The United Nations Security Council in session, September 24, 2009

China and Russia on Saturday blocked a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have called on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to cede power to a transitional government. The Russian ambassador to the United Nations accused Arab and Western powers of undermining a diplomatic solution by calling for regime change in the Middle Eastern country.

Ahead of the vote, Russia said the resolution wasn’t “hopeless” but needed to avoid “taking sides in a civil war.” Its deputy foreign minister warned last week that, “Pushing this resolution is a path to civil war.”

The Chinese representative insisted that “the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria should be fully respected.” Imposing an international solution would only “further complicate the situation,” he said. He blamed other members for pushing the resolution although there clearly wasn’t a consensus.

Susan Rice, the American ambassador, said she was “disgusted” that a mere two members of the Security Council blocked international action while the other thirteen voted in favor. She accused China and Russia of propping up “desperate dictators” and said, “Any further bloodshed that flows will be on their hands.”

This intransigence is even more shameful when you consider that at least one of these members continues to deliver weapons to Assad.

The Russians maintain strong trade relations with Syria, including billions worth of annual arms sales.

Germany’s permanent representative to the United Nations similarly lamented the Sino-Russian veto although his country abstained from supporting intervention in Libya last year. He stressed that the resolution “did not contain an arms embargo nor a sanctions regime” despite Western wishes for such language. It was taken out to accomodate Chinese and Russian concerns.

Sir Mark Lyall Grant, the British ambassador, also pointed out that the resolution had been watered to prevent a veto. “There was nothing in this text to justify a veto. We removed every possible excuse.” He lambasted China and Russia for choosing to “support tyranny rather than the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.”

The French, who, last year, played a key role in enacting a Security Council resolution that empowered Arab and Western countries to intervene in Libya’s civil war, have staunchly sided with the Sunni monarchies that suspended Syria from the Arab League in November and called on the United Nations to take more forceful action against Damascus last week.

Qatar has already voiced support for an armed intervention. Turkey, which maintained amicable ties with the Ba’athist regime before the uprising, said it had “lost confidence” in President Assad’s willingness to reform. The Turkish foreign minister last week said that his country was prepared “to do everything for the Syrian people” although he stopped short of endorsing calls for military action.

The French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, said recent killings in the western Syrian city of Homs, which has been a hotbed of the unrest, amounted to a “massacre” and proved that “Syrian authorities have jumped a new hurdle in savagery.”

In remarks that were clearly aimed at Moscow, Juppé further suggested that any country that blocked international action would bear a “heavy responsibility in history.”

The Russians were not persuaded. They fear that a resolution will pave the way for foreign intervention as happened in Libya last year. The Russians weren’t pleased to see NATO take sides in what they considered to be an internal conflict.

If Assad falls, he would likely make way for an administration that is dominated by Arab Sunnis who might be tempted to align their country to the Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, which are generally favorable to American and Western interests. Russia would thus be without leverage in the Middle East.

Finally, the Kremlin may worry that if the Syrian uprising manages to overthrow Assad, it will embolden separatist movements in its outer provinces and former satellite states which could dampen Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s hopes of establishing an Eurasian Union under Russian leadership before he has even had a chance to reunite the former Soviet Union.

Premier Wen Jiabao speaks in Dalian, China, September 14, 2011 (Adam Dean)

China’s premier on Friday warned Iran not to block access to the Strait of Hormuz and said his country “adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear weapons.”

The words came as tensions are rising across the Persian Gulf and were unusually blunt for a Chinese leader. Wen Jiabao’s criticism of Tehran’s threats were well received by his Arab Gulf hosts however who fear Iran’s aspirations to regional leadership.

Wen was in the Middle East for a six day visit of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, three Sunni monarchies that are wary of Shī’ah Iran projecting influence across the Gulf.

The Islamic republic is under increasing international pressure because Western nations suspect it intends to develop a nuclear weapons capability. China is among few countries that is recognized as a nuclear power under nonproliferation accords. Iran is a signatory to these treaties. A nuclear weapons program would be in violation of them.

The European Union and Japan announced this month that they would join the United States in a boycott of Iranian oil sales. The country is heavily dependent on oil revenue but its export market is limited. If Europe and Japan were to suspend their petroleum imports, it would cut Iran’s sales by roughly a quarter.

