An Israeli F-16 fighter aircraft, January 18, 2011

War seems imminent again. According to The Washington Post‘s David Ignatius, the Americans believe that there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran before June of this year when Iran is expected to enter what the Israelis described as a “zone of immunity” to commence building a nuclear bomb.

“Very soon,” he writes, “the Israelis fear, the Iranians will have stored enough enriched uranium in deep underground facilities to make a weapon—and only the United States could then stop them militarily.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doesn’t want to leave the fate of Israel dependent on American action, which would be triggered by intelligence that Iran is building a bomb, which it hasn’t done yet.

The United States are reluctant to engage in military action against Iran. Attacking the country carries great tactical and strategic risks.

Iran has threatened to shut the narrow Strait of Hormuz if menaced which would put roughly 40 percent of the world’s seaborn oil transports at risk.

Tehran has more retaliatory options at its disposal across the Middle East. It could seek to incite Shī’ah violence in Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia as well as in Iraq where there are no longer American forces to quell sectarian unrest. The Iranians could also encourage Hezbollah to initiate a renewed missile barrage against Israel. Reportedly, the Israelis are anticipating such a counterstrike and expect casualties on their side to number in the several hundreds.

According to Ignatius, Israel believes that a military strike could be limited and contained. “They would bomb the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and other targets; an attack on the buried enrichment facility at Qom would be harder from the air.”

This would appear to confirm a 2004 report in the German magazine Der Spiegel which said Israel had prepared a “complex yet manageable” plan of attack against six nuclear sites which were to be bombed simultaneously. The scenario envisioned Israeli jets traversing Iraqi airspace. With the Americans no longer present in the country, that could be complicated.

Israeli fighters are more likely to fly over southern Turkey or northern Saudi Arabia to reach their targets now. Neither country wants to have another nuclear neighbor.

The mountainous terrain in the northwest of Iran inhibits the country’s antiquated radar warning systems from spotting the Israelis from afar which makes the northern route an attractive one. Turkey, however, likes to think of itself as an interlocutor between Iran and the West and does not want to be perceived as an ally of Israel’s anymore.

The Saudis, by contrast, are engaged in something of a cold war with the Iranians and wouldn’t stop Israeli aircraft from overflying their northern desert. They have even warned that if Tehran gets the bomb, other powers in the region (i.e., Saudi Arabia) will seek a similar weapons capacity.

Ballistic missiles probably aren’t an option for Israel because they aren’t as accurate as aircraft delivering precision guided munition.

Iran’s nuclear facilities are scattered and concealed. It would be nearly impossible for an attacker, whether it’s Israel, the United States or both, to take out all of the Iranian nuclear sites in a single strike even if their bunker busting bombs are capable of obliterating the ayatollahs’ fortified positions. A unilateral Israeli strike this year would at best set the Iranians back several years in their alleged quest for a nuclear weapons capacity. Indeed, it would likely strengthen their conviction that Iran needs the ultimate weapon to defend itself against Israel.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey meets with Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, chief of General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, January 20

America’s and Israel’s top military officers on Friday downplayed differences in policy between the two countries. Despite rumors of discord on how best to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapons capacity, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, the head of Israel’s defense forces, said, “I do know that both our countries share the same interests, both the same values, and I’m sure that we can somehow work it out together.”

Army General Martin E. Dempsey said his first visit to the Jewish state since assuming the chairmanship of the Joints Chiefs of Staff in October of last year reflected “the commitment we have with each other, and I’m here to assure you that’s the case.”

In a later meeting, Dempsey was told by President Shimon Peres that Israel had confidence in the United States military and “that even today in a very complicated situation we can find a common ground.”

Dempsey’s trip, despite assurances that there is no daylight between the two allies, is perceived as part of an effort by the United States to convince Israel to give international sanctions more time and stave off unilateral military action against Iran.

The two Western countries suspect that Iran’s uranium enrichment program is aimed to developing a nuclear weapon. Iran has denied this and threatened to shut access to the Persian Gulf if more sanctions are enacted which would put 40 percent of the world’s seaborn oil transports at risk.

