.

    The Libyan capital, Tripoli, is divided among at least three different militias from different parts of the country — militias that turned their weapons on one another when one of the tribal groups tried to enter a city neighborhood not under its jurisdiction.

    This week, fighters from Zawiyah clashed with fighters from Warshefana along a major coastal highway leading into Tripoli from the west, killing at least six people before the rounds went silent. The issue that helped light the spark in that round of fighting was disagreement over which militia could claim ownership of a former loyalist military base along the highway.

    It would be a mistake to say that Libya is going down the tubes, or that NATO cut off its mission too early. As strictly an air operation, it is difficult to see what else the NATO coalition could have done after ripping Gaddafi’s loyalists to shreds. Their mandate did not include the reconstruction of the country after the tyrant and his men melted away. Nor were individual countries, like France, Great Britain and the United States likely to take the initiative on their own. Mindful of the Afghanistan and Iraq postwar experiences, the last thing Washington and its allies needed or wanted was another nation building effort abroad.

    Regardless, with Libya awash in weapons and the NTC dragging its feet on nominating a cabinet under new leadership, all of the gains that were made by eliminating Colonel Gaddafi and his regime could degenerate into the black hole of insecurity if regional and international efforts are not made to seriously draw all of the stakeholders into one room. Preparing for elections and supporting the vestiges of democracy should be encouraged yet these alone will not help Libya travel down the avenue of a peaceful, orderly and productive society. For this to happen, the NTC must show its commitment to reconciliation and a determination to carry it out.

    Libya’s record with democracy is nonexistent but this needn’t prevent it from succeeding at it. Rather, Libyans, with help from international organizations, when requested, should look at a post-Gaddafi Libya as a blank slate for their country, full of possibilities and opportunities. No one tribe, sect or region can grab all the authority — a situation that would be disastrous and a prelude to frequent militia infighting as the year goes on.

    Sharing power at the national level, even before Libyans line up to the polls for the first time, is a big step in increasing trust among Libya’s array of ethnicities and tribes. It cannot begin to build a modern state if all factions do not contribute to the effort.

  • The Hydro Power Boom That Will Power Africa

    Africa lacks electricity and its future growth hinges on developing a steady supply. A Chinese led boom in hydroelectric infrastructure investment is reinvigorating one of the continent’s least utilized resources which runs now at roughly 5 percent of potential.

    Current projects, such as the Gibe III in Ethiopia, the Kajbar in Sudan, and the Bui dam in Ghana are all much needed additions to Africa’s power sector. These dams range in size and power either a small portion of the country or entire regions of Africa.

    Many of the current dams were built in the 1960s and 1970s and are no longer working at full capacity. Inga I and Inga II in the Democratic Republic of Congo are prime examples with production at roughly 25 percent of total capacity. Decades of poor maintenance and conflict that saw power lines cut have left the continent’s energy sector in a feeble state.

    China is currently driving this infrastructure development with nearly $10 billion in hydropower projects. Chinese financing has proven ideal for many African countries because deals can be made quicker with less red tape, no political strings attached and engineering and construction knowhow is provided. All in all, these projects are a win-win for all involved. China essentially pays itself to build these projects and Africa gets the electricity it needs to fuel continued growth.

    Although China is an important figure both in terms of financing and construction, other players are jumping into these projects as well. Ethiopia is the continent’s second largest potential producer of hydroelectric power behind the Congo. The construction of the 1870 MW Gibe III is an important project there but the construction of the Grand Millenium Dam even more so with an estimated capacity of 5250 MW. Financing for the $4.8 billion project is unclear but reports have the Chinese contributing $1.8 billion and construction will handled by Italy’s Salini Costruttori.

    These larger dams have the ability to increase regional stability and integration. Growth in African countries has been hindered by a lack of electricity and the prospect of a steady supply is bringing leaders together.