China is another major buyer of Iranian oil but its largest supplier is Saudi Arabia. The kingdom and its emirate allies have offered to expand production to make up for gaps if oil consumers won’t trade with Iran. Wen insisted that China considers its business ties with Iran independently of its diplomatic relations. He has little choice but not to. China imports more than a third of its oil and Chinese oil consumption grows by 7.5 percent per year. It needs to buy wherever it can.

The crisis in the Gulf coincides with mounting turmoil in the Sudan. Before South Sudan seceded last year, the country exported the bulk of its oil to China. The Sudanese oil fields are largely situated in the South but the export industry is controlled by Khartoum. It recently confiscated Southern crude exports as compensation for unpaid transit fees.

Although the civil war in Sudan formally ended with Southern independence there continue to be clashes along the border. Oil revenue is a source of considerable discord between the two governments. If there is a disturbance in Sudanese exports, it would force China to increase its dependence on Middle Eastern oil producers, including Iran. Chinese petroleum imports from Iran already surged by 30 percent last year.

Hong Kong, China, June 15, 2010 (Wilson Lee)

Almost three years after the bricks of Wall Street crumbled, projections for growth in 2012 are more pessimistic than ever, as noted by the recently published Global Economic Prospects 2012 of the World Bank.

The effects of Europe’s spiraling debt crisis are felt across the developed and the developing world, countering the perception that emerging economies could be the motor of a global recovery. The imminent change of leadership in many countries, including China, France, Mexico and the United States, will make the foreseeable future a highly unstable one. In the upcoming months there will be an increase in populist policies and rising fiscal deficits. Governments may pay more attention to their constituencies which have been suffering the ongoing negative economic panorama.

As a result, protectionism could gain weight in the upcoming months and while it may be vilified by conventional wisdom which rightfully points out the benefits of free trade, there is a “human face” which legitimizes it.

Supporters of protectionism tend to justify their demands through what they regard as the direct negative effects of trade with other countries. Some of these effects are caused by the “unfair” practices of governments as China’s. Others are due to the abundance of cheap labor in countries as Mexico.

Whatever the reason, according to protectionists unchecked trade liberalization causes unemployment and income inequality. America’s disturbing trade deficit with China is one of the favorite arguments of trade critics in the United States. These opinions have a considerable impact in various segments of the population. The 2008 financial crisis only helped enforce the notion that Americans industry ought to be protected from unfair competition overseas.

According to theory, trade liberalization benefits an economy by expanding its production capabilities and diversifying the goods it can consume. Trade dynamics promoted by international competition lead to a decrease in prices, benefiting consumers and producers alike.

It also expands the labor pool, thereby reducing costs. Trade leads to specialization. Every country has a comparative advantage in producing certain type of goods due to its factor endowment. An economy will specialize in the production of goods which uses intensively its relative abundant factor. Thus, Germany, which is relatively abundant in high skill labor, specializes in the production of high end goods (computers, pharmaceuticals, etc.), while Vietnam, which is relatively abundant in low skill labor, specializes in the production of basic goods (agricultural products, clothes).

Through specialization, countries are able to increase their respective national income because they produce what they are more efficient in producing and trade it to the world. But then, what happens to those industries in which a nation is inefficient? Herein lays the main dilemma of trade which can fuel protectionism—specialization leads to the disappearance of inefficient industries. Theoretically, this should not be a problem, since workers in these industries will gravitate to other industries which are succeeding. Reality is more complex.

Skill biased technological change has made it very difficult for job displacement to occur. All types of jobs have modified their requirements in line with technological chance. A laid off worker will struggle to find another job because he doesn’t have the required set of skills. Retraining could take years. The protectionists argue that this is exactly why the state must design and implement policies to offset those effects of liberalization.

It’s easy for Americans to blame the Chinese for their trade deficit, to propose to punish China by turning its currency manipulation into an illegal subsidy and disregard recommendations to change domestic consumption patterns which, in fact, makes American society the main actor responsible for their current situation.

A more effective way to enable economic growth than either raise or reduce trade tariffs may be the implementation of an industrial policy. This refers to measures introduced by governments to channel resources into sectors which they view as critical to future economic growth. It implies benefiting some by hurting others (the financial resources have to come from somewhere else). Consequently, industrial policy should only be deployed to counter market failures and externalities which prevent the industries in which a country has comparative advantage from naturally becoming as efficient as they should be.