Israeli officials have welcomed tightening sanctions against Tehran but sometimes questioned America’s resolve. Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon, a former Israeli military chief, suggested on Sunday there is “hesitation” on the part of the Obama Administration to apply tougher sanctions “for fear of oil prices rising this year.”

Gasoline and oil transport insurance costs could skyrocket if there is a naval skirmish in the Persian Gulf. A prolonged Iranian blockade may lead to shortages because the United States import more than a million barrels of oil per day from Saudi Arabia, the bulk of which is transported by sea through the Gulf. After Canada, the kingdom is America’s second largest oil supplier.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hasn’t ruled out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities but his defense minister, Ehud Barack, this week offered more conciliatory words, saying that an Israeli decision on whether to attack Iran was “very far off.”

An Israeli F-16 fighter aircraft, November 30, 2008 (Nehemia Gershuni)

The International Atomic Energy Agency reported on Tuesday that it had received “credible” information indicating that Iran is developing nuclear weapons despite the regime’s insistence that it merely seeks a nuclear capacity to produce energy.

Israel is already up in arms about the allegation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly lobbying his cabinet to approve a preemptive strike. Conservative lawmakers in the United States are similarly dismayed and disappointed in President Barack Obama’s inability to “get tough” on Iran.

The administration is understandably hesitant. Striking Iran carries great tactical and strategic risks.

Iran’s nuclear facilities are scattered and concealed. It would be nearly impossible for an attacker, whether it’s Israel, the United States or both, to take out all of Iran’s nuclear sites in a single strike even if their bunker busting bombs are capable of obliterating the ayatollahs’ fortified positions.

There will be Iranian retaliation in any event. At least right now, it won’t be nuclear which is why Israel is pushing for an attack fast.

Tehran could order its navy to mine the Strait of Hormuz through which 40 percent of the world’s seaborn oil transports passes through every day or harass oil tankers with diesel submarines and shore batteries. This would put 20 percent of the world’s oil supply at risk. Even if the United States Navy should be able to break an Iranian blockade of the Gulf, oil prices and insurance rates will temporarily skyrocket and immediately impact the fragile economies of the West.

Beyond the Persian Gulf, Iran could seek to incite Shī’ah violence in Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia as it has before, according to these monarchies, and in Iraq where the Americans are preparing for a withdrawal. It also has retaliatory options at its disposal in the Levant where it may incur a renewed Hezbollah missile barrage against Israel.

All of these options could be deployed even if Israel attacks unilaterally for Iran is likely to perceive an Israeli attack as part of a Western scheme, whatever the reality. The United States will thus be forced to intervene to keep the oil flowing from the Arab states of the Gulf and possibly to destroy the remaining suspected Iranian nuclear sites lest it seek to retaliate with a “dirty” bomb which is composed of fissile materials but lacks the destructive impact of an atomic weapon.

On a strategic plane, an attack is likely to lock in an anti-American regime in Iran for another generation to come, one that is all the more motivated to become a nuclear and regional power. Once Iran possesses nuclear weapons, after all, it will be able to deter an American-Israeli offensive.

An Iranian bomb is likely to kick off a regional bout of rapid proliferation with especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey and, in the longer term, Egypt and Iraq seeking a similar capacity. The United States could extend their defense umbrella to cover friendly regimes in the region and discourage them from trying to build an atomic weapon of their own. But the Saudis are anxious. Their proxy government in Lebanon was torn asunder by Iranian intrigue and March’s uprising in Bahrain prompted a Saudi intervention because the kingdom feared Iranian involvement there.

With Egypt and Iraq in turmoil, Saudi Arabia is the only Sunni power in the Middle East that is able to keep the Iranians at bay. An Iranian-Israeli-Saudi nuclear triangle, balanced by American power, may be the best thing to keep the region safe.

If Washington isn’t willing to outright give the Saudis nuclear weapons, it could do worse than strike an agreement similar to the one it has with Turkey where forty American nuclear weapons are stationed and slated to pass unto Turkish control if it is ever threatened with nuclear attack by a non-NATO power. Extending the same privilege to Riyadh would ensure a nuclear balance across the Gulf with minimal American effort.

