Atlantic Sentinel

Category: News

  • Britain Unveils New Defense Strategy

    This is the first part in a series of reports on the effects of Britain’s latest Strategic Defense and Security Review. This part focuses on the announced changes in strategy. The second entry discusses the consequences for procurement.

    Britain’s Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) has now been published and, depending on whom you are, it’s either as bad or not quite so bad as you had feared. In fact the only people who may see benefit in changes planned in the SDSR are the Treasury, having managed to cut 8 percent of the budget for defense.

    The headline grabbing details include a loss of 5,000 personnel for both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The Army will lose even more, 7,000 to bring the numbers of soldiers from all arms and services to 95,000. Defense projects will be scrapped, along with a number of fleets of vehicles, including the iconic Harrier jump jet of Falklands War fame. Against much expectation, the two CVF aircraft carriers will be built but one may be sold.

    Each of the services is expected to suffer in terms of materiel and manpower, as is the Ministry of Defense, the political body which, in part, directs British strategy and security policy. However, procurement issues aren’t strategy; they are the visible results of changes within the system which mean either a reorganization based on strategic nuances or, in this case, economic weakness. In this article we hope to take a look at what the cuts are, what they mean for each service, and how they effect or are informed by strategic issues.

    Firstly we must examine the parts of the SDSR which aren’t attracting headlines. The strategy parts. The SDSR is informed by the National Security Risk Assessment, among other documents. The former points to the following as the major concerns for the British state: terrorism; instability and conflict overseas; cyber security; givil emergencies; energy security; organized crime; border security; counterproliferation and arms control.

    Energy security was hinted at during the SDR of 1997/1998, although cyber security is a new addition and has produced some alarmism in the media concerning “cyber terrorism” and also attacks of such a nature by other states. Cyber warfare, or rather, cyber methods within defense, have been used recently by both Russia and China and have caused some understandable concern within the administrations of the West. Operation Titan Rain, the Ukranian server crash, and some others have pointed out the vulnerability of states to these tools. The intention from this is to establish a counter cyberterrorism group.

    The rest of the SDSR seems to be more of the same as last time, but with rather less emphasis on an ethical foreign policy lead strategy. The harsh economic times seemed to have instilled a pragmatism which was not evident last time in the SDR. Because of this, campaigns outside that of a purely British interest flourished in places like Sierra Leone, Kosovo and more.

    The residual terrorist threat in Northern Ireland gets a mention, as do intelligence matters surrounding Islamic terrorism from both domestic and foreign sources. As expected.

    Of particular interest are the chapters concerning alliances and partnerships. There has been much speculation on this matter. Some hypothesized that Britain and France would enter into a surprisingly close defense partnership, perhaps including the sharing of an aircraft carrier. In the SDSR we see the results of these, and other, concepts concerning Britain’s alliances of the day.

    As has been the same since the 1950s, NATO forms a large part of British defense policy, as outlined in the SDSR, and is described as the bedrock, in fact. A continued close alliance with the United States is another continuing and unsurprising theme, though the reductions in spending and capability suggest an even greater asymmetry between the world’s preeminent military power and the United Kingdom. Interestingly there is a greater emphasis on European power features. An outward facing EU, willing to get to grips with global issues seems to be a desired element of British defense policy, much in keeping with the concept of working closely with the United States with the hope of directing American power in support of British aims, which has often worked in the past due to such close similarities in views. In the EU, where Britain has a greater say, the prospects of utilizing European power are even greater.

    Working closer with France and the Americans seems the order of the day. In the hard world of practice, a greater need for multilateral action and alliance may develop and this is well catered for in the review, with emphasis on allied operations.

    There are details concerning interoperability with the French, also, which include the development of Franco-British military doctrine and training programs. Greater logistical support based on the A400M airlift project is mentioned, suggesting the possibility of an amalgamated though not shared airlift fleet. The development of an integrated military industrial complex is also worth much attention. It certainly means a continuation in European based defense projects, with more jobs based in the United Kingdom and France for manufacture, and more homegrown capability. This is in keeping with much of the SDSR and the headlines which follow it.

    The knock on effect of the cuts and cancelations on British jobs, especially those in BAE, have been noted in the media — although this particular reference to developing a shared industrial and technological base with France will mean at least a continued position for British war related industries. What the results will be may include more shared systems development, such as how Eurofighter was built in league with an alliance of EU member states. It will not be surprising, therefore, to see more systems developed in league with the French to replace existing independent ones. Vehicles of all variety, small arms and so on may be developed from this to be used by both French and British armed forces for both ease in cost and interoperability. However, the history of shared defense projects is one which does not inspire confidence.