The successful examples of Japan, South Korea and the Southeast Asian “tiger” economies encourage governments around the world to intervene in their industries through subsidies, tariffs, taxes, etc. so as to increase their profitability. The idea is to benefit those sectors that the state believes have a comparative advantage over those of other countries and create national champions

There are problems with this analysis. Japan and South Korea both had the overt support of the United States which, due to Cold War dynamics, prevented their experiments from failing. For their part, the tigers, except Hong Kong, had authoritarian governments that facilitated the implementation of policies and they, too, enjoyed American support.

There are examples that demonstrate both successes and failures but, to be fair, the outcomes were contingent upon other variables which require closer analysis. China’s is the most recent case of an industrial policy, and, so far, it seems it has been successful.

This has caused alarm in the United States where China’s success is increasingly perceived as coming at the expense of American workers. The politicization of industrial policy that aims to “correct” market imbalances unfortunately often leads democratic governments to privilege certain interest groups, whether they’re corporations or unions, at the expense of their economy’s competitiveness as a whole. Perhaps, in this sense, China’s comparative advantage is its very authoritarianism?

Both supporters and detractors of protectionism tend to frame their arguments so as to cause the largest possible impact on public opinion. This is because protectionism has a “human face” embedded within it. For many sectors within society, protectionist policies are regarded as a solution to their grievances. With little regard for theory and the long term negative effects of poorly planned protectionist policies, they suffer from what political analysts call “shortsightedness.”

Governments should always bear in mind how to increase efficiency and productivity when intervening and implementing protectionist policies. Industrial policy demonstrates that this is very difficult and that many other variables are at play. By politicizing trade, protectionism becomes the vilified entity that economists so hate—short term solutions with long term negative consequences.

This article would not have been possible without the insights received when attending Georgetown University’s course imparted by Professor Theodore H. Moran, “Globalization: Challenge for Developed Countries.”

Oil industry in the Sudan (AP)

Sudan’s government announced this weekend that it had confiscated petroleum exports from newly independent South Sudan as compensation for unpaid transit fees but it promised that it would not shut down a pipeline carrying the south’s oil.

The move is likely to exacerbate tension between the two Sudans and could force China, which is major Sudanese oil buyer, to adjust its policy of noninterference if it isn’t to lose access to the region’s oil reserves.

South Sudan declared independence last year after decades of conflict with the north. Despite a 2005 peace deal, many disputes remain unresolved. Among them, possession of oil reserves which are situated close to the border.

Land locked South Sudan has two thirds of the former unified Sudan’s oil output but needs access to northern export infrastructure to sell overseas. South Sudan pumps around 350,000 barrels per day, according to government data. The north needs the entirety of its oil production, some 115,000 barrels per day, to meet domestic demand. The two parties haven’t agreed on transit fees yet but resumed talks sponsored by the African Union on Tuesday.

In the meantime, Khartoum has confiscated southern oil as a form of payment for use of its pipeline and port facilities on the Red Sea.

Before the south seceded last year, Sudan sold more than 60 percent of its oil to China. 90 percent of it came from the south so the Chinese have to maintain stable relations with both governments if they are to continue buying Sudanese oil. The likelihood of renewed conflict over oil exports puts Chinese energy security at risk and could increase its dependence on another country that Western oil majors rather avoid—Iran.

Some 15 percent of Iranian oil exports is destined for China but the country’s petroleum industry is under pressure from international sanctions. European countries, which combined account for a similar share of Iranian exports, are expected to declare an embargo this month while Japan announced last week that it would support a boycott.

So China’s foreign policy of noninterference is challenged in two instances. Where it has thus far refused to meddle in the internal affairs of nations it does business with, especially in Africa, sudden disruptions in Sudan’s oil supply may tempt it to change that position.

With regard to Iran, China is under American pressure to reduce its oil buys. It may not have much sympathy for the Iranian regime but has to buy wherever it can. China imports more than a third of its oil and its oil consumption grows by 7.5 percent per year. It is estimated that China’s oil reserves amount to some eighteen billion barrels which makes them the fifteenth largest reserves in the world, behind countries like Kazakhstan, Libya, Mexico and Nigeria.