An Israeli F-16 in Sardinia, Italy, November 16, 2010 (IDF)

Tough talk between the governments of Israel and Iran is nothing new. The two countries hold such diametrically opposing views in the region and such a negative history that strong language is often a predictable outcome.

The Israeli Government perceives the Islamic Republic as its greatest threat, not only due to Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s past remarks but also as a consequence of Iran’s continued drive to beef up its nuclear capability. ”Existential threat” is the term that is constantly used in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vocabulary when he talks about Iran’s ayatollahs.

Yet at no time in the past—as far as we know—has Netanyahu gone out of his way to lobby others inside his cabinet for a premeditated airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Such an action would be construed by Israelis and Iranians alike as a serious attempt by the Israeli Government to lay the groundwork for an actual military strike—a big escalation even when considering the Israel-Iran relationship. Internal planning for a preemptive strike would also alarm the United States, a country with tens of thousands of men and women in the region that would instantly become targets for reprisal Iranian attacks.

According to the Associated Press, Israeli newspaper Haaretz and European news services, this is exactly what the Israeli leader is doing though. And while Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program has always been on the minds of Israel’s security chiefs and policymakers, the rhetoric coming out of Tel Aviv at the moment indicates that some of Israel’s most influential politicians are coming around to supporting the military option.

The cabinet is divided however. The minister for strategic affairs, Moshe Ya’alon, a former military chief of staff, does not believe that Israel has the capability to successfully execute such a complex operation. Even the most outspoken foreign policy hawk in the ruling coalition, foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, wonders whether a strike against Iran’s nuclear plants could work. Defense minister Ehud Barak has chosen to back Netanyahu’s position.

For the sake of regional stability, the Israeli cabinet’s deadlock may be a blessing. Lobbying inside any government takes a considerable amount of time. It is often difficult to change the established viewpoints of policymakers on mundane day to day problems, let alone a subject of such strategic importance as a confrontation with Tehran over its nuclear development. The delay is a golden opportunity for all powers with a stake in the Iranian nuclear question to dial down the war rhetoric before it reaches a boiling point.

There is the question of whether Netanyahu really believes in what he is peddling. Is he sincere in his belief that only a preemptive attack on Tehran’s uranium facilities will halt the country’s quest for nuclear weapons? Is he trying to divert attention from the lull in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks by raising the stakes on the Iran problem? Or is Netanyahu’s lobbying campaign something entirely different, perhaps a way to gauge support in the cabinet or a ploy to draw out his opponents?

All of these queries are open for debate as is the question how Iran would chose to retaliate. A firmer resolve in producing the world’s ultimate weapon? The firing of ballistic missiles at Israeli cities? An increase in Hezbollah and Hamas rocket fire?

An Israeli strike would also provide Iran with a convenient excuse to lash out beyond the Middle East, which they have done when Iranian interests have called for it. And there’s the chance that the popular revolutions that have become such a formidable force in the Arab world could be overtaken by an Israel-Iran armed confrontation, giving autocrats in Syria and Yemen an opening to step up their security crackdown in the absence of an attentive global press.

Israel must wonder whether an attack is worth all these risks.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey speaks with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, September 24

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that Israel “shows no mercy” and is “cruel” in its treatment of Palestinians in an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria that airs on Sunday.

The Turkish leader also questioned the number of Israelis that have suffered under missile attacks launched from Gaza where the militant Islamist movement Hamas has been in government since 2007, before claiming that “hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were killed” as a result of military action by Israel.

Relations between the two Middle Eastern states have deteriorated since May of last year when Israel intercepted a small fleet of blockade runners that was bound for Gaza. The activists on board the ships claimed that they were carrying humanitarian aid for the people of the Gaza Strip but attacked Israeli soldiers when they boarded the lead vessel. Nine Turks were killed in the skirmish that ensued.

Ankara strongly condemned the incident. Erdoğan’s deputy prime minister likened the action to “piracy” and characterized it as “a dark stain on the history of humanity.” Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, the architect of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy, compared the Israeli raid to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

Turkey demanded a formal apology from Israel for the loss of life as well as reparations for the families of the deceased. When its demands weren’t met this month, it barred Israeli military aircraft from Turkish air space and vowed legal action against the Israeli soldiers that were involved in the incident.