    The biggest of these dams is the Grand Inga dam in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The project has an estimated capacity of 40,000 MW and the potential to power more than five hundred million people across Africa. The world’s current largest dam, the Three Gorges Dam in China, has a capacity of 22,400 MW and Brazil’s Itaipu is the second largest with a capacity of 14,000 MW. The entire hyrdopower potential in the DRC is estimated at 100,000 MW.

    South Africa and the Congo recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding that looks to finally move this stalled project forward. The project has been in the planning and negotiation stages for several years and was headed by the regional Western Power Corridor (Westcor) under the Southern Africa Development Community.

    Westcor’s focus was mainly on development of the 5,000 MW Inga III project, seen as a first step toward the Grand Inga, but planning and construction have been delayed by disputes from community members who have been excluded from the project.

    Westcor was comprised of the DRC’s Société Nationale d’Électricité Société, Angola’s ENE, Namibia’s NamPower, the Botswana Power Corporation and South Africa’s Eskom.

    The signing of the memorandum comes on the heels of the decision to dissolve Westcor in favor of a more regionally inclusive structure that is even looking to bring in its North African neighbors to the project. The agreement is expected to produce a legally binding treaty within the next few months to solidify a framework for financing and implementation of the project. Even though many of these dams will not come online for some time, Africa’s future gets brighter with each one.

  • Somalia’s Al Shabaab a Persistent Foe

    When the most feared Islamist insurgent group in Somalia withdrew from its bases in Mogadishu after a three year occupation of most of the city, commanders of the African Union’s peacekeeping force AMISOM and Somali government leaders boasted about the group’s sudden decline in the country. Before the withdrawal, Al Shabaab, as the Islamist group is known, had already suffered a series of military defeats in the capital city. A far better equipped AMISOM force, with Ugandan and Burundian troops in the lead, managed to get themselves together and retake some of Mogadishu’s important commercial districts.

    After the retreat from Mogadishu, optimistic Somali parliamentarians predicted that Al Shabaab was all but finished. At the time, they had a point — the organization is hated by most Somalis, who see the group as a main contributor to the deadly famine that is still claiming the lives of their family members and friends. (more…)

  • Steps Toward “Real” Freedom for Libya

    Take a quick glance at Tripoli from the TV, and you will see scenes of celebration and jubilation that the Libyan people haven’t been able to enjoy for 42 years. Columns of armed rebels have streamed into the center of the Libyan capital to the sound of cheering civilians kissing the ground and large billboards of Muammar al-Gaddafi being torn down. The trademark green flag of the colonel’s Libyan Revolution — a symbol of the regime’s oppression for decades — are ripped and replaced with the pre-Gaddafi red, black and green banner. The last-ditch effort by Gaddafi soldiers to stall the rebel offensive, with the exception of a few pockets of resistance near Gaddafi’s fortress like compound, proved to be a misnomer, with hundreds laying down their arms and blending into the general population. Even if no one knows where he is, Gaddafi is a beaten man, holding on to the delusion that Libyan tribes will come to his rescue and millions of supporters will desert their families to beat back the rebels in the streets of Tripoli.

    The international reaction to Gaddafi’s imminent downfall was optimistic and predictable. President Barack Obama issued a statement reiterating his call that the Libyan leader should recognize that his people have no love for him and should stop resisting immediately. NATO, which has paved the way for the rebel advance, has pledged to continue its airstrikes until Gaddafi no longer poses a threat to civilians.

    After six months of civil war, France, Great Britain and the United States are finally patting themselves on the back and congratulating one another on a job well done. Indeed, if it weren’t for NATO, there was a very high probability that Gaddafi would have survived the armed revolt against his opponents. Only six months ago, the rebels were days away from being squashed by Libyan security forces in the city of Benghazi.

    Sensing that a massacre was imminent, NATO decided to intervene with airpower, helping push Libyan forces to the periphery. Close to 8,000 strike sorties later — and with the rebel’s determination on the ground complementing NATO’s efforts — Gaddafi’s military infrastructure is nonexistent.

