The Korean War, fought from 1950-53, was a result of two earlier wars in the 1940s: the American-Japanese War, which ended with the destruction and occupation of Japan in 1945, and the Chinese Civil War, which ended in a Communist victory (and Nationalist retreat to Taiwan) in 1950.
With the Communists and Americans as the only powers in East Asia following these wars, the Korean Peninsula was split in two, each side taking a piece for itself. Read more
Imagining the End Game: How North Korea May Collapse
There are few things that touch off more firestorms than speculation. Speculation is easy; any drunk hanging out in front of a local Dunkin Donuts can do it.
But that shouldn’t automatically invalidate all speculation. You can, for instance, look at the clouds in the evening and guess you’ll need an umbrella in the morning. That’s not the mad-cap rantings of a person ideologically committed to morning umbrellas but the rational thought process of someone who’d rather not get wet on the way to work.
You can apply such rationality to geopolitical speculation as well. It’s important not to get too specific — assigning timelines and trying to foretell specific events is invariably doomed to failure. Just as you might guess the next morning will have rain based on the clouds in the evening, you also probably know better than to go bandying about how rain will arrive at 7:13 AM. You know a general forecast; that’s good enough to make a rational decision.
But we have a great deal of difficulty doing this with countries
And that’s because we keep thinking countries are like the people we know.
We all make the mistake of thinking countries act like the people they’re consist of. After all, our leaders are sometimes dismayingly human: they lie, cheat, have affairs, and make all sorts of bad decisions that make us very upset. It’s their bad decisions that makes us think countries have complete command of their fate: When our Masters of the Universe financiers helped lead us to the financial collapse in 2008, it seemed like the crisis was caused by the bad decisions of Wall Street and the financial sector in general. They kept on double downing on risky transactions, which one day came home to roost.
Thus it seems that if we’d only had better leaders, we might have avoided the Great Recession.
But I’d say that’s missing the point, especially when thinking geopolitically.
When viewing the financial collapse as financiers leading us over a cliff, focus on the cliff. Because if there had been no cliff, there would have been no crisis.
And that’s why environment matters and how we can speculate about the fates of nation states responsibility
Think of good leaders as those who see such cliffs and take the right action to avoid them. Think of bad leaders as those who don’t or, worst of all, won’t. Neither of them control the cliff; it exists regardless of what they think or do. They have presented with a choice of how to solve the problem it presents and the divide between good leadership and bad leadership is driven by the results of said choice.
Geopolitical conditions are such physical limits. The American president may be the most powerful man on Earth but geography prevents him from being able to conquer the world. He must measure his power carefully, use it when it will be most effective, or he will be consigned to electoral defeat or the dustbin of history. He must, in other words, find creative solutions to the many, many cliffs that he encounters.
So when we think about the destinies of countries, we must think about their physical limits
Last week North Korea threatened to wage open war on South Korea, which makes just about every Korea watcher ever so tired. The North keeps talking the talking but failing to walk the walk and in each of these crises, one begs the question, how does this end?
To understand, we must think of North Korea’s limits and how they will define North Korea’s eventual demise.
First off, why must North Korea die off? Well, because it’s a buffer state and buffer states only survive as long as someone sees reason to prop them up
North Korea was a base for the Soviet Union to conquer the whole of Korea which would have been a fine base to threaten American-occupied Japan. But when overt conquest failed, the USSR and China decided to turn North Korea into a well-armed and fortified buffer state separating American power from Chinese and Russian borders. (North Korea has a very small border with Russia which in Cold War days would have been a strategic goldmine).
When the Soviet Union collapsed, most of its buffer states went with it. But not North Korea; unlike the Warsaw Pact, China didn’t want Korea united under what might well have been a pro-American state. So instead of letting the End of History take its course, Beijing provided Pyongyang with life support. This didn’t allow North Korea to prosper as it did in its heyday in the 1960s and 70s but it did give the regime the ability to survive the famine of the 1990s.
So long as there is a rivalry between the United States and China, North Korea has value to the Chinese. But if the United States and China go from rivals to allies, or if China bungles it rises to superpower status and succumbs to the rules of dynastic cycles, North Korea will lose strategic value and collapse.