The Israeli embargo of Gaza continues but Egypt, where veteran president Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in a popular uprising last February, unilaterally lifted the blockade this May.

Erdoğan received a hero’s welcome in Cairo nearly two weeks ago where he spoke passionately on behalf of the Palestinian cause. “Our Palestinian brothers should be able to have their own state,” he told a summit of Arab leaders, urging their support for full Palestinian membership of the United Nations.

The Palestinian Authority sought recognition of statehood at the General Assembly in New York on Friday despite American and Israeli opposition to the move. Western powers insist that a Palestinian state can only come about as a result of negotiations with Israel.

Although he risks alienating traditional allies of Turkey’s with his populist rhetoric, Erdoğan will likely continue to champion the Palestinian cause and frustrate his nation’s relations with Israel in the process.

The prime minister’s moral support of the Palestinians held his administration in good stead among Arabs who took to the streets to demand democracy in Egypt and Syria this year. Its “zero problems with neighbors” policy, by contrast, accomplished little in Damascus where President Bashar al-Assad hardly recognized Turkey’s plea to end the violence against demonstrators.

The emerging new political class in Egypt and possibly Syria might remember Turkey’s willingness to do business with the old, authoritarian guard in these countries and regards Ankara’s once close ties with the Jewish state warily. This threatens to derail the very aim of more than a decade of Turkish foreign policy—to establish trade relations across the region and position Turkey as the pivotal power broker of the Middle East.

So Turkey is changing its foreign policy again, this time in favor of not just its neighboring governments but its neighboring people.

Turkey, with its novel blend of moderate Islamism and secular administration, uniquely positioned between the Muslim world and Europe, should have been on the side of those to whom it appealed most all along—the very educated, cosmopolitan youngsters who agitated against the corrupted and oppressive enlightened despotisms of their time.

Erdoğan admitted as much when he avoided answering Fareed Zakaria’s question about Turkey’s realignment plainly. “We work on adopting the science of the West,” he said. “But let’s not forget, there are really beautiful things in the East, as well. Do not leave the eastern parts of the world aside.”

The Human Rights Council of the United Nations convenes in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, June 11, 2007 (UN)

If the Palestinians manage to attain recognition of statehood at the General Assembly of the United Nations next week, Israel is unlikely to care. It regards the institution as biased toward Israel, with good reason.

The Palestinian bid for statehood defies international pressure and is expected to meet an American veto in the Security Council. In any event, the move could exacerbate tensions between Israel and the Palestinians which most recently erupted in May when the military interim government in Egypt unilaterally lifted its blockade of the Gaza Strip. Protests and disturbances immediately broke out along the border which led to the deaths of five Egyptian soldiers at the hands of Israeli border guards.

Israel has enforced a blockade of Gaza to prevent the smuggling of weapons into the territory. Missiles are routinely launched from there against nearby Israeli cities and settlements.

The embargo was enforced after the December 2008 Israeli military campaign in Gaza where the militant Islamist group Hamas is in government. Israel and Western nations regard Hamas as a terrorist organization.

In the wake of the Gaza campaign, the United Nations ordered an investigation into possible human rights abuses during the skirmish. A panel led by the South African judge Richard Goldstone spent almost a year amassing information before accusing Israel of war crimes.

Goldstone retracted that opinion in April of this year when he wrote in The Washington Post that Israel had not “intentionally” targeted civilians “as a matter of policy.” That was after much of the world had denounced Israel for doing just that, partly based on the study that bore his name.

The Goldstone Report was hardly exceptional among investigations sponsored by the United Nations however. It is common practice for Israel to be denounced for “offenses” at the UN that pass without comment elsewhere.

The Human Rights Council in particular is obsessed with the Jewish state. After its predecessor institution, the Human Rights Commission, was disbanded in 2006 because of its preoccupation with Israel, the council devoted nearly 60 percent of its country specific resolutions to condemning Israel during its first two years in existence.

After President Barack Obama brought the United States back onto the council, American diplomats managed to bring the number down during the last two years—to 40 percent. Meanwhile, Libya was scheduled to be commended by the council for its human rights improvements before Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime began gunning down peaceful protesters in the streets.