With Western companies dominating the market in most of Africa and Arab oil exploited exclusively by government monopolies, China has little choice but to turn to unstable countries like Sudan if is to continue to fuel its economic growth.

President Ma Ying-jeou of the Republic of China in Taipei, February 26, 2008 (Daniel M. Shih)

Taiwan’s presidential candidates tried to rally support on Friday ahead of a vote that could impact the island’s foreign policy with regard to China and so, by extension, its relations with the United States.

Although the elections are mostly about economic issues, with the incumbent pointing at Taiwan’s solid growth rate last year and relatively low unemployment and his challenger citing mounting income disparity, Saturday will also be a referendum on the president’s conciliatory China policy.

Ma Ying-jeou, chairman of the Kuomintang Party, has tied the island’s economy ever closer to China’s. He welcomed Chinese tourists to Taiwan and enacted a free trade agreement with the mainland in 2010 that reduced or eliminated tariffs on hundreds of goods. Most of Taiwan’s $124 billion worth of exports to China last year were electronic goods but there has been upsurge in agricultural sales across the Strait as a result of the tariff reductions.

China has entertained Ma’s overtures with largesse because it would rather have the Kuomintang in power than Tsai Ing-wen’s Democratic Progressive Party which is left of center but more adamant about Taiwanese independence.

Tsai has accused the president of undermining Taiwan’s de facto independence in favor of economic ties with the mainland. She has moved to the center in recent days to convince voters that she’s not a hardliner but China regards her election prospects warily nevertheless, especially after the United States announced a “pivot” to East Asia in order to contain China’s rise.

The Chinese still think of Taiwan as a renegade province. After the communists defeated the nationalist Kuomintang in China’s civil war in 1949, the party fled to Taiwan where it established a Republic of China that, until the early 1970s, was recognized as the true China by the United States.

The Americans remain Taiwan’s most important security partners up to this very day although there are voices in Washington calling for a suspension in military aid to the island in favor of more stable relations with the mainland.

The Obama Administration last year conceded to Chinese pressure when it canceled a fighter plane sale to Taiwan while the country had scheduled to retire some 70 percent of its fighter fleet over the course of this decade. China has significantly enhanced its air and missile strike capabilities at the same time, causing a security imbalance to develop across the Taiwanese Strait that America is unlikely to be able to mend with military force alone.

China seeks control of the Strait to enforce its claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea and keep foreign, i.e., American, naval forces out of that body of water. America isn’t giving up on Taiwan for this reason but has to pick its battles carefully as China emerges as the predominant power of East Asia. It may quietly hope for Ma’s reelection on Saturday and thus avoid a showdown with Beijing while a new generation of leadership prepares to take office there. It may see a need to assert itself in the face of what China perceives as Americans encroaching upon its natural sphere of interest. The question of Taiwanese independence would only complicate Sino-American relations while a fifth generation of leadership aims to consolidate power and authority in Beijing.

A similar dynamic plays out in the United States. President Barack Obama stands for reelection this year. If a shift in Taiwanese policy provokes a confrontation with China, that could leave him vulnerable to criticism from the Republican opposition that he’s “soft” on China whereas his challenger would vow to stand firm with America’s ally, Taiwan.

Aerial photo of Maldivian atolls (Haanee Naeem)

The best way to get success in strategy is through success. An historical case study was General Douglas MacArthur’s “island hopping” strategy in the Pacific during World War II. It involved capturing an island, building a base there and moving on toward the prime target.

China seems to be copying this strategy in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. In the former, it is seeking to contain India by forging alliances with island nations including the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles and building a “string of pearls” of military bases from East Africa to Pakistan.

The strategy is designed to curtail Indian influence in the region so China, with the Americans distracted in the Middle East, can have a free run in other parts of Asia and across the Pacific Ocean but also to encroach upon African countries that welcome its yuan diplomacy—developmental and industrial support with no strings attached.

China has never announced this strategy publicly. A recent statement from the Chinese military that it’s considering an offer from the Seychelles to host a Chinese naval base confirms that the strategy exists however.

Furthermore, the Chinese foreign ministry has stated that it isn’t interested in building military bases in other places.