One of those scenarios must come true: a permanent rivalry between China and the United States is impossible. Such rivalries are expensive and dangerous and therefore often short; we’re not talking about another hundred years of North Korea. Either one side will collapse (and the smart money remains on China, though that’s a different article) or both sides will realize geopolitical competition doesn’t serve their interests.
The two historical models are the Cold War and the Anglo-American relationship; in the former, the Soviet Union and the United States competed until the Soviet Union exhausted itself and fell apart. In the latter, the United Kingdom and United States competed until it became clear they had more to gain from cooperation.
Regardless of the outcome — nice or nasty — like the two halves of Germany and Vietnam, it will collapse once its foreign sponsor no longer sees need for it.
But that’s not the only thing that could happen and here’s where things get ugly
Nobody should count out North Korea’s bad leaders from making disastrous decisions.
In neighborhood terms, this is like the old resident who absolutely refuses to evacuate before a hurricane and drowns predictably. Should Pyongyang’s leaders fail to read the tea leaves appropriately, they could well drown as well.
Some of those tea leaves are obvious. North Korea can’t wage a war with South Korea and its allies and win. North Korea’s army is still largely Soviet in make-up and we know that Soviet strategy hinged itself mostly on the Soviet Union being huge in both land and population to make up for its shortcomings. North Korea can’t hope to wear down its enemies through attrition; its small size means its a monthly conquest for the superpower.
Nor can North Korea lose Beijing’s favor. This is where things are getting wobbly: it’s not wholly clear the young Kim Jong-un understands just how key China is to his survival. He’s tested nukes against China’s wishes and the People’s Liberation Army has deployed troops to his border.
In 2009, WikiLeaks even reported that China was trying to convince the United States it was prepared to push a coup to remove the Kim dynasty should they get too erratic. That may have been to placate the Americans but it’s also a solid strategy for a genuine need.
Thus the analogy of a madman driving a rusty, old truck is apt
On a long enough timeline, the truck will break apart from abuse at the hands of such a madman. That is assuming, however, the madman doesn’t drive it over a cliff or into a tree first. This is a worrisome destiny for North Korea: Is the regime still dominated by rational people? Or are the purges carried out by the young Kim Jong-un rendering it an increasingly bizarre place full of extreme yes men? Is the emperor, in other words, still wearing clothes?
This is a deep and troubling unknown. We can only guess from the regime’s actions where its thinking still lays. Thus far, it’s been willing to ratchet up tensions in exchange for negotiations, even at the expense of relations with China. Such bluff can’t last forever. Invariably, a government in South Korea will tire of those kinds of antics and refuse to respond. That will be a critical moment for the regime: will they be willing to start a war they can’t control or will they suddenly implode under their own ineptness?
Within North Korea, there are doubtless forces that understand the country’s position and future. Some of them may be close to the regime, others may dream of replacing it. Should they try to remove the Kim government, they could spark a civil war or revolution that might easily go nuclear.
With the Kim regime growing increasingly willing to risk alienating China, it seems likely the collapse scenario is the most likely one. As China now experiences its own economic downturn, Beijing may not be able to afford the necessary subsidies for North Korea. That could force the Kim regime into a crisis: Should they make the right decisions, they’ll go the way of East Germany, peacefully reuniting with the South. Or they could go the way of Yugoslavia or Syria, with rebellions turning to civil war and genocide.
Peacefully or not, the Kim regime won’t be around much longer.
Visiting South Korea on Thursday, China’s president, Xi Jinping, appeared to distance himself from his country’s longtime communist ally North Korea, telling his South Korean counterpart, Park Geun-hye, that China took an “impartial” view to situation on the peninsula.
According to Chinese state media, Xi said, “All parties concerned should jointly and properly manage and control the situation, avoid causing tension, prevent the situation from losing control and creating no more stirs.”
He added that China believes “all sides should be treated in a balanced way,” suggesting a shift away from Chinese support for the North Korean regime which just a day before Xi’s visit launched two rockets off its east coast in a show of force.