Virtually all nations have criticized Israel’s settlement activity in what is generally recognized as Palestinian territory yet similar settler movements elsewhere are never declared “illegal.”

Morocco and Turkey have both encouraged resettlement to the Western Sahara and Cyprus respectively to bolster nationalist claims there. Before it accepted East Timor’s independence in 2001, Indonesia similarly facilitated migration to the former Portuguese colony. In none of these cases have the United Nations ever proposed prosecution. Rather they allowed outside settlers to participate in referendums about the future of these territories, acknowledging their claims implicitly.

What makes Israel so exceptional? Nothing—except that it’s a Jewish state surrounded by Arab people that are overwhelmingly hostile to it. The UN’s democratic nature enables Arab and other nations to misuse the institution for their own political gain, adding legitimacy to their ongoing vilification of the state of Israel which, in turn, compels the United States to deploy their veto power and force some balance in how the country is treated in the international community.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey and President Shimon Peres of Israel at the Davos World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, January 29, 2009

At a time when the Israeli Government is facing mounting unrest at home over housing prices, turmoil along its border with Egypt, attacks against its embassy in Cairo and an imminent diplomatic crisis as the Palestinians prepare to make a bid for statehood at the United Nations General Assembly this month, a UN report threatens to make Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s life even harder.

The story starts back in May 2010. When a Turkish humanitarian aid flotilla was on its way to Gaza, Israeli commandos executed a daring operation to stop its landing. The ships’ immediate aim was to deliver humanitarian supplies to Palestinian civilians in the territory who had been subjected to a comprehensive and strictly enforced Israeli land and naval blockade since January 2009.

While easing Palestinian suffering was the stated intention of the trip, the flotilla always had a more political goal in mind—breaching the Israeli embargo and pressuring the Israeli Government into changing its policies in the strip.

The operation went terribly wrong. Turkish and Israeli accounts differ but reports suggest that Israeli soldiers were assaulted by a few passengers upon boarding, forcing the troops to retaliate once on the ship. When all was said and done, nine Turkish civilians were killed and the ship was intercepted and docked in an Israeli port for inspection. Relations between Turkey and Israel—which were deep and lasting on the military front—went into a free fall over Israel’s refusal to apologize for the deaths. For the last year, the United Nations were tasked with finding out what exactly happened on that flotilla.

The basic contents of the UN report (PDF) are now out for the public to see, courtesy of The New York Times. Its conclusions, based on the initial summary, are definitive on some points, but murky on others. Israeli commandos, according to the report’s authors, faced “organized and violent resistance from a group of passengers” but responded in an indiscriminate, abusive and improper fashion.

As to the intent of the flotilla, the UN panel concluded that serious questions remain as to whether the Turkish Government could have done more to ensure that the people participating were unarmed and peaceful. The commission also urged Israel however to issue “an appropriate statement of regret” for the killings—something Jerusalem has been reluctant to do.

As the duplicative findings fail to bring both parties to a sense of closure, the question must be asked as to whether the UN investigation was worth the paper it was written on. Fifteen months of inquiry and 105 pages later, the basic issue of who was ultimately responsible and therefore who should ultimately be held accountable is still up in the air. Splitting the blame may have been the diplomatically prudent way to do it but the lack of a clear cut verdict will likely aggravate the already tense relationship between Israel and Turkey.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has withdrawn his ambassador from Israel. Israel’s ambassador to Turkey was kicked out of the country and the military to military collaboration that is so vital for both countries has been suspended. Erdoğan has even threatened to use the Turkish Navy to escort future humanitarian missions, a decision that could spiral out of control if its navy is compelled to use force to ensure that a cargo is delivered to Palestinian territory. Benjamin Netanyahu, in the meantime, is not buckling to the pressure, reiterating his stance that Israel has nothing to apologize for.

Both states lose in the end. Turkey, which keen to promote a “zero problems with neighbors” policy in the Middle East, loses an important source of military expertise and credibility—especially from the West where Turkey’s diplomatic ties with Israel were viewed as a positive development. Israel loses an alliance with a Muslim country which has contributed to its now rock bottom legitimacy in the region.