    This brings us neatly on to materiel. The impact on British jobs could be seen as a sign of progress. Traditionally British defense capability has been marred by the intense and unpragmatic desire to develop equipment within the British Isles, much of it of a questionable quality, invariably late and almost certainly costing considerably more than previously expected. Even equipment bought in from the United States is often modified to comply with MOD specifications, at great cost, or to fit EU regulations, again at cost — a prime example being the Boeing Chinook debacle. This mindset has led to such unfortunate incidents as the 1990s example of amphibious vessels wherein the construction of such assault ships was seen as an opportunity for social regeneration and an attempt was made to build vessels on the river Tyne, where ships have not been built in decades. This effort failed miserably due to the lack of skilled workforce. The idea of putting the construction of important weapons in the hands of provincial politicians so that they may garner favor through the provision of jobs only works when the people have the skills to do so and is one of the sad tales of British procurement.

    Working closer with allies will also mean a smaller burden (depending on how you look at it, perhaps) on the British armed forces, though there are certainly issues around operational sovereignty. At current it seems unlikely that Britain could individually mount an operation similar to that in the 1982 Falklands War or even Sierra Leone. After the cuts this will certainly be the case for a few years and even then, with greater reliance on the French and/or Americans, such an operation may be even less likely as political and military action would be dependent on their support.

  • Jones Out, Donilon In

    Former Marine Corps General James Jones stepped down as President Barack Obama’s national security advisor last week. The resignation of such a top official would normally be treated as big news in Washington, particularly when that official is responsible for US security around the world. But Jones’ departure comes as an exception to the rule. Many inside the Beltway expected him to quit over the past few months. Indeed, this view was parallel to Bob Woodward’s portrayal of Jones in his new book Obama’s Wars as a depressed character who never managed to garner the respect he deserved from other members of the administration.

    Jones reportedly didn’t have a close working relationship with the president, which is a “must have” in his position. Some of the decisions that were implemented by the president were taken without his advice. General Jones failed to be the president’s eyes and ears on national security. He never truly confronted the military when the situation called for it. Nor did he stick up for the White House during the Afghanistan strategy review last fall.

    With Jones out, Obama has tapped Deputy National Security Advisor Tom Donilon as his replacement. While I personally have no recollection of Donilon as a player, he is apparently well versed and highly regarded by everyone who has worked with him over the years.

    Before serving as Deputy NSA, Donilon was the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs during the Clinton Administration, where he was in charge of — you guessed it — improving the State Department’s image. Donilon also served as a top member of Obama’s campaign team, so he knows how the current president operates in crisis mode.

    But the qualities that Donilon exhibits are perhaps much more important than the jobs he has held in the past. From all accounts, he is a workhorse in all things policy and he never takes a day to slack off. Steve Clemons calls him an expert at a “speedy, inclusive, decisionmaking process.” Bob Woodward praises Donilon as someone who runs “100 mph” compared to Jones’ 35. And sources within the administration have confirmed that Donilon has essentially been running the national-security shop for months, organizing meetings, questioning deputies, and making sure the president is fully informed on all the policy options that are available.

    It will be interesting to see whether Donilon’s appointment will affect the campaign in Afghanistan, for he is skeptical about American success in that part of the world. Jones had skepticism about the war as well, but he was consistently undermined by the military brass, all of whom were unified in their request for more troops. Donilon is no pushover, and he has already sparred with the military over troop levels.

    The White House has been shaken up for the time being. Expect more departures in the coming months if the Democrats do poorly in the midterm elections.

  • Congressional Apathy Toward Iraq

    As our military draws down, our dedicated civilians … are heading into the lead to support Iraq as it strengthens its government, resolves political disputes, resettles those displaced by war, and builds ties with the region and the world.

    That quotation is from none other than President Barack Obama himself, as he spoke directly to the American people on national television about the formal end of the American combat mission in Iraq. Most of that speech was dedicated to the achievements that Iraq has made as a country over the past four years: credible elections, diminished sectarian violence, a weakening of Al Qaeda, and the growing excitement among Iraqis about finally taking absolute control over their internal affairs. But a substantial piece of the speech was also what strategists would call Washington’s “blueprint” for Iraq over the next three to five years. And not surprisingly, much of this blueprint will go directly to the State Department’s portfolio.

    So why after all of the bombast associated with the official termination of America’s combat role — and after millions of people tuned into Obama’s nationwide address — is the United States Congress considering cuts in the State Department’s Iraq budget? Is it political necessity, considering the weak recovery at home, or is there another reason? Are the United States simply trying to forget that the “misadventure” in Iraq ever happened?

    For the sake of the American troops that have fought and perhaps died in the war, we should hope that the latter assumption is just that — an assumption. But judging from the direction that Congress is taking, Iraq doesn’t seem to be that much of a concern compared to other issues on the government’s agenda anymore.

    To be fair, Congress has yet to cut spending on civilian operations in Iraq, at least in an official capacity. The Senate has only suggested that American contributions may be lowered, and that the Iraqis should take on more responsibility for the costs of postwar programs. Nothing has been acted upon as far as concrete legislation. But at the same time, the Senate Armed Services Committee — at least from Chairman Carl Levin’s perspective — has already decreased the Pentagon’s request for an additional $2 billion for Iraqi training. Not a good sign.