The Chinese “island hopping” strategy defies historical precedent and differs from the strategies of other and past greater powers in that they were usually explicit about their intentions. China apparently believes that concealing its motives best serves its interests.

An increased Chinese presence across the Indian Ocean poses a challenge to India as it is trying to project itself as a greater power beyond South Asia. The two Asian giants are vying for economic opportunities and international recognition. Renewed American engagement, which is likely to follow military withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq, could prove an obstacle to China’s designs and cause it to intensify its efforts now.

As the United States court nations ranging from Australia to Indonesia to Vietnam, the Chinese imperative to erect naval bases in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific will only seem more pressing.

A group of American tanks prepares for a mock battle in the Republic of Korea, November 2, 1998

With the death of Kim Jong-il, the hermit state that is North Korea enters the unknown. Kim’s third and youngest son is slated to succeed him but it’s unclear whether the armed forces are prepared to accept his dynastic credentials.

The potential for conflict is high during this period of transition. The military could stage a crisis to prevent Kim Jong-un from assuming control if not the Great Successor himself, as he’s been dubbed by Korean state media, provokes a confrontation with the South and the United States in the process of consolidating power.

North Korea makes a habit out of staging crises if its regime is to assert itself internationally to bolster its legitimacy within. Last year alone, the North sank a South Korean corvette and bombarded a disputed island along the maritime border with the South. Its nuclear weapons program flies in the face of international pressure and sanctions which appear to have done little to alter the North’s behavior.

Roughly a quarter of the country’s annual economic output is devoted to defense. More than a million North Koreans are employed by the military. South Korea’s armed forces, by contrast, claim 4 percent of gross domestic product (although its economy is estimated to be more than two hundred times the size of the North’s) and it has 650,000 personnel in employ. In sheer numbers, including artillery, fighter planes and warships, the North’s army is nearly twice the size of the South’s but in terms of logistics and technology, the latter’s is far more advanced.

North Korea’s leaders may hope that their nuclear program gives them an edge over the South. Their ability to obliterate the capital city of Seoul, which is situated just forty kilometers off the demilitarized zone, with a single strike should deter American and Japanese intervention in the event of renewed hostilities, they could hope. This capacity is theoretical at best however given the difficulties that have plagued the North Korean ballistic missiles program.

The calculation is also misguided in that the United States, a nuclear power itself, would probably not be deterred from intervening if Pyongyang threatens to use atomic weapons. Nevertheless, if the calculation is made on the part of the North Korean leadership, it could easily induce them to initiate a war. The stated aim of keeping the country on a perpetual war footing, after all, is to eventually reunify the peninsula on North Korea’s terms.

Even if nuclear weapons aren’t deployed, Seoul could be leveled under a barrage of artillery charges, potentially with hundreds of thousands of casualties. On the North’s side of the demilitarized zone are stationed several hundred Soviet made tactical ballistic missiles, capable of delivering chemical agents, along with thousands of artillery pieces in hardened dugouts that can fire up to five hundred thousands rounds per hour. More than 70 percent of the North’s military manpower is located at the demilitarized zone. Tunnels are known to have been dug to facilitate an invasion.

Before North Korean tanks could start rolling south, the allied powers, certainly the United States, would have picked up on troop movements and prepared countermeasures. Air strikes against North Korean armor, artillery and military infrastructure would commence before there’s ever an invasion attempt.

North Korea’s air defenses are dense but obsolete. The Americans could probably fly stealth bomber missions from Guam without particular difficulty. The defense systems around Pyongyang are hardened but immobile, making them easy targets for bombardment. Other, purely military targets could be subject to cruise missile attacks launched from American destroyers and submarines based in the Pacific.

The generals in North Korea will be forced to implement their plans with haste if they aren’t to lose the war before it properly began. Artillery along the demilitarized zone will open fire on South Korean defensive lines and the city of Seoul, causing a flood of refugees that will complicate the South’s ability to stage an immediate defense.

After suffering heavy casualties while clearing the massive minefields that line the demilitarized zone on both sides, Northern troops will seek to overrun the South’s defenses within a matter of weeks, before American reinforcements can arrive. This is unlikely to succeed. Southern troops should be able to stave off a North Korean invasion while allied support pours in from Japan and across the Pacific.