The United Nations sit in a corner by themselves, wondering how to resolve a mess that their report made messier.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey's foreign minister

Turkey expelled Israel’s ambassador and froze military cooperation with his country on Friday after an international study into the deaths of nine Turks aboard an aid convoy that was attacked by Israeli coast guard last year failed to trigger an apology.

The Turkish posturing apparently exacerbated a diplomatic rift between Ankara and Jerusalem that coincides with popular unrest across the Arab world.

Israel intercepted a small fleet of blockade runners bound for Gaza in May of last year. The attack killed several humanitarian activists who resisted the raid and soured Israeli relations with Ankara where Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s conservative government forcefully condemned the incident. Its deputy prime minister likened the action to “piracy” and characterized it as “a dark stain on the history of humanity.” Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu compared the attack to 9/11.

Turkey demanded a formal apology from Israel for the incident as well as reparations for the families of the deceased. When its demands weren’t met this week, it barred Israeli military aircraft from Turkish air space and vowed legal action against the Israeli soldiers that were involved in the incident.

Its vehement rhetoric should not necessarily be interpreted as newfound resentment with the Jewish state however.

For decades, Turkey had been among few in the region that virtually allied with Israel. But like many of its neighbors, it worries about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Perhaps it pretended to be outraged last year and is Turkey consciously estranging itself from Israel in order to ultimately justify building an independent nuclear deterrent.

Israel is currently the only nuclear state in the Middle East. If Tehran acquired an atomic weapons potential, it would upset the existing balance of power in the region which, before the “Arab spring” happened, was dominated by countries that are aligned with the United States—Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Turkey has, in recent years, pursued a foreign policy that is more independent of the West and involves stronger trade relations with nearby Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The country realizes that it can be a regional power and exert influence throughout the Middle East, using its exports and ties with Europe as leverage.

In order for Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy to succeed, it needed distance between itself and the West. To be recognized as the neutral arbiter it aspired to be, Turkey could not be seen as a friend of Israel’s in a region where governments and popular movements routinely arouse anti-Israel sentiment for political gain.

The Arab uprisings that toppled decade old dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya this year continue to fuel major disturbances in Syria and forced the Turks to reconsider their approach. Turkish engagement with authoritarian regimes in Damascus and Tehran had not fostered the very stability Ankara wished for. Instead, Syria’s attempt at repressing civil unrest may provide an opening for Kurdish discontent and militancy to flourish anew.

If Turkey’s foreign policy is to survive the Arab spring, an even more outspoken pro-Palestinian agenda could help. Erdoğan’s vocal support for the Palestinian cause held his administration in good stead among Arabs who took to the streets to demand democracy in Egypt and Syria. Its closeness with the Ba’athist regime in Damascus, by contrast, accomplished little in the end. President Bashar al-Assad hardly recognized Turkey’s call that he end the violence against demonstrators.

So Turkey is changing its foreign policy again, this time in favor of not just its neighboring governments but its neighboring people. Turkey, with its novel blend of moderate Islamism and secular administration, uniquely positioned between the Muslim world and Europe, should have been on the side of those to whom it appealed most all along—the very educated, cosmopolitan youngsters who are agitating against the corrupted and oppressive enlightened despotisms of their time.

The Turkish president’s condemnation of Assad last weekend was a precursor of Ankara’s realignment. Abdullah Gül asserted that there was “no place for totalitarian regimes and one party governments” in the Middle East anymore. “Clearly, the leaders of these countries will take the initiative or they will be changed by force,” he added. A force which Turkey, no doubt, will support lest it end up like Germany did for opposing the NATO intervention in Libya—distrusted by its old friends and despised by the new power brokers in the region who would not be quick to forgive it for conniving with their predecessors.

Egyptians underway to a protest at the Israeli embassy in Cairo, August 19, 2011 (Mosa'ab Elshamy)

Tension between Egypt and Israel mounted in recent weeks as young revolutionaries in Cairo, apparently freed from a military regime which fostered amicable ties with the Jewish state, demanded retribution when several Egyptian security personnel were killed near the border with Gaza. Relations between the two neighbors have cooled since longtime president Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign this February. A resumption of hostilities after more than thirty years of peace seems highly unlikely though.