    There is a growing disillusionment among some senior government officials now that the war in Iraq is over and done with. Apathy is starting to brew over Iraq’s future. “Let the Iraqis take care of it. It’s their country. Americans are tired of footing the bill.” These criticisms are understandable. Yet criticisms aside, simply walking away by refusing to build upon the military’s successes would be detrimental to Iraqi development. It would also be a slap in the face to those who invested so much in the mission.

  • Drones are America’s Default Option

    For the past six years, counterterrorism officials have considered Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as a top priority in the fight against Islamic extremism. For the United States specifically, FATA has frequently been cited as the main hub of Taliban and Al Qaeda activity. Indeed, there appears to be a stack of evidence on their behalf; most of the attacks against coalition troops in eastern Afghanistan have originated across the border in Pakistan. The fact that western Muslims are traveling to Pakistan in droves to join the jihad draws another dimension to the FATA problem.

    The hard part for American and NATO officials has always been how to diminish the threat of terrorism in the FATA badlands. What techniques should be used? Relying on the Pakistani military to clear the area of militants has been an option, but recent operations by Islamabad have only worked in specific circumstances. Pakistani officials have repeatedly argued that the Swat Valley and South Waziristan have been totally cleared of belligerents, yet bombings against Pakistani policemen continue unabated. And North Waziristan, an agency that houses numerous Al Qaeda factions, has been virtually untouched by the Pakistanis.

    The introduction of American troops into Pakistan would at first appear to be another effective strategy. But Islamabad is not willing to permit American boots on Pakistani soil.

    Therein lies the importance of American-operated drone strikes in the battle against extremism in Pakistan. Since the program was initiated in 2004, the stealthy unnamed planes have killed hundreds of low level militants and perhaps dozens of senior terrorist commanders. Countless plots have been disrupted or scrapped due to the relentless pressure of the drones on terrorist hideouts, particularly in North Waziristan. Al Qaeda has been forced to replace its third most powerful leader multiple times over the past two years alone, and all of this has been made possible without a single American casualty.

    Yet despite all of the benefits associated with drone strikes, civil liberty activists and an increasing amount of think-tank researchers have questioned the sustainability of the program. Many of these individuals are particularly disturbed that the UAV attacks are allegedly operated by the CIA, which obscures the transparency and accountability which international law requires of all United Nations member states. Indeed, the criteria that is used to place a terrorist operative on the “kill list” is hidden from the public domain.

    Philip Alston, the UN official in charge of extrajudicial killings, is especially worried about these implications. In June, Alston submitted a scathing critique (PDF) of the drone program to the organization’s Human Rights Council, claiming that Washington is essentially executing drone operations on an “ill-defined license to kill.”

    Just this past Friday, Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations expanded upon this critique by offering a strategic rationale to the anti-UAV position. In addition to the innocent human lives that are often lost as a result of drone operations, Zenko argues that the entire program reinforces a “quick fix” mindset among officials responsible for counterterrorism policy:

    Under pressure to act in response to a threat and seduced by the allure and responsiveness of limited force, presidents elevate military options above other instruments of statecraft. Once the bombs have been dropped…and the politically necessary “do something” box has been ticked, complex, robust secondary measures rarely come to fruition.

    But what is the alternative? A fully resourced and expensive nonmilitary campaign? The rebuilding of infrastructure that would cost the American taxpayer billions of dollars? Economic development and institutional formation? Actually, this is precisely what Zenko recommends. Unfortunately, Americans’ and Europeans’ patience is running thin. Nobody wants to embark upon another nation building exercise, particularly when infrastructure is crumbling at home and military resources are tied down in neighboring Afghanistan. A Western counterinsurgency campaign in Pakistan is unfeasible.

    Given the lack of options that are both politically plausible and financially acceptable, targeting terrorist hideouts in Pakistan’s ungoverned tribal areas will likely remain the default choice. The Obama Administration certainly believes that covert attacks are worth continuing: last September saw the highest amount of drone strikes in western Pakistan since the program began.

    All of this, of course, assumes that terrorist networks based in Pakistan don’t successfully launch a major attack on American and European targets in the near future. If such an incident does occur, expect the United States to quickly forget about the limitations of Pakistani sovereignty.

  • Rand Paul, Jack Conway Debate

    In Louisville, Kentucky yesterday, Fox News Sunday hosted a debate between Republican Senate candidate Dr Rand Paul and his Democratic opponent, the state’s Attorney General Jack Conway. Among the issues discussed were the nation debt, spending, cap-and-trade, and the Obama agenda.