The only option North Korea will have to tip the balance in its favor then is to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. Its mechanized divisions are no match for the superior South Korean tanks and what’s left of its air force after American bombardments will not turn the tide of the war. North Korea’s nuclear devices are few and primitive however and their use could prompt the United States to deploy nuclear weapons of their own, devastating the North Korean state.

The allies will manage to stop the Northern offensive, perhaps in less than two weeks, but that won’t be the end of it. American reinforcements and South Korean reserves will be called to battle to crush the North. On their march to Pyongyang, they will likely encounter fierce resistance from army remnants and citizen militias. North Korean’s mountainous terrain is unfavorable to an invasion attempt. On the allied side, the heaviest military casualties could be incurred during this phase when questions will be raised in the West about the need of reunifying the peninsula.

It’s also at this time that China will seek to involve itself in the situation for it cannot tolerate an American bulwark on the Manchurian border. If South Korea and the United States push for regime change in Pyongyang, that’s unlikely to sit well in Beijing where there may be no intention of aiding the North Koreans in a war of aggression but where there is still sympathy for the other communist state.

China won’t seek a direct confrontation with the allies but could move in forces of its own to contain the disorder, stem a North Korean refugee tide and signal to the world that it will not allow a reunification of the peninsula on anyone’s terms but its own.

Whatever China’s intentions, there will be a real threat of escalation if it, too, becomes part of the conflict. The risk of confrontation, accidental or staged by renegades, will remain extremely high until the two superpowers agree on a preferred outcome.

A Second Korean War, one that doesn’t morph into a Sino-American conflict, could be very costly in blood and treasure. When war seemed likely in 1994, it was estimated (PDF) that in the first ninety days of skirmishes, there would be more than fifty thousand American military personnel killed and wounded along with nearly five hundred thousand casualties on the South Korean side. Those numbers would probably have to be revised downward for a war almost twenty years later given the improvements in American and South Korean defense technologies but could increase exponentially if the North does go nuclear.

Kim Jon-un, heir apparent to the North Korean leadership, watches a mass games performance in Pyongyang, October 9, 2010 (AP)

North Korean state television announced the death of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il on Monday and labeled his son, Kim Jong-un, “the great successor.”

The third and youngest son of North Korea’s former dictator is untested and relatively unknown. He came into the public spotlight in September of last year when his father appointed him vice chairman of the country’s Central Military Commission, one among a myriad of commissions and committees that helm the Stalinist hermit state.

Behind the scenes, the dead leader’s brother in law, Chang Sung-taek, has apparently assumed de facto control of the government since Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. A technocrat educated in Russia during Soviet times, he is vice chairman of the National Defense Commission which commands the armed forces and could emerge as a regent while the younger Kim consolidates power.

The third Kim in a dynasty of Korean leaders inherits control of one of the poorest places on Earth. His people are undernourished, ever on the brink of starvation. Energy shortages are a common occurrence. North Korea maintains almost no trade relations with the rest of the world. Its regime is a pariah among nations, surrounded by adversaries in Japan and South Korea, both economic powerhouses and allied to the United States.

By keeping North Korea on a perpetual war footing, Pyongyang justifies spending a gargantuan share of its budget on the military—25 percent of annual economic output compared to just 4 percent in the South.

The alleged threat posed by America, Japan and their brethren in the South is artificially exacerbated every so many years by the North when it invents a crisis to affirm the legitimacy of the regime.

According to analysis from the geostrategic consultancy firm Wikistrat, recent acts of aggression, including the torpedoing of a South Korean corvette and the artillery barrage of a disputed island last year, suggested a determined effort to speedily credentialize Kim Jong-Un among the military leadership that controls much of the government, economy, and, most importantly, mineral exports to, and humanitarian aid from, patron China.

Internationally, however, these crisis coupled with the North’s renegade nuclear program, make it increasingly difficult for its one erstwhile ally to shield the regime from repercussions.

There is mounting discord among the Chinese leadership over how to cope with North Korea’s erratic behavior. On the one hand are hardliners who occupy prominent posts in the military and at Communist Party schools. They suspect that the United States are conniving to deceive China and keep it poor and see in the North a necessary buffer to prevent American troops, permanently stationed along the demilitarized zone, from reaching China’s border.