The unrest began exactly a week ago when seven Israeli civilians and one soldier were killed in a coordinated terrorist strike against southern Israel. Many more were wounded on a bus in the tourist resort of Eilat. The attackers had presumably tunneled from Gaza to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula where they set up firing positions. When they fled, Israeli troops pursued them. What happened next varies with the account. In the process of killing the Palestinian militants, an Israeli helicopter or plane killed between three and six Egyptian soldiers or police. And Egyptians did not like that one bit.

Egypt’s government lodged a formal protest with Israel over the killings, demanding an investigation. It said that it would recall its ambassador from Israel unless it received an apology. The next day, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak apologized and promised an investigation along with a joint inquiry with Egypt into the deaths of the soldiers. Shimon Peres, Israel’s president, also expressed regret. Words were not enough for Egypt’s youth however. Thousands of protesters gathered outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo, calling for the expulsion of the envoy.

The Jerusalem Post has blamed Egypt for not securing the Sinai, claiming that asking Israel to apologize for accidentally killing Egyptian soldiers in the way of terrorists is unfair. After all, the natural gas pipeline that runs from the Sinai to Israel and Jordan has been attacked by unidentified militants five times since the start of the Egyptian revolution. The newspaper has pointed out that the terrorists, which Israel insists came from Gaza, could have come through the smuggling tunnels that connect the isolated Palestinian strip to Egypt and “must have had logistic support from one or more extremist organizations active in Sinai.”

They had to obtain vehicles, food and water as well as to set up observation points on the road to Eilat which they intended to attack.

Nevertheless, Egyptians who might otherwise oppose their military interim government were quick to agree with it when it blamed Israel entirely for the fatalities on Egypt’s side.

It is natural for them to react as such, not only because as nationalists, they mourn Egyptian deaths more than those of foreigners, but also because Egyptian politicians fell over themselves to condemn the killings as murders.

Amr Moussa, former head of the Arab League and a presidential frontrunner, was one of the first to speak out after the incident. “The blood of martyrs shed while performing their duties will not go in vain,” he commented.

Israel must realize that the day when Egypt’s sons are killed without an appropriate and strong reaction are over.

The Freedom and Justice Party, founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the revolution, described the killings as nothing short of a “Zionist assault against Egyptian soldiers.” A joint statement released by thirteen different political parties this weekend characterized the episode as “an example of Israel’s arrogance and racism supported by America.”

After Barak and Peres had both expressed their sympathies, a high ranking member of the National Association for Change, chaired by Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, called their apologies “inappropriate and insufficient” before suggesting that the Camp David Accords, which ended several decades of conflict between Egypt and Israel, should be amended or scrapped. The deputy head of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood said much the same.

Given these reactions, it’s little surprise that thousands of Egyptians found their way to the Israeli embassy in Cairo last week. Others demonstrated outside the home of the ambassador which was surrounded by Egyptian security forces. Young Egyptians also hacked Israeli websites, including that of the prime minister.

In these times of tension, Israel’s government has acted pragmatically. While rockets from Gaza struck Israeli targets and Israeli airstrikes pounded Gaza, the cabinet voted against a repetition of the horrendous assault on Gaza of late 2008. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Barak both argued that now was not the time for an all out war on the territory. Among other considerations was the fear of deepening resentment among ordinary Egyptians.

Was the killing an accident? Most likely. Israel has no reason to antagonize Egypt. President Peres felt the need to express regret for the incident after the defense minister had already done so, saying that “the peace with Egypt is strategic; both we and the Egyptians have a supreme interest in preventing terrorism from running amok.” The Netanyahu Government confirmed as much in its cabinet decision. Moreover, as Linda Heard points out in Arab News, the contrast between the swift apology to Egypt and the curt nod to Turkey after Israel’s killing of nine activists on the Mavi Marmara flotilla last year is telling. Israeli has a vital interest in maintaining its “friendship” with Egypt, however precarious.