    Moderator Chris Wallace pointed out early in the debate that whereas Conway was running campaign ads which portrayed Paul as being out of the mainstream, the libertarian candidate’s campaign hardly mentioned Conway. On air, Paul stressed that the issues were at stake in his campaign and he wasted little time to talk about them. He said that he opposed the administration’s energy agenda because its effects would be disastrous for Kentucky’s coal industry. Conway moreover, according to Paul, had in been in favor of President Barack Obama’s stimulus package; something that he believes has failed to recover the American economy. When pressed on the jobs supposedly saved or created by the stimulus, Paul claimed that 17,000 have been lost because of it while each of the jobs saved had a price tag attached to it of $430,000.

    Conway responded by pointing out that while he supported the stimulus, he had opposed the bailouts for lack of accountability.

    When the discussion came to federal regulation of environmental and workplace safety, the candidates agreed that unelected bureaucrats shouldn’t be the ones making law, as the Environmental Protection Agency recently attempted with regard to greenhouse emissions. They disagreed however on the extent to which government should be involved. Rand, who has been critical of the Democrats’ health care and economic policies, is a proponent of limited government and argued that local authorities are always better equipped to legislate on the things that directly affect people’s lives.

    Discussing his role in the Senate, if elected, Conway expressed support for union card checks and the health-care reform bill enacted by Democrats. When asked about his political position compared to President Obama, Conway repeated his pledge to “put Kentucky first” by focusing on national security and the war on the drugs.

    Paul, finally, said that he would support fellow Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell for Majority Leader if Republicans manage to win back the upper chamber this fall. His allegiance was in question because McConnell previously endorsed Paul’s primary opponent for the nomination. He further promised that more of Kentucky’s tax dollars would stay if Kentucky and that he would fight to rein in government spending.

  • Iran Struggles With Nuclear Plant Delays

    Iran’s first nuclear power plant in Bushehr will not be up and running until next year, according to reports from the Iranian atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi. Iran began loading Russian-made fuel rods into the plant in August, expecting to connect it to the national power grid by October.

    Salehi said on Wednesday that, “the fuel will be loaded to the core of the reactor completely by early November and … two to three months after that, electricity will be added to the networks.”

    The announcement follows a long history of delays with the Bushehr plant. Reza Aghazadeh, Salehi’s predecessor, promised to turn on the switch back in 2008. This year, Iranian officials have blamed intense heat for more recent delays. Meanwhile, American and Israeli officials continue to condemn the facility as instrumental to Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.

    Speculation has been swirling over the past few days about a different reason for the delays. Last weekend, Iranian officials confirmed that the computer virus known as Stuxnet had infected industrial infrastructure systems throughout the country. One official declared that as many as 30,000 individual computers had been affected.

    There are analysts who suspect that Stuxnet was created to specifically target an industrial facility. Is it possible that the worm was designed to target Iran’s nuclear program? Ralph Langner, a German cybersecurity researcher, told the Christian Science Monitor that “Stuxnet is a 100-percent-directed cyber attack aimed at destroying an industrial process in the physical world.” His research into the virus, which is supported by other experienced cybersecurity analysts, asserts that Stuxnet “is looking for one specific place and time to attack one specific factory or power plant in the entire world.”

    Iranian officials deny these assertions and no damage has been reported at the Bushehr facility. But Langner and other cybersecurity experts say that no one knows what Stuxnet’s ultimate aim truly is.

    What is clear about the virus is that it is incredibly sophisticated. Analysts agree that it must have required a team of developers supported by a wealthy individual, organization, or perhaps a government. Once Stuxnet identifies its target and certain parameters are met, Lagner believes that “we can expect that something will blow up soon. Something big.”

    The United States and Israel have both the software development capabilities and the motive to devise a sabotage effort aimed at Iran, but is this a likely scenario? It is hard to believe that the Obama Administration would employ computer espionage to try to derail Iran’s nuclear program. Similarly, the Israeli government, while certainly worried about an Iranian nuclear bomb, would probably turn to other means to delay or destroy the program. What’s more, they would probably wait until closer to the point of no return before showing their hand.

    If and when the Bushehr plant comes online, it is expected to generate 2.5 percent of the country’s total electricity supply. This would be an important victory for President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s government, which has repeatedly rebuffed international efforts to put a stop to the Iranian nuclear program. But Stuxnet may have found its target. We don’t really know if the virus is the main reason for the delay in opening up the plant, or exactly what damage it has already caused, or what it is waiting for.

    One question will remain regardless of the outcome in Bushehr: who created the Stuxnet virus in the first place, and for what purpose?

  • Saudi Arabia Bulking Up

    What do you do when a developing power insists on continuing its nuclear weapons program  Well, you could impose “crippling” sanctions as a penalty and hope that your enemy capitulates to the pressure (as President Barack Obama is doing now). Or if you were a neoconservative, you could use (or threaten) military action and hope that those operations don’t result in a full-scale armed conflict. Either way, both choices are based on a word that isn’t exactly dependable in international relations — hope.

    But there is a third option. Sensing that a military strike is too dangerous and economic sanctions are too ineffective, a world power (like the United States) could pump arms into the region in order to boost the deterrence capabilities of its key allies. For instance, the United States could sell advanced military hardware to Israel, Saudi Arabia or Jordan before Iran decides to turn the screws on full weapons development. This is good old-fashioned deterrence at its finest, and the concept has worked remarkably well for the United States throughout the twentieth century.