    Yet at the same time Libyans are dancing in the streets and shooting celebratory gunfire into the air, the work of rebuilding the country and its institutions is only just beginning. As history has demonstrated countless times over the past four decades (from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to Mobutu Sese Seko’s Congo), driving a dictator into hiding is a whole lot easier than ensuring that peace and inclusiveness will define the transition process. The United States found out the long way how difficult establishing a postwar order was both Iraq and Afghanistan, where the new governments have failed to be impartial and fair to all sectors of society.

    Libya, with its tribal, regional and ethnic dimensions, is no different. The North African country may have its own political history but the comparisons to post-Saddam Iraq could be a self-fulfilling prophecy if certain steps are not taken immediately to edge the country in the right direction.

    Gaddafi was a lot of things but he was certainly not a developer. He leaves in his wake a debilitating set of national institutions that were designed specifically to promote his bazaar brand of Arab socialism.

    With rebels streaming into the capital, the official Libyan army and police force has essentially disbanded themselves, leaving open a security vacuum that rebel militias have tried to fill. Oil production, which has long been Libya’s main industry, is pumping and selling oil at a trickle of what it once was before the civil war began. The postwar period in Libya, therefore, will be an especially combustible period — but one that Libyans and the world must turn into a success.

    Courtesy of foreign journalists on the ground, Libya watchers in the private sector, academics specializing in postwar reconstruction and my own ideas, here are a few steps (some small, others large) that could be taken in the first few months to smooth the process toward a fair and representative interim authority.

    Keep Gaddafi technocrats in their positions

    The last thing the Libyan rebels and the National Transitional Council in Benghazi need are ministries that are run by incompetent people with ulterior motives. Not all of the men and women who worked for the Libyan dictator were supportive of his ideology. Like those who worked under Saddam Hussein, many of the middle managers and midlevel technocrats joined Gaddafi’s administration for a steady paycheck, benefits and a sense of security for their families. Most of them also possess an acute knowledge of the social fissures in their own society.

    Rather than shutting these public servants out and wasting their experience, the NTC must work with them to begin the reconstruction.

    Secure ammo dumps and provide basic law and order

    Libya is a huge country, with the entire territory larger than the state of Texas. Libyans are also armed to the teeth and with rebels now in the capital, the desire to raid government ammunition dumps (either to sell or to maintain the battlefield advantage) borders on the certainty.

    If the NTC were smart, it would issue an executive order demanding that all rebel factions under its control resort to guarding the dumps rather than stealing what is inside.

    Unfortunately, some of the rebels may not listen. The looting of Gaddafi’s Tripoli compound is a case in point. But better to issue an order and attempt to deal with the problem now than face a situation in the future where thousands of untrained men are strapped with AK-47s and ground to air missiles.

    Unfreeze Gaddafi’s assets

    The United States and the United Nations hold approximately $32 billion in frozen Libyan government assets. That money can go a long way to jump starting a number of projects in areas that were destroyed by the fighting. 

    The NTC is the legitimate government in Libya today and with Gaddafi loyalists melting away, their authority will only increase as the days go by. Releasing the frozen funds, which after all belong to the Libyan people, is a great first step that the world can take toward building confidence in the new Libya and promoting a deep relationship with Libya’s new rulers. 

    The news coming out of the United Nations Security Council, which authorized the release of $1.5 billion on Thursday for humanitarian and reconstruction needs, is a positive example that should be used as a precedent. The funds, however, should not be released all at once, as postwar reconstruction expoert Daniel Serwer has suggested. Iraq and Afghanistan have both taught us that billions in the open market are more likely to fuel corruption than fund local, regional or national growth.

    Promote reconciliation

    While eastern and western Libyans both participated in ousting Gaddafi from power, the two areas of the country hold specific grievances and remain suspicious of one another. A large part of this animosity is due to Gaddafi’s abandonment of eastern Libya, which is precisely why Benghazi was the first major city to push for an alternative form of government. 