On the other side, internationally oriented bureaucrats, including many in the foreign ministry and banking sector, argue for peaceful ties with the West and have expressed growing puzzlement and anger about the North’s posturing.

The change of leadership that is expected to take place in China over the next couple of years could enhance or complicate Kim Jong-un’s ability to consolidate power. In an effort to bolster his credentials with the military and stave off the possibility of a coup, the new Kim could instigate crises or organize shows of force which could be interpreted by South Korea and Western powers as provocations, necessitating retaliation.

“Everybody,” Wikistrat predicts, “especially an incoming fifth generation of leadership in Beijing, will want to appear decisive because of the perceived precedent setting nature of the moment—namely, what it says about the future of US military hegemony in the region versus China’s potential for the same.”

China’s incoming leaders may well observe that an offensive on the part of the younger Kim serves their interests as it would force the United States to divert resources from other efforts in the region that limit China’s rise.

If rather they decide that it’s time for China to become the “responsible stakeholder” in international relations that the United States would like it to be, they could rein in the regime’s ability to stir crises but risk ultimately undermining its legitimacy if China suspends food and military aid.

This article also appeared in The Seoul Times, December 20, 2011.

Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh of India and Jacob Zuma of South Africa meet in Pretoria (PTI)

The current geopolitical landscape in Africa represents an unique opportunity for occupying the power vacuum that will be created as Western nations reduce their footprint abroad. China will be best placed to seize this opportunity and has already been aggressively stepping up its involvement in Africa.

Domestically, there is a sentiment in India that it is not doing enough to compete with China in Africa because the Indian economy is sensitive to oil prices, which notably affect the prices of food. India will have to do more if it wants to pole vault to superpower status by riding on the African wave.

Forming an alliance with other nations would enable India to compete seriously with China’s spending power, value neutral approach and lack of domestic opposition. India could team up with Brazil and South Africa by expanding the ambit of the India Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum or with the United States in recognition of India’s democratic credentials.

Taking on China with the IBSA approach will require considerable political will because all three nations depend on China to some extent. Dependencies, though, are always double edged. Teaming up is the favorable option because one third of the pie is more than what either of the parties could secure if they act unilaterally, with the opportunities otherwise falling to either China or the West.

The potential for backlash might be mitigated by masking extraction of resources energy with developmental initiatives which benefit the common man, bringing into play Brazil’s expertise in agriculture and India’s in low cost technology. Having South Africa on board will give this coalition an edge over the Chinese who could increasingly be seen as neocolonialists.

China could spoil the relationship by forming a partnership with South Africa of its own, which it has helped promote to the league of BRIC nations despite its small size. An alliance with South Africa will not so much help China as it will thwart the efforts of other nations.

The “Look West” in Africa strategy plays on Western fears that China will paint the dark continent red. Although India has been wary of forming an alliance with America domestically, it may choose to collaborate in Africa to test the waters.

The mutual interest in balancing the rise of China has started to crystallize with opposition lawmakers in the United States pushing for deeper engagement with India at the expense of the military partnership with Pakistan. Given China’s efforts to reverse recognition of Taiwan on the continent, the bond will grow stronger if Africa becomes an ideological battleground for issues like Tibet.

Apart from leveraging Indian entrepreneurial experience with American technology and capital, an ideological strategy which politicizes the role of the religion and NGOs to promote democracy may be worth exploring as well. These efforts could be supplemented by cultural and student exchange programs which offer individual Africans a taste of liberty in the hope that they inspire others.

The Chinese response could vary depending on the success of this policy but an extreme choice would be to mobilize local militia using colonial rhetoric to force the United States to extent a security umbrella for its investments.

The Look West policy would cause a convergence of interests that would push America to look at Asia through India’s lens, which could become important if China continues to refuse India a Security Council berth, but should the policy fail, India risks being sequestered from the south.

Both policy options will require India to move its foreign policy beyond notions of nonalignment, an achievable feat given the generational shift that will see new Indian policy makers, born in an independent India, eager to play a greater international role. Furthermore, both will attract China’s arm twisting tactics, so sticking your nose out against China will be easier than keeping it there.