    Absent evidence to the contrary, all indications seem to conclude that deterrence will continue to work well. At least that’s Washington’s perspective.

    So the United States are selling some $60 billion in weaponry to Saudi Arabia in order to further isolate Iran from the Middle East. Granted, the sale still has to be approved by Congress, which is undoubtedly concerned that this transaction may weaken Israel’s own deterrence capability in the region. But if the package is signed off, it would include the sale of 84 new F-15 fighter planes, 70 Apache attack helicopters, 72 Black Hawk helicopters, and 36 Little Bird (troop carrying) helicopters. If that doesn’t put a little scare in Iran’s strategic calculation, then perhaps Tehran’s leadership is more ideological than I previously assumed.

    If conventional wisdom were any guide, the proposed American-Saudi arms agreement would sound like a big deal. The New York Times overhypes the story by writing that the package could “shift the region’s balance of power over the course of a decade.” But when we take history into account, this sale is anything but new. The United States pursued a similar policy in the late 1980s and 1990s, when Saudi Arabia purchased American planes and the United Arab Emirates bought American manufactured weapons systems in bulk (they continue to do so, by the way). Of course, the rationale back then was to box Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into a corner. The only thing that has changed over the past twenty years is the antagonist.

    We now wait and see if Congress approves the plan. Some are rightly concerned that placing more weapons into an already volatile region could push Iran to either manufacture its own weapons as a response or buy them through the black market. Others are probably worried that the scheme will simply not work. Tehran may go ahead, as planned.

    But absent other options, providing moderate Middle Eastern regimes with an improved defense capability is perhaps the most logical. At least it won’t start a war.

  • Karl Rove Discusses Tea Party Primary Wins

    With Tea Party backed candidates winning primaries in several states, is the movement usurping the GOP? Fox News Sunday’s Chris Wallace interviewed Republican campaign strategist Karl Rove over the issue and his party’s refusal to back Delaware candidate Christine O’Donnell.

    Rove said that in order for the Republicans to win they need a winning strategy. The problem with O’Donnell is that there are several questions about her past that have gone unanswered. If those questions linger, Rove warned, O’Donnell can only win if voters decide to ignore them and care about government spending and the recently passed health-care reform bill instead. The winning strategy, however, would be to answer those questions in a sympathetic manner.

    When confronted with O’Donnell’s admittance to “dabbling in witchcraft” back in 1999, Rove expressed concern over the many churchgoing people in Delaware who would want to have some answers about that. “I, frankly, think a winning strategy requires coming to grips with these questions and explaining them in the most sympathetic way possible so that people unblock their ears in Delaware and begin hearing the broader message,” said Rove.

    On the current political drama in Alaska, Rove was asked if Lisa Murkowski’s write-in campaign would win her the Senate seat or cost the Republicans the election. The first part of his reply was a lighthearted jab stating that in a write-in campaign, voters have to spell the candidate’s name correctly and he challenged anyone to write Murkowski’s to see if they can get it right.

    On a more serious note Rove added that he couldn’t imagine the state of Alaska wanting two liberal Democrats who were in line with the Obama Administration’s agenda representing them in Washington but feared that Murkowski could accomplish that as a “spoilsport”.

    My hope is that the Republicans and conservatives in Alaska recognize the bigger issue, which is defeating President Obama’s agenda and go for this highly qualified Republican nominee, a West Point graduate, a military veteran, a graduate of one of the nation’s most prestigious law schools, a former magistrate judge, a practicing attorney in the state and an active Republican.

    Asked about the impact of these primary results on the 2012 presidential race, Rove said that it was too early to tell. People are focused on the midterms and on getting Republicans who are keeping true to the core tenets of the party elected. He did add about Sarah Palin however that if she wanted to prove the amount of pull she had and become the frontrunner instead of just one party favorite, she should head for Delaware and help O’Donnell’s Senate campaign. “Sarah Palin has enormous magnetism and a big following,” he said. “And let her employ it in the field on behalf […] of the candidate that she cares so much about.”

  • World Watches As Afghanistan Votes

    After weeks of intense door-to-door campaigning, and after months of preparation, Afghan politicians hoping to enter into parliament are ready for the electoral competition. The question is whether Afghan themselves are ready to stand in line to cast their ballots.

    Electoral democracy in Afghanistan has always been a hard sell, even after Mullah Omar and Company were driven from power nine years ago. Yet the underpinnings of democracy itself have actually been present throughout the country’s history. Historically, Afghans would express their daily grievances to tribal leaders, who would then convene a small jirga (or conference) to address the problem and find a solution. That practice still goes on in villages across Afghanistan to this day. But risking one’s life just to vote for an official who will probably turn corrupt is a whole different story. And unfortunately, after last year’s fraud ridden presidential election, when close to one third of the votes were disqualified, electoral democracy only weakened as a concept.