    Easterners view western Libyans as the main beneficiaries of Gaddafi’s oil-producing economy. The colonel’s hometown of Sirte has seen development, while Libya’s eastern frontier is wracked with leaking sewage systems and blackouts.

    For their part, western rebels paint a poor picture of a Benghazi based leadership that is laissez-faire on too many issues, the most important being the NTC’s cumbersome support for western rebels during the Nafusa Mountain offensive.

    Giving all of Libya’s regions and tribes an equal say in the transition process is a necessity if the NTC wishes to hold on to power before elections are scheduled. Fortunately, NTC chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil has called for a conference emphasizing just that.

    Bring the NTC to Tripoli

    Once Gaddafi and his men are gone for good — and the neighborhoods of the capital city are relatively secure — the NTC leadership should move their permanent headquarters from Benghazi to Tripoli. The move would be a symbolic gesture to western Libyans and Gaddafi loyalists who might otherwise fear that Libya’s interim government plans on marginalizing them.

    Get Libyan oil up and running

    Libya’s oil industry is the primary income generator for the government. Civil servants, policemen, militiamen, schoolteachers, diplomats and construction workers all need to get paid — and paid consistently. Opening up Libya’s oil to outside markets and using profits from those contracts and sales for salaries could be the fastest way to make everyone happy in the short term.

    Prepare for elections and draft a constitution

    For the past 42 years, a functioning constitution never came into play. The entire government structure was predicated on Gaddafi’s personal beliefs, down to the local level. With the man now gone, Libyans have an opportunity to draft a national constitution of their own liking.

    Libyans above all should be the sole drafters of the Constitution after reasonably free and fair elections have taken place. Western nations should keep their involvement in the Constitution drafting process to a minimum, eliminating the concern that is prevalent in Libya over a possible return to colonialism.

    Don’t get ahead of yourself

    Tripoli may be in rebel hands but Gaddafi loyalists will continue to stage fierce resistance elsewhere in the country. Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte and villages in the southern desert are still held by loyalist forces and may be held for many more months. Declaring victory, even as Gaddafi remains at large and towns in the Sahel are still contested, could very well hurt the NTC’s credibility with its supporters if the security situation deteriorates. Avoiding a “Mission Accomplished” moment while recognizing that Libyan territory is still not entirely free from Gaddafi’s influence would be a demonstration of realism in an otherwise hyped atmosphere.

    Everything in this list is pivotal to lifting Libya off the ground after six months of armed conflict. More work will need to be done as the NTC meets its initial deadlines, particularly on the important task of drafting a constitution that every tribe, region and ethnicity can live with. But with a post-Gaddafi Libya now progressing, preventing political disintegration, lawlessness, looting, factional infighting, retribution against former Gaddafi supporters, economic distress and regional rivalry must be on the top of any “to do” list.

    None of this will be quick or easy but it is essential if Libya is to divert from the path of other postwar countries.

  • Egypt-Israel Relations Cool But Will Endure

    Tension between Egypt and Israel mounted in recent weeks as young revolutionaries in Cairo, apparently freed from a military regime which fostered amicable ties with the Jewish state, demanded retribution when several Egyptian security personnel were killed near the border with Gaza. Relations between the two neighbors have cooled since longtime president Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign this February. A resumption of hostilities after more than thirty years of peace seems highly unlikely though.

    The unrest began exactly a week ago when seven Israeli civilians and one soldier were killed in a coordinated terrorist strike against southern Israel. Many more were wounded on a bus in the tourist resort of Eilat. The attackers had presumably tunneled from Gaza to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula where they set up firing positions. When they fled, Israeli troops pursued them. What happened next varies with the account. In the process of killing the Palestinian militants, an Israeli helicopter or plane killed between three and six Egyptian soldiers or police. And Egyptians did not like that one bit. (more…)

  • Beware Gaddafi’s Tripoli

    In a less than a week’s time, disappointment turned into optimism for Libya’s opposition. After months of incremental progress on the ground and hundreds of NATO airstrikes, the North African country’s band of rebels have had an impressive string of victories against Muammar Gaddafi’s struggling army, with cities just a few dozen miles away from the capital now under the transitional council’s umbrella. Gaddafi’s soldiers are battered, rebel commanders say, and increasingly tired of putting their own lives on the line for a regime that is destined to fall this summer.