The lBSA approach is comparatively less hedged and represents an opportunity for these rising powers to forge their own path in Africa. The new kids on the block will be taking on both China and the United States but should America retreat, they might prefer the IBSA camp.

Forming an alliance with the West could also be less attractive because it entails dealing primarily with democracies and enforcing other standards of good governance, which could make progress slow and cost India more concessions on Iran and Myanmar.

Artwork of the RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aerial vehicle

Reports of an intact American RQ-170 Sentinel drone brought down by Iranian authorities have triggered a media storm. It is difficult to determine the exact cause of the incident, the methods used to bring the drone down or what state the machine is in. This incident will highlight a number of burning issues for months and years to come. It points out a fundamental weakness in unmanned aircraft technologies and may undermine American confidence in employing drones. But one of the immediate concerns is the possibility that Tehran could allow Chinese authorities to inspect or even extract the drone and its technologies.

Is such a “terrifying” scenario the end of the world? Or to be more precise, what would be the implications for China’s indigenous UAV research and security in the Asia-Pacific region?

Allegations of state authorities giving China access to captured or shot down aviation technology are not new. Some analysts have speculated that China’s strategic cruise missile programme has benefited from parts of the American UGM-109 Tomahawk acquired from Iraq, Afghanistan or Sudan. More recently, concerns that Pakistan gave China access to parts of a US stealth helicopter used in the operation that killed Osama bin Laden raised alarm bells.

On a related note, it was believed that China was able to decipher some of the sophisticated technologies and software onboard the EP-3 signals reconnaissance aircraft that was forced to land on Hainan Island during the 2001 Sino-American “spy plane” incident.

In the case of the RQ-170 currently in the hands of Iran, transfer of its technology may in theory help China’s indigenous aviation industry. For example, the MiG-23s acquired from Egypt in 1976 were extremely useful for China’s own combat aircraft development, influencing the the J-8II Finback and canceled J-9 and Q-6. Depending on the extent to which the airframe was damaged and the security and encryption of its software, the downed RQ-170 could in theory give something for Chinese engineers to smile about. Its flying wing concept, propulsion, sensors and stealth technologies could benefit both domestic unmanned and manned aircraft projects.

But the transfer of its data or technologies to China (if it were to happen) will not be the “end of the world” nor would it result in a seismic shift of power in Beijing’s favor. It does not mean that we will be seeing an army of made-in-China Sentinel knockoffs ruling the skies over Taiwan or Japan.

The truth is that even if the Iranians were gracious enough to ship the entire RQ-170 specimen to China, it would not offer a decisive breakthrough or transformation in China’s indigenous stealth and UAV projects. China has already demonstrated to the world its ability to develop advanced stealth fighters with the unveiling of the J-20 prototype. Similarly, China’s domestic UAV industry is approaching an advance stage and it is unlikely that their existing designs require an RQ-170 energy lift to make them operational.

Multiple Chinese UAVs are reaching prototype stage and are expected to enter service within the next decade. Tactical systems include the Pterosaur, CH-3 and Pterodactyl I UAVs. These are capable of being armed with light air to ground precision guided munitions and designed to function in a similar role as the American MQ-1 Predator. In terms of strategic systems, the BZK-005 high altitude reconnaissance UAV is already in service. The most recent designs to emerge are the Soaring Dragon and Sky Wing high altitude UAVs. These are expected to perform a similar function to the American RQ-4 Global Hawk in terms of long-range surveillance over the Western Pacific.

In summary, fears that the RQ-170 in the hands of Iranian authorities could be dissected or obtained by China are grossly exaggerated. Such a scenario should not be ruled out as China has historically depended on acquiring advanced foreign aviation technology to enable its indigenous aviation industry to make critical breakthroughs. Moreover, the PLA may exploit this opportunity to develop methods of intercepting and eliminating UAVs as eyes and ears of US forces in a prospective conflict in the Far East.

However, given the state China’s indigenous unmanned aircraft industry is in, Beijing does not need an RQ-170 specimen to build its own UAVs. It already has dozens of prototypes or advanced concepts to choose from. Indigenous UAVs and their use by the PLA could potentially be a game changer in a distant future conflict. But China’s study or acquisition of a copy of the RQ-170, if it were to happen, is unlikely to change the game anytime soon.

This article originally appeared on Asia Security Watch, December 8, 2011.