    There is some bright news, however. This year, 2,500 candidates are squaring off against one another for just 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. That, in and of itself, is a great indication of electoral democracy. The fact that some Afghans would rather use the political system is a pretty good sign of how far Afghanistan has come from Taliban rule just a decade ago. In fact, there are reports of semi-independent Taliban commanders participating in the process as well.

    But all the candidates in the world won’t do any good if the Afghan people haven’t any faith in these elections. With the Taliban threatening voters and candidates alike, and with intimidation dominating the environment, millions of Afghans may choose to stay away for their own safety. Others, however, will undoubtedly march to the polls and weather the storm.

    All in all, the United States and its NATO coalition partners would be wise not to expect too much from today’s election. Ballot stuffing will occur in certain provinces; casted votes will be “lost” in transition to headquarters; violence will target Afghan civilians and election workers; volunteers will be kidnapped; and warlords will probably defeat legitimate candidates who truly want to make a difference. In other words, a lot of things will go wrong, even in the best of circumstances. But the election will have gone forward, and democracy will have played out despite a volatile climate.

    If all expectations are met, the United States may be able to use the momentum that the elections provide to the advantage of future coalition operations. But if the contest is less than desirable; if Afghans refuse to vote or if hundreds lose their lives, then it will be yet another dagger in the heart of Washington’s Afghan project.

  • Iran’s Nuclear Plant Grand Opening

    Iran has finally announced the opening this Saturday of its first nuclear power plant, leaving many Western nations and Israel nervous about possible forays into nuclear weapons.

    Iran considers the ability to build and operate a nuclear power plant its right. The project has been underway with much opposition since 1974. Russia has supported the endeavor with money and technology, while at the same time supporting UN sanctions over the years. As of right now Iran is purchasing fuel for the plant from foreign sources, but has plans to begin production of its own fuel. Herein lies the danger for Iran’s foes. The uranium enrichment sites can be used for producing weapons grade uranium as well as enriched uranium for power production.

    The question is not whether Iran will gain nuclear capacity, but what role in this other nations play. No advance in civilization, particularly in war, can remain a secret indefinitely. And though Iran has been known for its aggressive behavior in the Middle East and its outspoken opposition to Israel and many Western nations and policies, it is still a sovereign nation. If there is individual freedom is there freedom for nations? Do foreign nations have any authority to oversee Iran at all, as the United Nations are doing right now? If so, from where does this authority originate?

    The authority to oversee nuclear plants in certain nations is claimed by the UN and it is backed up by threat of force. The authority only exists so long as the UN can and will use the force it threatens. It is a right of might, not an inherent one. The inherent rights of man would suggest that a foreign nation has the absolute right to govern themselves as they see fit. If what nations choose is aggression, then they must expect to be met with aggression in return. But there is nothing immoral in simply having weapons and armies; it is the way in which they are used that raises moral questions.

    The Nuclear Age however poses certain problems never before known. A nuclear missile might be launched from a distance and its destructive power dwarfs all previous human attempts at annihilation. Therefore prevention is much more desirable than retribution. Does the right of self-defense trump the right of self-determination in this case? Perhaps. Especially if the claim of right comes from a nation of unrepentant antagonists. For now, the UN will be inspecting and overseeing the nuclear projects of Iran.

  • US Military: Give Us More Time

    There is a potential revolution in the making going on within America’s Afghanistan policy, and it’s not emanating from where you might think.

    Instead of the White House pushing the American military to change its approach and to change its tactics — which is something that Democratic presidents have traditionally embraced throughout American history — it’s the armed forces that are now starting to take that role. The issue in question is none other than Afghanistan, where whole squadrons of junior officers are lobbying the president hard on his July 2011 pullout date. “Too fast and too soon,” say these military leaders. “Don’t abandon Afghanistan like you did in the early 1990s.  Don’t withdraw American forces while the Afghan Security Services are still weak and ineffectual. But most of all Mr President, please refrain from terminating a war policy that has yet had the chance to prove itself.”

    In more ways than one, the marines and soldiers voicing this opinion are absolutely right. When President Barack Obama spoke at West Point last December and announced his decision to send an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, most in the audience assumed that the current administration was unveiling a brand new strategy to curtail the Taliban and turn the situation around.

    The brand new strategy was called counterinsurgency, an approach that combines the traditional aspect of killing the enemy with the untraditional task of building local governance, promoting economic development, and showing the local population that the United States and the Afghan government were a better alternative to the Taliban. “Winning hearts and minds,” is the catchphrase that Washington has used to describe counterinsurgency, but the strategy is actually much more complicated than that. It’s more like “winning hearts and minds,” sustaining a relentless campaign of violence toward the insurgency, and swallowing your tongue when local residents frustrate your efforts.