    The rebel capture of Az Zawiyah, strategically located between Gaddafi’s Tripoli and the Tunisian border crossing, has had the intended effect of squeezing the Libyan government’s access to vital resources. Gas to fuel trucks, food to feed the troops and weapons to fight the rebels are all running low. While the Libyan-Tunisian border checkpoint is technically still in the hands of Gaddafi’s men, supplies are unable to reach beyond a third of the way to the capital. Large swaths of the Libyan desert, which until recently were contested, are now mainly held by rebel forces. Absent the occasional loyalist sniper or a few GRAD rockets fired at rebel positions, the opposition has a strong foothold in the western area of the country, starting from the Nafusa Mountains to a mere thirty miles from Tripoli.

    By cutting of highways and other roads leading into the north, Libya’s opposition managed to encircle the capital from all directions, depriving the city of the materials that are needed to sustain the battle — all the while limiting Gaddafi’s options.

    The news is encouraging for a NATO coalition that has backed the anti-Gaddafi movement to the fullest extent possible short of direct military intervention.

    While it is tempting to predict the strongman’s imminent demise, Libya is still prone to a violent showdown. Gaddafi has lost all semblance of credibility in the south, east and west of his country but retains some popular support in Tripoli. Most of his active duty soldiers who were previously defeated along the country’s western frontier have been called to redeploy into the city center, a move that might indicate the regime’s willingness to fight to the last man.

    A popular uprising against Gaddafi’s forces in Tripoli before the rebels enter is a possibility, though a distant one at that. The Transitional National Council know that many Tripoli residents are too scared to revolt, having been locked by Gaddafi’s men in a perpetual state of fear throughout the uprising. Tripoli is the one city in Libya that is still fortified by government compounds and patrolled street to street by Gaddafi loyalists. Most of the anti-government demonstrations that surface in the city, however small, are snuffed out.

    The TNC also understands that a brazen advance into the capital could be the most violent battle of the entire war. This makes the siege of Tripoli all the more central to the rebels’ battlefield strategy. By isolating the coastal enclave and choking off fuel shipments into neighborhoods, electricity shortages and rising food prices will hopefully annoy some of the more pragmatic Libyans in the capital to join the opposition’s side. However, these developments will be moot unless the rebels actually consolidate their gains, which has been exceedingly difficult as Gaddafi’s soldiers rely on mortar and rocket counterattacks to stall their advances.

    The regime is clearly at its weakest since the start of the uprising in February but an embattled Gaddafi could actually transform the Libyan conflict into a more catastrophic one in the short term. A ruler is far less likely to resort to Scud missile attacks if he thinks his authority is relatively secure. But with Gaddafi’s men folding over the last three days to rebel and NATO pressure, the likelihood of the dictator using long range weapons increases. Given Gaddafi’s insistence on fighting rather than surrendering, more Scuds flying around northern Libya may be his final act of desperation.

    Everyone hopes that Gaddafi would rather save his skin rather than ruin the country he has governed for the past 42 years. Unfortunately, his past indicates that may be more prone to lashing out than compromising. With the rebels near their doorsteps, the Gaddafi family’s determination is at its peak.

  • Egypt Invades Itself: Unrest in Sinai

    As Egypt’s ruling military council deals with an ongoing revolution by thousands of frustrated citizens, resources and manpower are being diverted from other areas of the country, some of which have deteriorated into lawlessness. While the Sinai Peninsula to the east of mainland Egypt has never exactly been a glowing model for Egyptian governance, the large desert area is shaping up to be the most troubling spot for Egypt’s post-Mubarak authority.