Xi’s visit was in itself remarkable as no Chinese president previously visited South Korea before coming to Pyongyang. He had met Park four time earlier since the two presidents took office last year, underlining the growing commercial relationship between their countries.
Xi has yet to visit North Korea while its ruler, Kim Jong-un, has yet to visit Beijing.
Trade between China and South Korea totaled $275 billion last year, forty times China’s trade with North Korea which relies on China for 80 percent of its fuel and half its food. China is now South Korea’s biggest trading partner while South Korea is China’s third largest.
China appears to have taken a more dispassionate view toward its internationally isolated neighbor since Xi succeeded Hu Jintao as general secretary of the ruling Communist Party in November 2012 and as president in March 2013. In February that year, China said it was “strongly dissatisfied” by a North Korean nuclear test. Three months later, China’s biggest state bank closed the account of North Korea’s main foreign exchange bank.
North Korea is believed to possess several nuclear devices but lacks a reliable intercontinental missile capability to deliver them. Missile tests have repeatedly failed.
China effectively props up the North Korean dictatorship — whose population lives on the brink of starvation after years of gross economic mismanagement — because it provides a buffer against South Korea and the nearly 30,000 American troops that are permanently stationed there. However, its erratic and oftentimes provocative behavior appears to have baffled China more than usual since Kim Jong-un took over as the country’s leader after his father, Kim Jong-il, died in late 2011. Increasingly, it does more to raise tension on the Korean Peninsula than it keeps China secure.
In its propaganda, North Korea has justified its recent actions, which have included missile tests and threats to strike American army basis in the Pacific, as a response to the United States’ strategic “pivot” to East Asia.
China also regards the burgeoning American presence in the region warily, fearing that the aim is to encircle it and contain its rise.
But North Korea’s threats only give the Americans more reason to strengthen their alliances with Japan and South Korea and deploy forces to the area, moves that China’s leaders — many of whom do not share their predecessors’ emotional attachment to an alliance that was forged in a war against the United States over half a century ago — might rightly interpret as detrimental to their own interests.
All the same, China is unlikely to undermine North Korea. Regime change in Pyongyang could herald the reunification of the peninsula on South Korean terms which would raise Chinese fears of encirclement.
Top North Korean Party Official Reportedly Arrested
Just two months after North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un had his uncle Jang Sung-taek, a top official in the secretive communist regime, executed for treason, South Korean media report that Choe Ryong-hae, the ruling party’s military chief, has been arrested.
Choe is the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission that Kim leads and was believed to be one of this closest advisors. He is also one of the few members of the executive body of the Workers’ Party Politburo which previously included Jang. If Choe is removed, this presidium would only count Choe Yong-rim and Kim Yong-nam, both octogenarian figureheads, besides Kim Jong-un himself.
The news of Choe’s arrest was first reported on Friday by Free North Korea Radio, which is run by defectors in the South. One of its sources speculated that Choe had been arrested for failing to instill sufficient loyalty in the army ranks.
Kim has tightened his grip on power since taking over from his father, Kim Jong-il, in late 2011. In July 2012, he relieved the army chief of staff, Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, of his post. Observers of the North Korean regime believed Ri had originally been appointed by Kim Jong-il to shield his son from a potential challenge by the generals. Ri had also served as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Choe, a party apparatchik with no military experience, took over the role from Ri and was promoted to vice marshal, signaling that the balance of power in Pyongyang had shifted to the party.
Following Ri’s purge, South Korean media reported that as many as two hundred army officers might have been removed from office since Kim took power, supporting the thesis that the young despot was moving away from his father’s “military first” doctrine.
Choe’s arrest, if corroborated, would therefore come as something of a surprise, even if North Korean state media started referring to him as a “general” as early as December 2012, suggesting he had been demoted.
Late last month, South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo newspaper also reported that Choe was fading from public view, appearing by Kim’s side less and less which usually indicates that a North Korean official has fallen out of the ruler’s favor.
For Choe, it would not be the first time. In 1997, he was removed as head of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League — officially due to illness but reportedly because he had been found stripping assets.
South Korea’s Ministry of Unification said on Monday it could not confirm the rumor of Choe’s arrest.