    Yet seven months later, the situation in Afghanistan is still dire. Hundreds of insurgents have been killed by coalition forces, but the thousands more are still strong enough to coordinate attacks in every corner of the country. Afghan President Hamid Karzai remains an unreliable American partner at best, and large portions of his government are still occupied by corrupt figures. Little headway has been made with the training of Afghan police, despite Washington’s hope that there would be close to 130,000 cops on the beat by July 2011. And America just experienced its deadliest month in the nearly nine year-old war, with 66 American soldiers killed in action by small arms fire, roadside bombs, and suicide attacks.

    As a consequence, lawmakers in Congress are getting a little antsy. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, is demanding that the Obama Administration stick with its timetable of withdrawal, and an increasingly high number of House Democrats are questioning the very notion of funding the soldiers that are already in the warzone. As Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, and David Sanger wrote in The New York Times, more than a third of the Democratic caucus voted against financing the war, sending a clear signal to Obama that his own party is distancing itself from the entire effort. In other words, Afghanistan in 2010 looks a lot like Iraq did back in 2006: violent, desperate, and a place where hope is in short supply.

    Will Obama cave into pressure in order to appease his own party on the war? Or will he listen to a growing number of commanders that are asking the president to give the military more time to make the counterinsurgency strategy work? These are the important questions that will not only determine the course of the war, but also America’s credibility in South Asia well into the future. Afghans and Pakistanis still distinctly remember how the United States packed up and left after its covert intervention against the Soviet Union ended in 1989. The result of that departure was nothing short of a long and brutal civil war in Afghanistan, culminating in the rise of a Sunni fundamentalist movement that drove the United States back into the country twelve years later.

    American generals want to get Afghanistan right. But they cannot kill Taliban, beef up a central Afghan government, pave roads, and build schools all before the summer of next year. The mission should be given more time to fulfill these objectives. Otherwise, the United States should either ditch counterinsurgency for a more limited counterterrorism plan, or get troops out altogether.

  • General Petraeus on Winning in Afghanistan

    In his first interview since taking over as commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus talked about his strategy on NBC’s Meet the Press Sunday with less than a year before the withdrawal of the first American troops is scheduled to commence.

    Asked what was needed to win the war in Afghanistan, one of the things Petraeus mentioned was the need of reintegrating Taliban fighters in Afghan society. This is possible, he believes, especially with the “five dollar a day Taliban,” men fighting for the Taliban for a price, as well as with insurgents who are beginning to realize that the Taliban’s leadership appear to be leading from the rear.

    According to General Petraeus, the Taliban’s leaders largely send messages and leave everyone else at the broken end of the bottle, inflicting the most civilian casualties in this war. He added that the mission is still to win over the hearts and minds of the people in order to bring an end to the conflict.

    When asked what failure or success would mean to Afghanistan the general stated that while success means economic and national growth for the country, failure could affect the entire region, with civil war breaking out in Afghanistan and surrounding nations picking their sides, aiding the efforts of those prolonging the fighting and suffering.

    Interestingly, Petraeus said that while Iran has no desire to see Americans gaining an easy victory in Afghanistan, they don’t like the Taliban emerging victorious either, despite the small amounts of funding and training which Tehran has offered them. The Iranians see the Taliban as too conservative in their views while a victory for them could undermine the stability of their own regime.

    On the rather tricky subject of meeting with Taliban leaders in order to broker a peace agreement, Petraeus said that it was a lot like it was back in Iraq. They asked, “Were we willing to meet with people who had our blood on their hands?” The answer, said Petraeus, was yes. This may come as a somewhat disheartening response to many after the recent Time magazine article about Afghan women and their suffering under what’s left of the Taliban. But meeting with the Taliban is a reality of the war, and it may well be the price of peace.

  • Local Elections Canceled in West Bank

    Last month, Palestinians in the West Bank were supposed to vote on a new set of local politicians. To Americans and Europeans, municipal elections aren’t such a big deal. But for people who haven’t had a taste of democracy in years, just the slightest chance of waiting on line to cast a ballot is an exhilarating experience. For Palestinians — a people under persistent occupation, divided between two political factions, and separated in two geographical areas — this exuberance would have been even more fulfilling.

    Sadly, the elections were canceled by the Palestinian Authority, which argued that they would have fragmented Palestine’s national identity and diverted attention away from the more pressing problem of Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe.

    Little do they know that Palestinian identity hasn’t been unified for quite a long time. Hamas and Fatah have been battling it out for the past four years. 1.5 million Palestinians in the slim coastal enclave of the Gaza Strip are separated from another 2.5 million in the West Bank. And if you want to get mired in technicalities, the Palestinians don’t even have a national identity. The lack of a Palestinian state kicks the “national” right out the door.

    Something else is at work here. The cancelation had nothing to do with Gaza, and it certainly had nothing to do with efforts at unity. Instead, fear of who would win and who would lose was most likely the culprit. And in some strange way, the United States is partly to blame for Palestine’s increasingly authoritarian behavior.