    To the modern eye, the Sinai is not much too look at. Located hundreds of miles from the capital and hundreds more from Egypt’s historical Nile Valley, the peninsula is a hot, dry, arid and tribal land whose people have never been truly integrated into Egyptian society. The Sinai bedouin tribes have resisted the writ of the Egyptian government ever since the nation state concept was first introduced. The mighty Ottoman Empire, which ruled Egypt briefly, was never sure how to run the area.

    State security, the Egyptian military and Egypt’s intelligence corps are hated in this neck of the woods. During the Mubarak era, hundreds of tribesmen were rounded up by Egyptian police officers and detained without charge and held without trial. It is not uncommon for a bedouin family to have at least one relative imprisoned by the central government, even if suspicion was the only motive for the arrest. Sinai residents have long been the poorest citizens in Egypt, with the province of North Sinai the most economically destitute.

    The Sinai has also been the victim of contemporary history. During the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, bedouin tribes were suspected of helping the Israelis defeat the Egyptian army, whether through intelligence tips or showing kindness to Jewish soldiers. Mainland Egyptians, including many in the Egyptian government itself, view the people of the peninsula not only as traitorous but uncivilized.

    Now, with Mubarak out of the picture, the Egyptian government has a very real opportunity to set its relationship with the bedouin — and the entire Sinai — on a firmer track. Unfortunately, this opportunity is being squandered by all of the parties. With the exception of a recent military offensive in the northern Sinai town of el-Arīsh, there has been no police presence in the peninsula, forcing the bedouin to administer the only law that keep the region from tipping into anarchy.

    Centuries of mistrust and hatred between Cairo and the Sinai tribes will not disappear overnight but it can be reconciled, albeit gradually. The fact that Sinai residents look at their own government with disdain demonstrates that this work will not be easy and may be put off for years to come. Yet the alternative for the region — remaining poor, underdeveloped and politically marginalized — is more dangerous and more challenging for the chance of a unified, peaceful and prosperous Egypt.

    In case Egypt’s military rulers need an example of what that alternative future holds, take reports by Sinai natives that Islamist extremism is seeping to their cities. Late last month, a police station in el-Arīsh was attacked by a convoy of armed masked men dressed in black. Five people, including two security officers, were killed in the violence. But worse than the actual attack was the celebratory fervor by the men afterwards.

    A witness told Time that the men carried black flags with the words “There is no God but God” written on one side and “Revenge” written on the other. CNN also reported that Takfiris (the group responsible for the assault) had distributed fliers, demanding Islamic law, in the city earlier that day.

    While not entirely accurate, this picture is in some ways similar to the way Islamists in Iraq operated during the heyday of the insurgency in 2006. Men strapped with assault rifles and parading their way through neighborhoods accomplishes a psychological objective that the physical attack on the police station does not have — overt displays like these frighten locals into submission and feed into the jihadist narrative.

    Even with this attack, it is too soon to sound the terrorism alarm in the Sinai. Despite claims that the militants were from Al Qaeda (which may not be true; Egypt is home to a number of small militant factions), an Al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula” scenario is still far off. Bedouin tribes, who pride their autonomy, courage and independence in the area, are far too astute in defending their power to be overtaken by a few hundred Salafists with guns and scary clothing. Many of the same bedouin families have been living on the land for centuries. They consider the Sinai to be their historical homeland; a connection that any terrorist group will find difficult to overcome in such short notice.

    What can the Egyptian government do to stabilize the situation? Right now, Cairo has stressed military force as an option, deploying police officers and army personnel to flush out criminals and terrorists (and if the past is any indication, bedouin as well). Yet military incursions will only delay further violence rather than solve the problem.

    The violence in the Sinai should be an incentive for Egypt’s generals to ensure that the parliamentary elections scheduled for this November go as smooth as possible. Only then will Egypt’s new leaders start the difficult task of bridging the political and social divide between the Nile Valley and the Sinai desert. Without such an effort, militant groups will seem an increasingly appealing option to the next generation of Sinai residents.