Try telling that to angry Egyptian youth. The young revolutionaries hold significant power in Egypt at the moment. If enough of them demand some form of conflict with Israel, it is possible that a newly elected civilian government will give in. Recent opinion polls imply that a majority of Egyptians favor rescinding the three decade old peace treaty with Israel. That doesn’t mean they want war though and the military is unlikely to push for it. Since it will probably retain considerable authority after parliamentary and presidential elections this autumn, whatever some overzealous young people are calling for, an armed confrontation seems far from imminent—especially as the military has little incentive to give up the $2 billion in yearly aid it receives from the United States.

Although the young remain riled and future accidents or aggression could lead to attacks on the Israeli embassy or even the storming of its border with Egypt, it remains highly improbable that both nations would enter into a state of war any time soon.

Nuclear detonation in the Nevada desert during Operation Buster-Jangle, October 30, 1951

Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program has the potential of destabilizing the balance of power in the entire Middle East. In a recent special strategic issue, the analysts of Wikistrat warn that a nuclear Iran could kick off a regional bout of rapid proliferation. “If and when this occurs,” the geopolitical analysis firm predicts, “the region will rerun the same brinkmanship dynamics that Europe experienced during the early Cold War decades, logically leading to the same stabilizing conclusion of arms control but suffering an extended period of extreme danger along the way.”

Iran’s reach for the bomb is far from irrational. As Wikistrat points out, it came amid American invasions of both of its neighbors—Afghanistan and Iraq. “Also, Iranian leaders believe that if Iran had had the bomb in 1980, it never would have suffered its devastatingly long war with Iraq.” The logic of seeking a nuclear capacity is clear—it provides an enormous security benefit compared to nonnuclear states.

An atomic weapon in the hands of the ayatollahs may well pose an existential threat to Israel although its conventional and nuclear weapons superiority could be sufficient to deter a first strike. Other countries are in a less enviable position. Wikistrat points out that given Saudi Arabia’s fears of Iranian encroachment on the peninsula, “it is possible that Israel might someday act with more than just the silent blessing of the region’s Sunni regimes.”

If Israel doesn’t attack however and Iran eventually weaponizes its nuclear potential anyway—the likeliest scenario—would it compel the Saudis to seek a similar capacity? Iran and Saudi Arabia are the only two powers standing in the Middle East but the kingdom’s influence seems to be eroding. Its client government in Lebanon was undermined by Iranian sponsored Hezbollah earlier this year while the Shī’ah turmoil in neighboring Bahrain was, according to the Saudis, part of an Iranian conspiracy.

“If the Saudis join Iran and Israel in a nuclear triangle, it is possible others in the region would feel compelled to join in,” including Egypt and Turkey which already controls tactical nuclear weapons deployed there by its NATO ally. Indeed, Wikistrat analyst Thomas Barnett suggested last year that Iran’s nuclear quest could be why Turkey pretended to be outraged when Israel intercepted a fleet of blockade runners bound for Gaza. For all the anti-Israel rhetoric that suddenly poured out of Turkey, what mattered, according to Barnett, was that “Ankara has its bloody shirt, which will be used—once Tehran inevitably announces the weaponization of its nukes—to justify Turkey’s rapid reach for the same.”

Turkey can claim that—despite its efforts to broker a nonnuclear peace in the region—it needs its own deterrent against Israel’s nuclear arsenal, too.

It may be preventable if the United States are willing to assume an even more activist role in the region. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed last year that America extend its defense umbrella to cover friendly regimes in the region which, if sufficiently credible, could deter Iranian aggression. Middle East analyst Ramzy Mardini offered similar advice, fearful that “uncertainty about Washington’s commitment will dramatically increase the incentive for regional states to seek self assurance, and hence, indigenous nuclear deterrents of their own.”

In the long run, a nuclear Iran may make the region a safer place. Just as during the Cold War, when mutually assured destruction always stopped the superpowers from going to war, Iran and Israel may be compelled to reach an understanding which includes a de facto recognition of the Jewish state by the Middle Eastern parties involved. The world’s greater powers would not allow confrontations in the meantime to escalate out of fear of putting the world’s primary oil reserves at risk.

History teaches that whenever a region welcomes its second nuclear power, its potential for major conflict plummets. According to Wikistrat, “it all depends on how unique you think the Middle East is versus how universal you think the impact of nuclear weapons is.”