    Back in 2006, the United States encouraged Palestinians to come out and vote for their next national government. At the time, it was an historic moment; the first elections since the death of longtime leader Yasser Arafat and the beginning of a new era in Middle East democracy. But when the elections were over, and the winner was announced (Hamas), encouragement in Washington quickly turned into despair and disappointment.

    The right thing for Washington to do was applaud the Palestinians for their trust in democracy — even if the United States didn’t necessarily like the results. Such a positive response could have served as a precedent for further elections into the future.

    Unfortunately, the Bush Administration took the opposite approach. The same democracy that Washington trumpeted beforehand quickly turned into an embarrassment. Due to Hamas’ place on Washington’s terrorist list, the United States refused to declare the contest legitimate. The administration dug itself deeper by not engaging Hamas at a low level, which would have at least shown Palestinians that America meant what it said about democratic institutions.

    Four years later, what we have in the Palestinian territories is a powerless legislative branch, a Palestinian president ruling by decree, and an authority that is divided internally between old-time technocrats and upwardly mobile moderates.

    We are still suffering from that disastrous 2006 experience. Just as America was afraid about the results back then, the PA is afraid about what’s on the minds of Palestinian voters today. Canceling the elections gives them more time to delay the inevitable.

  • Obama’s Numbers in the Arab World

    I’m a big fan of Dr Marc Lynch’s work. In addition to being considered a respected professor in a top-tier American university (George Washington University), he is also one of the best versed in Middle Eastern culture and knowledgeable about virtually every issue in the Arab world. So whenever Dr Lynch writes a post about Arab public opinion or has something to say about American-Islamic relations, I tend to read it very quickly.

    Such was the case last Thursday, when Lynch devoted a post to the dwindling appeal of President Barack Obama in the eyes of ordinary Muslims. Technically, the Brookings Institution sponsored the poll and conducted the project, but it’s people like Lynch (not to mention Steve Walt and Tom Ricks) that make sense of the data and try to put it into some perspective.

    For a full look at Brookings’ results, click here (PDF). I highly recommend that you take a look at the raw figures, because it gives us a sense of what issues still ring true in the hearts of Arabs. But if you just want to get to the nuts-and-bolts, the results can be best described as quantification of America’s declining appeal, even in countries that are considered to be American allies. The poll not only reveals an unfortunate American decline in popularity, but also the deep frustrations that many Arabs hold over America’s inability to meet its promises and commitments. (more…)

  • Israel-Lebanon Border Skirmish Not All Bad

    The last thing the Middle East needs right now is another shooting war. But when gunfire erupted between Israeli and Lebanese troops along the border this past Tuesday, that is exactly what the Levant experienced for a few brief moments.

    The border between Israel and Lebanon has been relatively quiet ever since Israel and Hezbollah decided to stop fighting one another back in August 2006. A mutual ceasefire was signed to damper down hostilities, which called for the deployment of a sizable United Nations peacekeeping force along the green line in order to ensure that a violent incident wouldn’t spark out of control. As of that agreement, the Hezbollah militia has shown restraint along the frontier, even as its weapons supply has increased to an estimated 40,000 rockets. Knowing that another violent confrontation with Hezbollah would be a costly military campaign, Israel too is content with the status quo (although it worries about Hezbollah’s growing arsenal).

    But all of that changed in a split second when Lebanese soldiers fired on Israeli commandos when they were trying to trim down a tree along their side of the border. One high level Israeli soldier was shot in the head and killed. Israel responded by firing mortars and machine guns toward the Lebanese, killing two of their soldiers and a journalist.

    The incident was the most violent in four years, and many in the region are deeply worried that the situation could quickly spiral into another full fledged armed conflict.

    Fighting over a cypress tree is certainly a tragedy for both sides, especially when casualties are involved. But the incident could have been much worse. Hezbollah, with its vast arsenal of missiles, could have used the opportunity to provoke violence toward Israel’s northern frontier in the name of “protecting Lebanese sovereignty.” Thankfully, Hassan Nasrallah chose to stay on the sidelines during the dispute. This shows that Hezbollah is indeed weary of another violent confrontation with Israel, despite its growing military capability in Southern Lebanon.

    Both the Israeli and Lebanese governments are meeting with UNIFIL to resolve the incident and to make sure that nothing like it ever happens again. It’s only a start, but the move confirms that both sides would much rather hold a fragile peace together instead of resorting to another round of shooting.

    Another point to consider: Given that the UN have now confirmed that Lebanon instigated the shootout, will this force the United States to reevaluate its partnership with the Lebanese Defense Forces? Last year, Washington donated $162 million to the Lebanese Army, hoping that the money would be used to counter Hezbollah’s own military gains. Now that a violent spat has occurred, President Barack Obama may have to consider whether this policy can be sustained without strong opposition from Congress. Thanks to Daniel Levy of the Middle East Task Force for bringing this up, because it would have sailed over my head had it not been for his piece at Foreign Policy.